

THE
BRITISH JOURNAL
OF
MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY

BEING THE MEDICAL SECTION OF THE
BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY

EDITED BY

T. W. MITCHELL

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

H. G. BAYNES

ERNEST JONES

WILLIAM BROWN

GEORGE RIDDOCH



Cambridge University Press

LONDON : Fetter Lane, E.C. 4

also


H. K. LEWIS & Co., LTD., 136, Gower Street, London, W.C. 1

CHICAGO : The University of Chicago Press
(Agent for the United States and Canada)

BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, MADRAS : Macmillan and Co., Limited

TOKYO : The Maruzen-Kabushiki-Kaisha

Price Ten Shillings net.



THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

DIRECTED BY SIGM. FREUD

EDITED BY ERNEST JONES

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

K. ABRAHAM
BERLIN

D. BRYAN
LONDON

J. C. FLÜGEL
LONDON

C. P. OBERNDORF
NEW YORK

G. BOSE
CALCUTTA

J. VAN EMDEN
THE HAGUE

H. W. FRINK
NEW YORK

A. A. BRILL
NEW YORK

S. FERENCZI
BUDAPEST

E. OBERHOLZER
ZURICH

O. RANK
VIENNA

ISSUED QUARTERLY

Subscription 30s. per Volume of Four Parts, Post Free,
the Parts not being sold separately

Bound Copies of Volumes I, II and III, 37s. Post Free.

VOLUME V, PART II, 1924

CONTENTS OF PART II

FREUD, SIGM.: The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido.

TAUSK, VICTOR: Compensation as a Means of Discounting the Motive of Repression.

REIK, THEODOR: Some Remarks on the Study of Resistances.

FLÜGEL, J. C.: Polyphallic Symbolism and the Castration Complex.

ABRAHAM, K.: Blunders with an Over-compensating Tendency.

MEYER, M. A.: A Compounded Slip of the Tongue.

EDER, M. D.: From Child Life.

ABSTRACTS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

BULLETIN OF THE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION.

Lists of Contents of Vols. I, II, III & IV will be sent on Application

THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL PRESS

57, Weymouth Street, London, W. 1

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF COLOUR VISION

By SIR JOHN HERBERT PARSONS,
C.B.E., D.Sc., F.R.C.S., F.R.S.

Ophthalmic Surgeon, University College Hospital;
Surgeon, Royal London (Moorfields)
Ophthalmic Hospital

SECOND EDITION

Royal 8vo. 25s. net. With a FRONTISPIECE and 94 TEXT-FIGURES

"The author is to be congratulated on producing a work that contains an immense amount of information with a good bibliography on the subject. He has given us an excellent general and unbiassed view of the facts and theories of colour vision."—*Nature*

"The vast literature of colour vision consists almost entirely of papers written in support of some particular theory. It is therefore with unusual pleasure that we welcome this excellent all-round résumé of the subject....We can only refer our readers to this storehouse of information. The bibliography provided is excellent...and throughout Mr Parsons treats his subject with a scientific feeling that is admirable."—*The Lancet*

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON: Fetter Lane, E.C. 4

The CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS



WAR NEUROSES. By JOHN T. MACCURDY, M.D., Assistant, the Psychiatric Institute of the New York State Hospitals. With a Preface by W. H. R. RIVERS, M.D. Demy 8vo. 10s 6d net. CAMBRIDGE MEDICAL SERIES

PROBLEMS IN DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY. A CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED FORMULATIONS. By the same author. Crown 8vo. 12s 6d net

INSTINCT & THE UNCONSCIOUS. By W. H. R. RIVERS, M.D., Sc.D., LL.D., F.R.S. *Second edition.* Demy 8vo. 15s net. CAMBRIDGE MEDICAL SERIES

BENIGN STUPORS. A STUDY OF A NEW MANIC-DEPRESSIVE REACTION TYPE. By A. HOCH, M.D. With a Preface by J. T. MACCURDY. Crown 8vo. 14s net

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INSANITY. By B. HART, M.D. Royal 16mo. 3s net. CAMBRIDGE MANUALS SERIES

Fetter Lane, London, E.C. 4

FUNCTIONAL NERVOUS DISORDERS

KENLAW HOUSE, Colinsburgh, FIFE

Accommodation for twenty-five patients of either sex. Climate dry and equable. Within easy reach of St Andrews and Elie. Two hundred acres of grounds, with extensive gardens, private golf course, bowling green, tennis lawns, etc.

Large workshop. Two billiard tables. Electric light and central heating.

For particulars apply to

The SENIOR Resident Physician, W. H. BRYCE, M.B., C.M., or to the SECRETARY

Telephone and Telegrams : UPPER LARGO, No. 8

The CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES. By JAMES WARD, Sc.D., F.B.A.
Second edition. Royal 8vo. 22s 6d net. CAMBRIDGE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIBRARY

INSTINCT IN MAN. By J. DREVER, M.A., B.Sc., D.PHIL. *Second edition.* Demy 8vo. 10s 6d net

THE GROUP MIND. By W. McDUGALL, F.R.S. *Second Impression.* Royal 8vo. 18s net. CAMBRIDGE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIBRARY

PSYCHOLOGY AND PRIMITIVE CULTURE. By F. C. BARTLETT, M.A. Crown 8vo. 8s 6d net

THE INVESTIGATION OF MIND IN ANIMALS. By E. M. SMITH. *Second edition.* With 10 illustrations. Crown 8vo. 6s net

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REACTION. By R. H. THOULESS, M.A., Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Manchester. Crown 8vo. 7s 6d net

THE ESSENTIALS OF MENTAL MEASUREMENT. By W. BROWN, M.A., M.D., D.Sc. and G. H. THOMSON, D.Sc., Ph.D. Royal 8vo. 21s net. CAMBRIDGE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIBRARY

KNOW YOUR OWN MIND. A LITTLE BOOK OF PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY. By W. GLOVER. Fcap 8vo. 3s net

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOUND. By H. J. WATT, M.A., Ph.D. Royal 8vo. 12s 6d net

Fetter Lane



London, E.C. 4

NOW READY

Proceedings of the VII. International Congress of Psychology

HELD AT OXFORD, JULY 26th to AUGUST 2nd, 1923

Edited by C. S. MYERS

THIS VOLUME, of about four hundred pages, contains papers by the following eminent psychologists:—K. Abraham (Germany), A. Adler (Austria), E. D. Adrian (England), S. Alrutz (Sweden), P. B. Ballard (England), F. C. Bartlett (England), H. Binns (England), E. G. Boring (U.S.A.), William Brown (England), C. Burt (England), E. Claparède (Switzerland), G. Dwelshauvers (Spain), J. Drever (Scotland), C. H. Griffitts (U.S.A.), H. Head (England), A. Ikin (England), P. Janet (France), E. Jones (England), M. W. Keatinge (England), W. Koehler (Germany), K. Koffka (Germany), J. M. Lahy (France), J. F. MacCurdy (England), E. Mira (Spain), W. Moede (Germany), C. S. Myers (England), T. H. Pear (England), H. Piéron (France), Morton Prince (U.S.A.), H. S. Raper (England), G. Révész (Holland), H. Sjöbring (Sweden), B. H. Streeter (England), M. Sturt (England), G. H. Thomson (England), R. H. Thouless (England), L. L. Thurstone (U.S.A.), G. van Wayenburg (Holland).

It includes many articles of general psychological interest, e.g. on "The Conception of Mental and Nervous Energy", "The Classification of the Instincts", "The Nature of General Intelligence and Ability", "The Principles of Vocational Guidance", "The Present Position of Vocational Testing in Germany", "An Experiment on Indirect Measures of Fatigue", "The Cardio-vascular Changes in Mental Work", "Psychic Asthenia and Atony", "The Psycho-galvanic Phenomenon in Dream Analysis", "Religion and Psycho-neurosis", "Symbolism in Folk Lore".

PRICE : 12s. 6d. net

**PUBLISHED BY THE
C A M B R I D G E
UNIVERSITY PRESS
FETTER LANE, E.C. 4
And obtainable through
ALL BOOKSELLERS**

NEUROSES.

BY J. C. McKERROW.

I.

THE view of Life peculiar to myself set forth in "The Appearance of Mind" and "Aberrations of Life" regards all manifestations of life as the interaction of living process and its conditions, the organism and its environment, and dispenses altogether with all "conscious faculties"; I do not use the notions of feeling, sensation, will, belief, knowledge, memory, etc., and if I use the terms, it is only for the sake of convenience. I cannot enter here into a discussion of the steps by which living-activity (emerging from non-living-activity) comes to be manifested as complex organisms, apparently endowed with "conscious faculties." The essential conception in the theory is that of a relation of equilibrium between the living-process and its conditions, analogous to that which exists between chemical action and its conditions, which, as it were, controls the living-process, in that the total situation is constantly tending towards such equilibrium, a change in the conditions being the occasion of a change in the activity. It is clear, since living-activity never ceases, unless, in individual manifestations, it ceases for ever, that this state of equilibrium is not one of rest, of physiological or bio-chemical inactivity. It may be defined as a state (of the whole situation, organism-environment) in which the living-process proceeds normally. The whole environment, external and internal (the bodily activities proceeding normally), is so *right* that nothing more is "desired." It is Nirvana. The intrusion of a "desire," an act of "attention," a "painful stimulus," constitute a disturbance of the equilibrium. This equilibrium I call "viable" equilibrium, and the operation of the tendency to viable equilibrium can be described in three "laws." (1) Action tends to be repeated in similar circumstances, (2) Unviable activity tends not to be repeated, (3) Activity tends to occur at its proper period. The First and Third of these laws state the same thing from different points of view, as may be illustrated in the case of "hunger." The tendency to eat may be regarded as occurring in certain (bodily) circumstances, or at a certain period. The Second Law covers all cases of "learning."

The "psychological" tendency is peculiar to animals. It is one which restores viable equilibrium, not by an internal rearrangement, but by the action of the organism as a whole. Its pre-condition is motility, and its first manifestation must have been movement away from unviable conditions.

The environment of an organism is compounded of many kinds of conditions, in respect of any of which disturbance of viable equilibrium may occur. Not only are there external, physical conditions to which and to changes in which the living-process must adapt itself, or stop, *e.g.* temperature, light, air-supply, etc., but also internal, physiological conditions, organic changes such as those which are the occasion of "hunger."

Infinitesimal changes of conditions do not occasion any "psychological" tendency. The amount of difference of intensity of a physical condition, say heat, must be of a certain degree before viable equilibrium is disturbed, *i.e.* before the organism reacts "psychologically." This amount is fairly constant for the species. If an organism reacts to this minimal stimulus, I shall say it has a normal standard of viable equilibrium (for that particular condition; a normal organism has normal standards for all kinds of conditions, all that the species reacts to).

Change of standard of viable equilibrium can be experimentally demonstrated. Let us suppose three organisms, *A*, *B*, *C*, of a species which reacts to light and whose light-ratio is 1:10, *i.e.* they react to a difference of illumination of 10 per cent.; and let us set them in a 20 candle-power environment. The addition or subtraction of two candles (or more) occasions a "psychological" reaction in all of them; in subjective terms, the difference is "perceived." The addition of one candle is not "perceived." Now let us transfer organisms *B* and *C* to environments of 15 and 25 candle-power respectively, and let them stay there a while. Again add or subtract two candles in all three environments. *A* reacts as before, *B* more strongly, *C* not at all. *B* and *C* have had their standards of viable equilibrium altered. This is the essence of the process of "acclimatization." In this case the alteration of standard is the effect of an enduring change of environment. In other cases the change is in the organism; it is born so. In either case we may say, using the word in its widest sense, there is "degeneracy." In subjective terms, *B* is hyper-, *C* is hypo-aesthetic.

In higher organisms other aspects of the total situation have to be taken into account. The external environment comes to have other than merely physical characters, the internal environment becomes more com-

plex and correspondingly more liable to derangement. Thus, what is called an emotional situation occasions a violent reaction, organic and voluntary, of a stereotyped pattern, according to the particular "emotion," the particular kind of situation. ("Action tends to be repeated in similar circumstances.") An "emotional" situation is not different from any other except in degree. It is a *massive* disturbance of viable equilibrium, not a particular *kind* of disturbance. A starving man reacts emotionally to food.

Here, then, is another standard to which ideally normal individuals would conform, round which, in fact, individuals vary. Normal men react emotionally in certain circumstances; others react emotionally where the normal do not. Their standard of viable equilibrium is altered in this respect. They are emotionally hyper- or hypo-*aesthetic*. And again, this character of the individual may be innate, or it may be the effect of environmental conditions, say patrolling the North Sea in war-time.

With the development of the gregarious habit, still another aspect of the organism-environment relation is manifested. Gregarious animals react in definite ways to the behaviour of their fellows. In subjective terms, they perceive the "meaning" of such behaviour, and act according to such meaning. This quality of gregarious animals is called Suggestibility, and all normal individuals of gregarious species are normally suggestible, while others are more so or less so. In man, with the development of speech and coincidentally, of the "Thinking-Subject," suggestibility and its variations from the normal become more important, indeed become overwhelmingly important. "Society made man," but it made him and makes him anew every generation through his suggestibility. Normal suggestibility is a function of the authority of the suggester and the "experience" of the suggestee. When these two are one, as in the thinking of an individual, and when the coefficient of suggestibility is abnormal, we have all the mechanism necessary to the occurrence of delusions.

II.

I am now in a position to put my theory of the neuroses, *i.e.* of the so-called true neuroses, in a sentence. They are the effects of deviation from the normal standards of viable equilibrium, degeneracies, aberrant manifestations of life-activity.

It is not to be expected that, in applying this conception to the various neuroses that have been more or less defined by medical men, I should be able to say that in this one such and such a standard is altered, in that

one such and such. An individual is not so readily dissected by abnormality into his constituent psychological elements. If one standard is widely deviated from the normal, it is *prima facie* likely that others are not normal.

On the other hand, the conception entirely bears out the insight of medical science in differentiating two main types of neurosis, hysteria and neurasthenia. For it is fairly well agreed that the essence of the former is over-emotionality, and of the latter over-fatigability, and these are deviations from the normal standard of viable equilibrium in different respects.

But the view here suggested goes further than merely to endorse a distinction made by clinicians. It suggests a reason *why* it was possible for such a true distinction to be made amid the welter of clinical symptoms, and in the absence of an inclusive theory of the nature of "neurosis." Why do hysteria and neurasthenia present fairly distinctive clinical pictures? Let the reader refer to what was said on the development, the "emergence," to use Prof. Lloyd Morgan's now fashionable term, of new aspects in the organism-environment relation. I said "The external environment comes to have other than merely physical characters, the internal environment becomes more complex and correspondingly more liable to derangement." It is this antithesis to which that of hysteria and neurasthenia adds point. It is in the organism's relation to external (emotional) situations that hysteria arises; while neurasthenia is abnormality in the individual's relation to its own inner environment, its body.

Hysteria, however, is not abnormality of the emotional standard only—at least, such a restriction of meaning would make the term valueless for medicine, and of very little value at all. It is preferable to retain the medical use, but to point out that in the picture labelled "hysteria" by medical men, the hyper-aesthesia to emotional situations is only the most outstanding deviation from normality.

Another hyper-aesthesia is so constant in hysteria that one school of medical science proposes that hysteria is excessive suggestibility, rather than excessive emotionality. It would seem that there is some very close connection between the emotional state and the suggestible state, that either an emotional person is therefore suggestible, or a suggestible person is therefore emotional. The latter proposition is really meaningless; the former commends itself at once as true—true of all kinds of emotions, of all kinds of suggestions. The very mechanism of suggestion involves an emotional situation as between suggester and suggestee (this is what

constitutes the just-mentioned meaninglessness), and the suggestibility of the latter increases (or decreases) the more emotional the situation becomes. (It increases if the suggestee is "sympathetic," decreases if he is "antipathetic.") The orator works on the emotions of his audience; the cooler they are, the harder they are to convince. The lover is easily convinced by the flimsiest arguments; he is a believer of the "Credo quia impossibile" type. I am not, therefore, called upon to explain the abnormal suggestibility of hysteria. It would be surprising if it were not so.

Thus in hysteria we are concerned with the relation of the individual to his external environment; that is where the trouble is. In neurasthenia the trouble is in the relation of the individual to his own inner environment, his body. His relation to his external environment is normal. He would like to be about his business, but he cannot; the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak. He tires almost as soon as he has begun. (N.B. I restrict the term "neurasthenia" to abnormality in voluntary neuromuscular functioning.)

Normal individuals tire after a certain amount of application to work, whether muscular or mental. Further application becomes unviable, unnatural, in the bodily circumstances. The appropriate psychological reaction to the situation of "having been long at work" is to stop. But whether this reaction shall occur or not depends upon the "interest" of the individual in the said work. We should run farther and faster for our lives than we do for a train. We are more interested in survival than in punctuality at the office. The spirit, not necessarily the spirit of material self-interest, can whip up the body.

The normal individual feels tired and stops, after a normal amount of work. There are certain individuals who do not know what fatigue is, —a state of affairs as dangerous as not knowing, like the Nelson of legend, what fear is. The neurasthenic is either abnormally susceptible (hyper-aesthetic) to the bodily changes produced by activity, or a little activity causes an abnormal degree of physiological change. He either exhibits a psychological reaction (stopping work) to a very slight physiological change (auto-intoxication) or a very pronounced physiological reaction to a small amount of work done, that is to say, the body is working badly, there is a loss of mechanical efficiency. (These are not logical alternatives; both are possible.)

On my hypothesis of an alteration in the standard of viable equilibrium of the neurasthenic as between the essential individual (= his psychological tendencies) and his body, both these factors are concerned. I postulate the former, and apart from the *prima facie* likelihood that the

second would occur independently of the first out of the same conditions as give rise to the first, it is bound to occur in any case, secondarily to the first. For the first involves inactivity, and nothing is so detrimental to machinery, animate or inanimate, as disuse. A vicious circle thus arises between the two factors; the engine more and more losing its mechanical efficiency, and developing less and less power.

The anxiety-neurosis and the compulsion or obsessional neurosis are usually considered to be symptomatic of neurasthenia. It is true they are often associated, but that is simply because they are all effects of "degeneracy." They are obviously not symptoms of neurasthenia, as I have defined it. I might say, they are symptoms of "neurasthenia," only when the term is used in a portmanteau sense, as equivalent to "degeneracy."

The anxiety-neurosis is part of the price paid for reflective self-consciousness. Men look before and after and pine for what is not; we all hope and fear; the anxious-neurotic simply hopes and fears too much, more than the average. He is emotionally hyper-aesthetic, like the hysteric, but in the world of four dimensions.

III.

Obsessions cannot be dismissed so easily. Let me remind the reader first that "mental" normality consists in appropriateness of reaction, organic and voluntary, to all the various circumstances of life as they arise. "Action tends to be repeated in similar circumstances" is the sanction of our organic and voluntary reactions when we meet a lion at large. If then similar reactions, more or less modified, arise in certain individuals when they meet a cat, it is no great matter for surprise. The circumstances are fairly similar. The case is exactly analogous to that of personal idiosyncrasy; it is a psychological idiosyncrasy, a "local" hysteria.

On the other hand, this is not the only possible aetiology of a cat-phobia. For just as we exhibit acquired as well as instinctive idiosyncrasies, so may we exhibit acquired as well as instinctive psychological idiosyncrasies. Many phobias have actually been traced to events experienced by the individual and "forgotten." The organism, as physiological, "remembers" better than the organism, as psychological, the individual "self."

This dissociation of the two "organisms," or tendencies, the physiological and the psychological, is well illustrated by cases of the shell-shock type. The physiological organism keeps on reacting in the appropriate

manner to the circumstances of the original shock long after the circumstances have ceased. The reactions have become habitual. The "memory" of the original shock, on the other hand, has been lost, and this seems to be a condition of the continuance of the physiological reactions, for if, by psycho-analysis, suggestion or other means, the memory is revived, the patient recovers, more or less, from his physiological bad habit. This is not surprising, being analogous to what occurs normally. We cannot control our organic (emotional) tendencies, but normally we are aware of their occasion, and when the unviable occasioning conditions cease (when the *viva* is over), we gradually subside, return to our normal viable equilibrium. The shell-shocked man, being unaware of the occasion of his physiological reactions, does not subside in this natural way; but let his memory of the shock be revived, and it is as natural for him to subside as it is for us when we wake out of a terrible nightmare. The loss of "memory" in these cases seems to be a primary condition of the symptoms; I should not care to be dogmatic as to the conditions of the loss of memory. In cases of concussion they may be physiological; it seems beyond doubt that in some cases they are psychological ("repression").

Other obsessions arise out of the relation of the individual to his ideal world, *i.e.* the world of his ideas—another part of the price of reflective self-consciousness.

This brings us to the phenomenon of repression. I would here emphasize the fact that in my account of this indubitable phenomenon, for the discovery of which, or for emphasizing which, the world is indebted to Freud, I shall rely on laws which I had formulated from the observation of the lower functions and forms of life, long before I came to apply them to the higher, namely, to the human intellectual activities. I mention this because it would undoubtedly seem far-fetched, as an *ad hoc* explanation of the facts.

Repression, then, consists in the operation of my Second Law of Life in the field of the imagination, where it has no business to operate. No ideas ought to be unviable. Where we have repression we have an individual not at unity with himself.

The Second Law ("Unviable activity tends not to be repeated") modifies the operation of the First, in those organisms which have developed *general* instincts, who try all things, many of them, naturally, unviable. It is the chicken's sanction for not always pecking the nasty-tasting worm when it sees it.

But "ideas" are not so easily dropped as tendencies in regard to objects. It is true we forget most of our experience. Experience that

has had interest for us, however, we do not forget, if we are normal, however much we should like to. The unpleasant fact stands out in retrospect, or is brought to mind by present association: we cannot escape it, as we can escape from objects. *Ça y est; ça y reste. Coelum, non animum, mutant, qui trans mare currunt.*

So much for the normal individual. The abnormal has another way of dealing with past unpleasant experience, the fabled manner of the ostrich. If there is anything he is interested to "forget," he "forgets" it. He is really remembering to ignore it, like the wise chick. In his retrospects he develops a blind spot for this particular experience. (It is probable we all do it.) We call in the Second Law, which normally should have no jurisdiction in the world of ideal experience, to keep us unconscious of what is tending "towards consciousness" through the operation of the First Law, to inhibit a reaction which would otherwise occur. (The occurrence of an idea is a reaction.)

The most typical cases perhaps are those referring to sexual matters. These matters have a primary interest for all, while a prohibition attaches to them secondarily. The natural man is interested in sexual matters; the conventional man is interested to ignore what interests him as a natural man.

The simple repression is just a blind spot in an individual's ideal world, a negative hallucination. But there is another way than the ostrich's of dealing with unviable ideas. We may either be blind to what we would not see, or we may look at something else. The disputant, whose opponent's meaning is ambiguous in form, if not in fact, is at liberty to choose the meaning which best suits himself,—"'tis a law in disputation."

Consider now the ease with which objects are "associated." Do we not often find it difficult to say how an idea "came into our head," and discover, after much searching and perhaps retraversing, in fact or in imagination, our recent sense-experience, that a certain part of that sense-experience had suggested to us, not the idea of the particular sense-object presented, but the idea of an associated object? We had looked at *A* and thought of *B*, and *A* had never been explicitly in consciousness at all. And this too when we had no interest in ignoring *A*—as far as we can see. Now let *A* be an idea in which the individual (1) is primarily interested (First Law), and which (2) he is interested to ignore, as an unpleasant idea (Second Law). The first condition determines the recurrence of the tendency *A*; the second inhibits *A* and thus allows the substitution of *B*. *B* becomes an obsessive idea. (Freudians will

note that this is "pure Freud," with the substitution of my First Law for libido and my Second for the censorship.)

An obsessive idea is a phenomenon quite analogous to the case of shell-shock. We can convert each into terms of the other, and say either that the abnormal bodily reactions of the shell-shock patient are physiological "obsessions," or that the obsessive idea is as physiological a reaction as those of shell-shock, only it is a reaction of the higher functions of the organism. The obsessive idea is at the same time a testimony to the superficial plausibility of the automaton theory of mind of the pure materialists, and its obvious condemnation. Physiology in its highest manifestations is still physiology. Normal thinking is not of the type of the recurrence of obsessive ideas.

Hence it is that the cure for both states is the same, the discovery to the patient of the occasion of his reactions. The individual thus becomes at unity with himself; there is a cessation of the aberrant physiological reactions determined by the improper operation of the Second Law.

The same aetiology would apply to certain hallucinations, organic sensations and motor tics. They are obsessions, tendencies not apparently appropriate to the situation. The repetitive nature of obsessions corresponds to the repetitive nature of normal tendencies, of the "normal obsessions," for instance, in regard to food and sex, in a word to the repetitive nature of life. We need hardly point out the *omnium gatherum* nature of the term "obsession."

IV.

So far I have dealt with what may be called psychological neuroses, *i.e.* with changes of standard of viable equilibrium as between psychological reaction and its conditions. I have not dealt, except to glance at it in connection with neurasthenia, with the relation of physiological reaction and its conditions. Is there such a thing as a physiological neurosis?

Whatever we may call it, there is certainly in physiological activity a type of abnormality exactly analogous to that which, in psychological activity, is called a neurosis. What is pure idiosyncrasy but a "functional" disorder of the organism as physiological activity? (We say "pure" because idiosyncrasies may be of psychological origin.) Most people can eat shell-fish or eggs without untoward consequences, but some people cannot. Their bodies react to these articles of diet in an abnormal way, find them unviable. Such reactions are physiological neuroses, alterations of the normal standard of viable equilibrium as between physiological activity and its conditions.

The relation between physiological activity and its conditions is not so complex, so various, as that between psychological activity and its conditions, but it is perhaps more baffling. For in the latter case we may consider first the relation of the psychological activity to its external conditions, and thus give a specious simplicity to the relation, which we complicate later by considering the internal conditions, the body. We can as it were distinguish a Soul to be the informing principle of the life-activity, a Conscious Subject which reacts to its environmental conditions, and which can be called hyper- or hypo-aesthetic. In the former case we cannot. We have a bio-chemical activity in which it is as hard to suppose a Soul as in a chemical reaction. It seems impossible (except for a monadologist) to separate, even in thought, physiological activity and its conditions.

But the appearance of a Soul or Mind or Conscious Subject is simply due to the operation of the tendency to viable equilibrium, the real informing principle of life-activity. And this tendency operates no less in physiological than in psychological activity. When it operates aberrantly, we have the physiological neuroses, which are not intelligible, any more than the psychological, as long as we keep within the circle of material conditions, in our attempts to understand them.

If a physiological process proceed abnormally because of some demonstrable abnormality in its conditions, this constitutes an *organic* derangement, about which no one has any difficulty whatever. But it is also possible for physiological process to proceed abnormally when all the conditions before and after birth are normal (not *appear* to be normal, but *are* normal, a thing we can suppose for the argument's sake) except the internal physiological conditions of the fertilized ovum itself. The individual manifestation of life is degenerate. This is one condition of the occurrence of functional physiological derangement, of physiological neurosis. The organism's physiological standard of viable equilibrium is altered from the normal. Development in such cases proceeds aberrantly, resulting in all the anatomical malformations and disproportions called stigmata of degeneracy. Such mal-development is physiological neurosis. To refer the abnormalities to one another, as when cretinism is referred to thyroid insufficiency, or neurasthenia to loss of muscular tone, shows the medical man as poor a natural philosopher as the people who proposed to live by taking in each other's washing showed themselves poor economists. All the abnormalities present are the effect of the degenerate condition. Families, human and other, can die out; a race can be sick; and the neuroses, physiological and psychological, are symptoms of this racial sickness.

This is by way of apology for my inability to exhibit the physiological neuroses as deviations from various particular standards of viable equilibrium, as I could do with the psychological neuroses. The physiological neuroses are simply departures from the type. For any fertilized ovum the attainment of physiological viable equilibrium is the attainment of the normal maturity of its type; it is a repetition of its parents. And for the mature organism, physiological viable equilibrium is normal working.

It may be said that I myself have not got outside the circle of material conditions, since I refer the physiological neuroses to physiological abnormality in the germ-cell. The objection would show a misunderstanding of my position (and incidentally a poor opinion of my intelligence, but to this I am accustomed). I have no ambition to explain material phenomena as the effects of immaterial causes. I can meet the objection equally well on the ground of normal living processes, developmental or otherwise, for in these also the notion of viable equilibrium (or some such notion) is essential to our understanding of them. Given a fertilized ovum and a suitable environment, something else is still required, or why should one ovum become a fig-tree and another a thistle? A definite tendency towards a goal is required, a tendency, I say, towards viable equilibrium, determined by the past history of the life in question. (Action tends to be repeated in similar circumstances.) It is in recognizing this tendency, this "law" of life, that I get outside the circle of present material conditions. But the living-process is unthinkable without its material conditions, just as is physical activity. I have no wish to divorce life-activity in any of its manifestations from its material conditions. A "law of Nature" is the way things happen. Apart from the happenings, it is nothing.

So with the phenomenon of acclimatization, which is acquired "degeneracy" or change of standard of viable equilibrium. I have no wish at all to deny that, in the case of the organisms *A*, *B* and *C* aforementioned, a super-physiologist would be able to find physiological conditions in *B* and *C* different from those of *A* and from those of one another. What I deny is that such physiological abnormality is the *cause* of the degeneracy.

The same applies, of course, to the psychological neuroses. The super-physiologist would be able to detect the physiological conditions of hysteria.

v.

The manifestations of psychological tendency (= the "self") occur only in respect of physiological change, not in respect of the changes and situations of the external physical world. The individual is not in direct contact with the world. His body is interpolated. Of any given change we cannot know whether it is in the world or in ourselves. "The world is grey." "No; you are growing old." Hence the illusion of the *laudator temporis acti*.

This fact gives rise to ambiguity as to the "site" of the disturbance in certain functional disorders. For they may arise either in the relation, psychological reaction—physiological conditions, or in the relation, physiological reaction—conditions.

Take, for instance, hypochondriasis. In the former case it is properly described, in subjective terms, as "the arrest of attention on the bodily sensations" (H. Rayner). But it is also possible that the individual's bodily changes are actually of such abnormal intensity that, occurring in any of us, even the most normal (psychologically), they would compel our attention to them. The visceral neurasthenic has a *right* to be hypochondriac.

Take the individual whose physiological processes find eggs unviable. How many of these unfortunates have been bullied by well-meaning people who have regarded the affair as psychological, as a case for having "the nonsense knocked out of them"? And again, this may be the right diagnosis sometimes. (I say nothing as to the treatment.)

So with neurasthenia, as I pointed out in discussing it. The physiological machine may be working so badly that any of us would quickly tire of driving it. We are all neurasthenics by bedtime. Or the machine may be well enough, originally at least, but the driver too easily tired.

Organs and systems have their neuroses also, their hyper-aesthesia to such bodily changes as those occasioned by emotional conditions. When a wife can tell "how business is" by the history of her husband's heart or stomach, the physician labels these organs "neurotic."

In the relation of the individual to his *external* environment, no ambiguity as to the "locality" of the neurosis can arise. The observer simply notes the intensity of the physical change or of the emotional situation and judges whether or not it is sufficient to occasion a reaction in a normal person. And his measure is himself. The phlegmatic thinks a great many people hysterical.

VI.

Neuroses, whether physiological or psychological, and in the latter case, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, if I may so distinguish the hysteria-type from the neurasthenia-type, are not necessarily innate. The abnormality of the conditions which determines the abnormality of the individual manifestation of life may either have been in the past history of the race or it may occur in the history of the individual born, or, to be more accurate, conceived, normal.

The innate origin of neuroses I need not linger over. It presents no difficulty to thought. It would be stranger that the child of degenerate parents should be normal than that it is, in fact, abnormal, physiologically or psychologically.

The broad type of acquired degeneracy has already been exhibited in the case of our organisms *A*, *B* and *C*. I say the "broad" type, because in this particular instance, the "degeneracy" of *B* and *C* as compared with *A*, is degeneracy only in a logical sense. The adaptation of *B* and *C* to their altered conditions is effected perfectly, because the change of conditions is not actually unviable, prejudicial to life, but only unviable in the sense that any act of "attention," any "perception," is the effect of an "unviable" change, a disturbance of viable equilibrium.

Yet the example is a perfectly good illustration of acquired degeneracy. It exhibits a change of standard of viable equilibrium as a result of an enduring change of conditions. We have only to make the change a really unviable one in order to have a case of acquired degeneracy. When conditions are really unviable, though short of being fatal, it is clear that *perfect* adaptation is incompatible with normality of life. If we use the word "viability" for the perfectness of normality of living-process, we may say, and it is obviously a truism, that in really unviable conditions the viability of the organism is diminished. We cannot, for instance, adapt ourselves perfectly, without loss of viability, to half-rations. The horse whose owner tried to adapt it to living on nothing a day could adapt itself to the altered conditions only by dying, the last "adaptation" possible. Similarly, we cannot be subjected to long-continued or often recurrent emotional strain without loss of viability, without suffering a change in our standard of emotionality. In this connection it is important to notice that "emotions" may be divided into two kinds, those in which the disturbance of viable equilibrium is only relative, and those in which it is actual, the same distinction as that which we made in regard to "perception" and "pain." Thus the emotion

of a lover is not actually unviable; it is natural and appropriate in the circumstances, and the circumstances are not unviable actually. From our point of view there is only one really unviable "emotion," as pain is the one really unviable "feeling," namely, fear. These two are the subjective aspects of real unviability of conditions, the former of physical conditions, the latter of particular (dangerous) situations. When we speak of "emotional strain" it is of "fear" we are speaking. Among humanity, of course, fears are multiplied a hundred fold; though we no longer, for the most part, go in fear of our lives, we pay dearly for the immunity. Nietzsche has probably said that we are afraid to live.

For cases of physiological acquired degeneracy I need only refer the reader to the text-books of pathology, which is the study of physiological reactions to abnormal conditions. Here also within certain limits physiological adaptation implies no loss of viability. The organism of the manual worker differs obviously from that of the mental worker, yet both may be healthy, viable organisms. But if an organism is subjected to a really unviable condition, say, for instance, alcoholic toxæmia, its viability is to some extent diminished, however healthy it may appear to be, as mortality statistics show.

VII.

.Am I bound to try to apply my theory of the neuroses to particular clinical signs and symptoms?

In respect to hysteria, I submit, I am not. For the same reason that science (psychology) declines to discuss the alleged phenomena of "psychical research"; it is not worth while, as long as the objectivity of the phenomena remains in doubt. A hysterical fit is perhaps more than an "alleged phenomenon," but it is not a purely objective phenomenon. There is a "person" in the case, by general admission an abnormal person, and "persons" are not objective. Usually a woman, too.

As to neurasthenia, there does seem to be more justification for the demand—I feel the demand—to come down to cases. Here the "person" is not so clearly abnormal as in hysteria. It seems that we are dealing with physiological abnormalities of the organism, which, however recon-dite, are capable of discussion, if not, in time, of discovery.

Certainly, but when these abnormal physiological conditions shall have been described with the utmost exactitude, we shall still be as far as ever from the *cause* of neurasthenia. We shall then still be discussing the physiological *effects* of neurasthenia, in no better case in fact than when we were discussing its very grossest, most palpable effects. And

the demand to come down to cases is a demand to show how my theory is causally related to particular clinically-observed phenomena.

An experimental pathologist introduces abnormality into the conditions of a living-process, and observes what happens. From his, quite legitimately, restricted point of view the abnormal condition is the cause of what happens. This is the very type of the aetiology that satisfies medical men in regard to what are called organic derangements. But in functional derangements the method is simply not applicable. The abnormal condition in the above case is simply the *occasion* of the happening; we are entitled to ask why it happens thus and not in some other way. Upon which the pathologist tells us not to be silly; all his concern is to observe *what happens*.

This is precisely my case in regard to functional derangements. They happen, in the abnormal conditions of the particular individual manifestation of life. They are the effect of this and of nothing less—an aetiology too large to be satisfactory to the pure scientist—in this instance, as pathologist or physician.

But if our aetiology is unsatisfactorily large, so is his clinical picture. I say, roughly, that “neurosis” is “anything going *naturally* wrong.” Anyone who feels this to be unsatisfactory and goes to a text-book of medicine for something more definite will find that anything going wrong without an “organic cause” is “neurosis.” This is a perfectly fair epitome of the picture given in medical text-books. We find cerebral, spinal, cardio-vascular, visceral and uro-genital forms of neurasthenia, and the only interest such a very inclusive description—as a description of “neurasthenia”—leaves us is the question why there is no respiratory neurasthenia. Probably because the simplicity of structure of the respiratory system, reminiscent as it is of the Irishman’s description of a net as “holes tied together with string,” leaves little scope for functional derangement, while its one very definite functional disorder, asthma, has long had a name and a place of its own in text-books of medicine.

The loss of muscular tone in both voluntary and involuntary muscle, to which the name “neurasthenia” more especially applies, is the bad working of those organs—the bad working natural in the circumstances. Normal tone is not a material, physiological condition. It is a function. It is the way a normal muscle works, or let us say, to avoid ambiguity, the way a normal muscle exists—lives and has its being.

I do not suggest that the most naïve pathologist is content to regard neurasthenia as the effect of loss of tone. I do suspect him of hoping to find the *cause* of the loss of tone by a more and more minute investigation

of its material conditions. My case is that however useful such more minute knowledge of material conditions may be, for instance, with a view to curative measures, it is logically impossible to arrive in this way at the *cause* of the neurosis. The pathologist I have supposed is still taking life for granted, never asking if it itself can be normal and abnormal, as though even in the most degenerate organism he ever saw, the life-principle could be doing no wrong, but in the nature of things must itself be perfect and the degeneracy the effect of abnormal material conditions, as though "form" were necessarily perfect, however imperfect its "matter." But the principle of life is merely "the way that living-process works," and the process proceeds aberrantly, badly, in bad, *i.e.* actually unviable conditions. Nothing less, therefore, than a theory of life is adequate to explain the functional derangements of life, a theory according to which these will be manifestations of less perfect life, or as I say, of diminished "viability."

I would again emphasize, however, that no hard and fast line can be drawn between functional and organic derangement. This dualism, the medical analogue of that of mind and body, disappears in my theory along with the latter. In organic derangement the pathologist never demonstrates anything but the *occasion* of physiological abnormality. And for a super-pathologist, who should be able to demonstrate the abnormal physiology of a hysteric, the distinction of "functional" and "organic" would cease to exist. But as long as he remained *mere* pathologist, concerning himself only with the material, physiological conditions of life, he would fail to understand the true nature of a neurosis, however exactly he might be able to demonstrate its physiological conditions. In the same way a physiologist deeply misunderstands life, if he thinks he can explain it in terms of physiological conditions *alone*, as bio-chemistry. He requires more than physico-chemical activity to animate his clay; he must invoke other laws than those of physics and chemistry to explain his animation, normal or abnormal.

VIII.

Summary. Life is a continuing physico-chemical activity whose manifestations cannot be described in terms of physics and chemistry only. The equilibrium towards which it tends, the adaptation to change of conditions which it exhibits, is not merely that of physical or chemical activity. It tends towards viable equilibrium, and this equilibrium must clearly vary in individuals according to the conditions in which their lot is cast.

Normal individuals are such as are of normal stock and have lived under normal external conditions, intra-uterine and extra-uterine, physical, emotional and social. They react normally, physiologically and psychologically, to physical changes, emotional situations, suggestions and bodily changes. Their standard of viable equilibrium, in respect to all possible relevant conditions, is the normal one for the species.

In neuroses the standard of viable equilibrium is altered from the normal.

PRIMARY IDENTIFICATION AND MYSTICISM¹

By ALFRED CARVER.

THE subject of this study, whom I will call *D*, was a well-educated single man aged 38, the only son of conventional middle-class parents. Ever since his university days he had been addicted to alcohol, taking this drug regularly rather to excess with occasional dipsomaniac orgies of about a week's duration. It was on account of the loss of various positions as a result of this failing that he was persuaded by friends to submit to psychoanalysis.

At the first interview *D* stated that he took alcohol deliberately to drown pessimistic thoughts and to overthrow something that prevented him from mixing happily with his fellows. The orgies were however followed by a profound sense of inferiority and self-loathing. He had also cultivated a mystical pantheism which enabled him at times to feel in harmony with nature, which he personified as "The Earth Angel."

The history which unfolded itself during analysis was as follows. As an infant *D* had been weak, sickly and backward and on this account was unduly coddled and fussed over. Though he had certain vague memories or rather feelings regarding this period his earliest definite recollection was the birth of a sister when he was nearly three. He regarded the new-comer with mixed interest and resentment, but she only survived a few days so that *D* was not troubled by her. His mother was ill for some while after the event and *D* one day entering the room suddenly surprised his father drawing off her milk with a breast-pump. This sight seems somehow to have disgusted *D* yet it stimulated his curiosity, for from that time he began to interest himself in secondary sex characters and differences in dress between men and women. He noticed disapprovingly the various artifices, pads, corsets, etc., of which his mother made lavish use to enhance her secondary sex characters. Once, about a year later, he was in his mother's bedroom when she was going to take a bath there. She enjoined upon him not to look. Naturally he made the most of the opportunity, but what he saw again only disgusted him. He got the impression of "a skinny uncomely form, flaccid breasts and red inflamed nipples." His mother's over-solicitousness for him, which as an infant had been acceptable became as he grew older hampering

¹ Read at a meeting of The Birmingham Medical Psychological Society 14th Feb. 1924.

and unwelcome. Instead of showing him encouragement she continued to treat him as a baby and to thwart his childish impulses on the pretext of his delicacy; but more than this she behaved as though everything he did was naughty. *D* early resented her interference with his excretory functions, particularly her practice of dragging him from bed to make him urinate. She tried to overcome his obstinacy by squirting water from a little syringe into the commode as a suggestion, but even so the child was not to be cajoled. Feeling himself persecuted by his mother's efforts to educate him *D* sought to escape from the sphere of her influence to the kitchen where the environment was more propitious. Hunted from this refuge, however, he was thrown back upon himself.

D was early the subject of night terrors, which according to his recollection took two main recurring forms. In one an old hag, or witch, seemed to be bending over him with intent to harm him. A variant of this theme was that a large spider hung over his cot ready to devour him. In the other nightmare the ceiling of his bedroom became crowded with black shadowy hands clutching and crawling as though to inflict some awful doom upon him. In addition to fear the latter nightmare was associated with a worked-up sensation; his whole body becoming stiff as though something queer were about to happen within him. *D*'s method of escape from these unwelcome disturbers of his peace was to snuggle up in the bed and completely to bury himself under the clothes. Once he ventured to speak of them, but was so discouraged by the reception he met with that he thereafter kept them to himself.

Already, at the age of 4 to 5, *D* gained a certain pleasure from putting a strap tightly round his waist when in bed. His mother discovered this and tried to break him of it, but he persisted in the habit until years later, his mother intuitively perceiving that he got some sort of auto-erotic pleasure from it warned him against masturbation, saying that such practices led to madness. As years went on *D*'s conscious dislike for his mother steadily increased. He sensed in her not only lack of understanding and hypocrisy, but actual enmity. It is not easy to be sure how far this estimate by *D* corresponded to anything actually present in his mother, but we must note that his parents had married late in life (over 40) and many things suggest that his mother did not wish to be burdened with children but to devote herself exclusively and platonically to her husband, who was already failing in health. Her gush over and excessive fondling of her baby may have been compensatory to a lack of real love for him. Perhaps also she later realised his auto-erotism and was by harsh behaviour attempting to put a stop to it. In any case

her early exaggerated solicitude and her later detachment from *D*'s real interests, while at the same time keeping a strict restraint upon him, were objective phenomena.

D hardly ever saw his father, who was absent all day and engaged in literary work upon his return home. Only six times in his life does *D* remember his father taking any notice of him. Once he promised to take him fishing when *D* was as high as the mantelpiece, but this promise was never fulfilled. Altogether *D*'s father ignored him and did nothing to develop his virility either directly or even by way of stimulating rebellion. The father thus stood for a dull if lofty intellectualism, which *D* vaguely admired but disdained as being too remote.

When *D* was 8 his father's health so far failed that a move from the suburbs to a country place became necessary. For *D* this meant leaving the dame school at which he held the record for absences and the gaining for the first time a certain amount of freedom from home restrictions as he was allowed to wander off and play in the country, a thing which previously had been prohibited. His attention now turned to natural history and in spite of his mother's objections he managed to spend a good deal of time by the river. Here he found companions of his own age but with very few of them did he become at all intimate. He delighted in everything connected with water, and became passionately fond of swimming, although this, the only form of sport he ever attempted, was forbidden by his mother as dangerous. He also made a little aquarium and studied with deep interest the habits and movements of fish and water-beetles; so things went better for a time.

At age 13 his father's health broke down completely and the family moved to an inland spa. *D* was "overwhelmed with desolation"; his outlets were again closed. He was sent to a local school where from the first he mistrusted and feared his school-fellows. His feeling of inferiority became more noticeable and his only method of defence was a refusal to enter into competition. During his first term he obtained a medical certificate excusing him from playing games and contrived to make it last out all his school days without getting it renewed. His mother's attention was now absorbed by the father and *D* was almost completely ignored by both parents. Only on Sundays did his mother interfere with him by driving him, against his will, to attend church. *D*, who had always considered his mother's religion as hypocritical, now came to regard it as a cloak for cruelty. The only means of escape from the hated school and domestic situation was solitary rambles in the country during which he began seriously to interest himself in entomology. He studied par-

ticularly bees and wasps, but had a morbid horror of spiders, which embodied for him "malignant cold cruelty."

At age 15 *D* became aware of vague sexual promptings. He revived his attention to secondary sex characters, particularly the breasts, sought out books likely to bear on coition and began to masturbate. The latter practice afforded most gratification when he put on a pair of corsets. A sense of guilt and shame, however, followed the performance, and his secretive asocial behaviour left him with the idea that he alone indulged in such practices. Throughout these years *D* was not only unsociable but definitely antisocial. He regarded the society of the place and its conventions with positive abhorrence and sought companionship with nature not with humanity. He happened, however, upon his wanderings, to make the acquaintance of a Bohemian artist and novelist from whom he acquired a good deal of sophistication. "This man was the first good sportsman he had ever met and the only one who talked to him frankly as an equal." *D* received both encouragement and knowledge from this man and stayed with him on several occasions.

At age 18 it was decided that *D* should go to university, and his mother tried hard to persuade him to take Holy Orders. This he resolutely declined, and congratulated himself the more over his refusal when he later surprised his mother into the admission that her main reason for so urging him was the idea that he was neither strong enough nor clever enough for other careers. On going up to university *D* made a determined effort to overcome his feeling of inferiority and isolation. He discovered that alcohol helped him greatly towards this and called it "the breaker of barriers." By its aid he became popular with a certain set and "managed to amuse his company."

When he felt inadequate in a situation he resorted to buffoonery as a means of ingratiating himself. For a time he almost enjoyed life, though he "regretted the habit of masturbation and longed to realise a woman"; but whether drunk or sober he proved impotent. In other ways both at sports and in his studies he was well up to the average and manifested no objective signs of inferiority. Before leaving university *D* made the acquaintance of a lady some 20 years older than himself in whom he found for the first time sympathy and helpfulness. She opened up to him new worlds of literature and art and comforted him in his moods of depression and self-hatred, which he called "fits of blue devils." The relationship between them became almost that of mother and son with platonic love on both sides. Without her, *D* was prone to doubts as to his virility, mistrust as to his capabilities and regrets over the past, but her presence and encouragement always sustained him.

Upon leaving university, where he had obtained 2nd class honours in history, *D* became a schoolmaster. For a time he derived pleasure from venting his animosity against suburban conventions and humorously parading his eccentricities. Soon, however, he contracted a liaison with a demi-vierge in a neighbouring resort, which for a year or so ran a tempestuous course and included most things except actual coition. The girl, however, desired a more virile mate and broke off the relationship leaving *D* more than ever distrustful and angry with his own virginity. He now turned to nature for solace, and "rejecting a dualistic conception of a creator external to the universe moulding it from without he groped towards a pantheistic or monistic philosophy." He wished to be closer to the Earth-angel, to feel with her, to achieve some sort of mystic union. And, "in rare moments he seemed, like Richard Jefferies, to sink into the earth, to feel some peculiar power passing into him and to be on the brink of some strange revelation." This he called "sensing"—a term also used by W. H. Hudson—since to attain the experience he had to relax until his senses became blurred and blended into one. Then through this single channel he obtained "direct throbbing communion with his mystical Earth-Angel." Alcohol helped him towards this Gnosis, but the presence of man upon a landscape seemed to defile it and prevent communion. In his own words, he "continued to use alcohol not only to gain the fellowship of man, but also to further kinship with nature. The actual taste of spirit did not attract him;—the dreams were better than the drink." He quoted, as applicable to himself, Hardy's description of inebriated peasants returning from a fair, "they followed the road with a sensation that they were soaring along in a supporting medium possessed of original and profound thoughts, themselves and surrounding nature harmoniously and joyously interpenetrating one another." This phase lasted some years, during which he remained a schoolmaster, but grew increasingly restless. Then by a stroke of luck he managed to secure an appointment as entomologist in the tropics. On the voyage out he indulged in a serious flirtation, but "certain scruples prevented him from obtaining complete satisfaction," although he judged that the woman would have yielded had his attack been pressed. In the tropics he plunged into work with vigour and success, enjoying his new-found freedom; yet his addiction to alcohol increased. Few women were available and these were so greatly in demand that he "lacked confidence to enter the lists and avoided them instead." Then the war broke out and when it became apparent that all hands were needed another conflict arose in *D*'s mind. He had no wish to join up and many excuses for not doing so, yet he

feared that he would be despised and unable to face people if he held back any longer. Under this added strain *D* increased his consumption of whiskey to a bottle a day and began to attract unfavourable notice. Eventually he insisted on war-leave and returned to England.

At first, as private and N.C.O., he was kept so busy and had so little money that he only indulged in occasional mild alcoholic orgies. As an officer with more money and leisure he became restless and apprehensive. "Self-distrust drove him to freakish escapades and heavy drinking." In the army of course his social environment was exclusively masculine and unusually intimate in character. He got out to France without coming into conflict with the authorities, but in France several times got into serious trouble on account of drunkenness and was only saved by the attribution of his "attacks" to malaria.

Upon demobilisation he was warned that his "old failing" had reached the ears of and greatly annoyed the higher authorities and that unless he had overcome it he had better not return to his job. He nevertheless went back, but found himself even more than before unable to settle down reasonably. His addiction rapidly became worse and he was soon compelled to resign.

D was now in the depths of despair and his feeling of inferiority and isolation made life seem not worth living. Many times indeed he contemplated suicide, to which he referred humorously as a "going back to the land." Through the influence of a friend he was offered another entomological post, but lost the opportunity by appearing for medical examination in an intoxicated state. Having in this way cut himself off from entomology he was driven to seek employment in his old line as a schoolmaster. In this capacity he managed to hold several positions for short periods, but through ill-timed orgies invariably lost them. During this swift débâcle he tried various methods of struggling against drink. He coquetted with catholicism, strove to regain his earlier mysticism and produced a pantheistic philosophy, but all in vain.

In giving this historical outline I have used as far as possible the patient's own words and phrases.

The outstanding features in *D*'s life-history, upon which I wish to concentrate attention to the exclusion of many other points of secondary interest, are his attitude towards his mother and his mysticism. The deeper interpretation of these two correlated phenomena is, in my opinion, illuminated by a thesis for which we are indebted to Burrow¹. This

¹ Trigant Burrow, "The Genesis and Meaning of Homosexuality," *Psychoanalytic Rev.* vol. IV, No. 3

author contends that the condition of harmony existing between mother and foetus while the latter is still *in utero* persists in but slightly modified form during the early period of infancy. The larval consciousness, which then obtains is undifferentiated, intensely subjective and tends towards a close consolidation and welding together of the infantile ego and the mother-imago. "This subjective continuity; this organic mental bond" Burrow calls the principle of primary identification. It is the same phase of existence which Ferenczi¹ has described as the stage of "magical hallucinatory omnipotence." The condition which may result from an undue prolongation of this resembles that met with in Melancholia, though differing in mechanism in that whereas the melancholic has withdrawn his libido from an object which it once invested and has then secondarily set up the object within the ego itself *D* never reached the stage of object-investment but continued fixed in the subjective mode of primary identification with the mother. We note that *D* was in consequence of his delicacy as a baby, and possibly other causes also, excessively coddled, while later circumstances combined to render adaptation to reality unusually hard. At the time when the primary mother-self identification should have been superseded by the development of object love and when in most children the Oedipus situation is in process of formation *D* was repelled by his mother's behaviour and instead of love, disgust and hatred towards her were called forth. The process of weaning in the larger sense of the word should be and usually is gradual; the infant being led to objectivation and adaptation slowly and kindly. With *D* the demand appears to have been made abruptly and ruthlessly, in consequence of which he refused it. He thus came to hate his mother as he found her at that time, but since his own ego was identified with her imago he by the same means came to distrust and despise himself. This must be conceived of as taking place at the transition period between the stage of primary identification and subjectivity and that of objectivation, *i.e.* just when *D* should have been developing an individuality of his own. Unfortunately he received no help from his father, either at this critical period or later, for his father held entirely aloof from the situation. Yet in later years his father's very aloofness and "sardonic intellectualism" did contribute towards the formation of *D*'s ego-ideal, giving rise to what *D* termed his "intellectual snobbery and highbrowism."

The most important consequence of *D*'s primary identification with the mother and his adoption of a feminine ego was that it motivated in him unconscious homosexual trends of the passive variety. Now the

¹ S. Ferenczi, *Contributions to Psychoanalysis*. Trans. by Ernest Jones.

Freudian¹ explanation of homosexuality is well known and is undoubtedly correct, from the mechanistic standpoint, in a large number of cases, but Burrow has argued that genetically unconscious homosexuality arises as a consequence of primary identification and the latter hypothesis seems more fully to interpret the facts met with in *D*'s case. According to Burrow the subjective unity with the mother causes the infant in his first attempts at objectivation to follow the lines of his mother's solicitude, namely himself. His own body thus becomes the focus of his interest—which is auto-erotism. "Now auto-erotism or the love of one's own body is the love of that sex to which one's body belongs and this in psychological interpretation is precisely homosexuality²." We note, further, that *D*'s homosexuality was of the feminine or passive variety, that is to say, he tended to adopt the receptive rôle in life and acted as female both in masturbation phantasies, in his behaviour with women and in feeling himself recipient of mysterious force when "sensing" nature. I would explain the passive type of his unconscious homosexuality as being due to the identification of his ego with the maternal ego. That is to say, his real ego, psychologically though not physiologically was feminine. Now the ego-ideal is particularly resistant to the implied inferiority of complete sexual inversion much more so than to aggressive homosexual cravings. Kempf³ in his studies of the social and sexual behaviour of infrahuman primates suggests that "probably the irrepressible sexual craving to assume the female rôle in the sex act causes so much distress because the individual's other wishes, namely to be 'manly,' 'strong,' biologically as potent as others are so seriously conflicted with and belied." *D* certainly felt inferiority and anxiety in the presence of other men, was quite unable to account for such inadequate feelings and sought to remove them by means of alcohol. He also constantly railed against the shams and pretences of suburban life although, or just because, he was held in bondage by them. His mother, as epitomising such things, always received the strongest mead of his contempt and hatred, for until analysed he had not perceived that she was the external counterpart of the tendencies he so much disliked in himself and that in abusing her he was indulging in projection. Consciously he vainly sought to establish virility towards women although despising them and fearing their domination. He was, however, unsuccessful in this because unconsciously he craved to adopt the feminine receptive

¹ S. Freud, *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*.

² Burrow, *op. cit.* p. 277.

³ E. J. Kempf, "The Social and Sexual Behaviour of Infrahuman Primates," *Psychoan. Rev.* vol. iv, No. 2.

rôle himself. Hence he never achieved more than mutual masturbation with women and this left him disappointed and angry. The libido being unable to obtain gratification with either men or women, *D* turned to nature with a vague feeling that there he could find harmony and experience something which was forbidden to him elsewhere. His earliest essay in this direction was at age 8 when he escaped to the river. His joy in swimming, so contrary to his attitude towards other sports, is noteworthy. In water he found himself (again) bathed in a delightful, stimulating supporting medium and experienced feelings analogous to those attributed by Hardy to the happy peasants returning from a fair. He also envied fish, which are not expelled by a cruel fate from their native element; and watched with passionate interest their movements in this congenial enveloping medium. In this connexion I may remark that skin (tactile) and muscle erotism were highly developed in *D*. Theoretical considerations lead me to infer that these two systems constitute the primary prenatal erotogenic zones. Tickling, which sometimes reached an unendurable pitch—equated with the worked-up sensation of his childish nightmares—occasionally accompanied veiled erotic dreams during analysis. Again, the strap and corsets had as one motivation the cutaneous sensation which they induced. Next the complexities of insect life attracted *D* in place of the more usual boyish preoccupations. He selected the hymenoptera as the favourite objects of study, but had an uncanny aversion to spiders. It may be recalled that in his early night-terrors a spider often replaced the threatening old hag. Spiders also figured in some of his dreams during analysis. On two occasions a crab and on one occasion a vampire was substituted for a spider. *D*'s association to bees was "what is sweeter than honey and what is stronger than a lion." He considered the sweetness of honey as cloying and by surfeit leading to disgust. Honey (coddling) originally had cloyed him. The bee, which gave honey proved on closer acquaintance to conceal a sting. Sting immediately gave the association penis, which corresponds to the assumed virile or lion-like aspect of the bee. Yet the worker-bee, though possessed of a sting, is not troubled by sex. "It is a castrated female; of neuter gender." It appears also to be, in a marked degree in harmony with nature—with the "mother hive" in which it lives. Just as fish remain always in their native supporting medium so do bees continue through life with their queen in the matrix of the hive. *D* himself reacted resentfully to his expulsion and to enforced objectivation in a hostile world, where in place of a diffuse caressing stimulation pleasure and power seemed to be centred in the penis and each was forbidden.

The sting—penis—power—of others was too overbearing for him; he could not use his own, but was compelled to submit to the domination of others. Originally the domination had been exercised by his mother, to whom, prior to any sophistication, *D* had attributed a penis, which he equated with nipple. In earliest postnatal days his appetite had been sated with food (honey) from the nipple, but later this was denied to him and he came to regard the red inflamed nipples of his mother with aversion. They were sour grapes, unconsciously desired, consciously hated. Gladly would *D* have been of neuter gender (castrated) and have returned to his matrix as do bees to theirs. If only he could solve the riddle of the bee all might come right. The only magic he could attempt to this end was imitation of their muscle activity and environment. In the case of the bee this imitative magic took the form of vigorous rambles over the countryside, just as in the case of fish it had consisted of swimming and bathing. Bee and wasp thus stood as an over-determined symbol for the mother, self and mother-self-combination.

To spider *D* associated "the evil power of nature." "Spiders are the embodiment of malignancy. They have fixed, hard, calculating eyes and cruel claws. They wrap up their prey until it is like a child bound up in hampering clothes. The female spider is bigger and more powerful than the male and often eats him." Spider thus represents female sadistic qualities and stands for the cruel mother who separated herself from him and, dissolving the close subjective bond once uniting them, treated him objectively and harshly. The mother of his babyhood had cloyed him with fussiness, the mother of his childhood emasculated him. What he craved was the mother of the original mother-self combination not an objective mother at all. Space does not permit me to recount the numerous dreams in which *D* amplified the above theme. To get back to Nirvana; "to the estuary of a great river where things had been lost," and so on was a constantly recurring theme in his dreams.

During the period of puberty the solitary study of insects served not only as an excuse for fleeing the distasteful society of other boys and evading competition in games, but actually afforded him a compensatory feeling of superiority in that he felt himself possessed of certain deeper knowledge which the others lacked. The Bohemian novelist with whom *D* came in contact at this time gained his confidence by complimenting him upon his knowledge of natural history and by praising the endurance and keenness which he displayed upon his long rambles. This novelist was the only man, who had displayed an encouraging paternal type of interest in him. *D* had often felt that his father ought to have done

something for him and paid the same attention to him as to the mother. From the response *D* made to the kindly overtures of the novelist one may surmise that his life-history would have been very different had the father vouchsafed any interest in his son's upgrowing. We may notice that in *D*'s later theophany the importance or existence of a father is implicitly denied by the repudiation of a creator external to the universe. Thus did *D* avenge the slight inflicted upon him by his father's neglect.

Upon going up to university *D* did make a very strenuous effort at adjustment. He began by refusing the overt domination of his mother in declining to take Holy Orders and he strove desperately to gain an equal footing with men. His unconscious homosexuality, however, prevented him from entering into friendly relations with them unless he overthrew the barrier by means of alcohol. There remained only one other method of establishing himself and that was by intellectualism. It was in accord with his ego-ideal and followed his father's one strong trait. Compensation for his inferior virility was thus to be gained by a hypertrophy of the head or intellect, which is a special instance of what Freud has termed displacement from below upwards. This had been foreshadowed by the superiority he felt at school in the possession of knowledge not shared by his fellows. To this way he turned again, now with the help and encouragement of an intellectual woman, who, being childless, adopted him as son. With her help thrown on to the side of his ego-ideal the balance was partially redressed and he succeeded in keeping the "blue devils" in control by humorously parading his eccentricities and rebellion against what he termed "suburbia." Had he been able to transfer his original identification to this new mother and then work through it to a secondary objective relationship his ego and ego-ideal would have ceased so violently to conflict, but the primary fixation proved too strong. When removed from the immediate influence of this lady, *D* fell back into an auto-erotic liaison with a woman, which ended in mutual dissatisfaction and brought about a return of the repression. The renewed anxiety drove him back to nature with a quasi-religious fervour far more intense than he had previously exhibited. He now conceived of nature as a mysterious all-pervading force, personified as the Earth-Angel, and strove to attain ecstatic throbbing oneness with her. We may here recall *D*'s early nightmare in which he pictured hands stretching out towards him and had that strange worked-up sensation as if something queer were about to happen within him. During analysis he associated this with the curious expectation of a strange revelation upon the brink of which he hovered in moments of "sensing nature." The

tense throbbing sensation, the sinking into the earth and the drinking in of mystic power evidently betoken an erotic stimulation, which was unable to reach to the pitch of orgasm. More deeply considered this throbbing oneness, experienced when his consciousness merged in the universal, represents an extreme regression to prenatal "organic memories" modified retrospectively by later developments. In early days the tense sensations, the outstretched hands and the threatening old hag filled him with dread. Possibly during sleep there was actual forbidden manipulation of the genitalia, for about that time he already constricted his waist with a strap—the forerunner of corsets, which he later deliberately used to enhance the pleasure of masturbation. At the time of ecstatic union with the Earth-Angel sexuality suffered temporary complete repression, and in its sublimated form disguised erotic sensations were permitted pleasurable recognition. After the experience however *D* always felt irritable, exhausted and depressed. Schroeder¹, in reporting a case of mysticism in a woman, presents a study of hypothetical prenatal psychisms, which is in agreement with the already referred to thesis of Burrow; though he does not mention the latter. According to either of these authors we may view *D*'s strivings for mystical oneness with the universe as a regression to the undifferentiated subjective phase, which obtains *in utero* when there is complete organic harmony and union with the universe as then experienced, namely the mother. Here, however, one can hardly avoid the question as to how far a neurosis is to be regarded as sexual even when, as in *D*'s case, a disturbance in the sexual sphere is one of its most obvious contents. The sex instinct, or instincts, seem to be doubly motivated; one urge, and that primitively the most powerful, is entirely appetitive and egoistic, aiming as it does at sensuous satisfaction to the ego without any external reference. It is, if we may for a moment speak anthropomorphically, this sensuous satisfaction, for which the ego is already conditioned during the primary subjective phase, that nature later uses as a bait to lure the individual to the purposive function of sexual propagation. The second motivation, union with a suitable mate, is reactive and introduces potentially altruistic relationships. As a child begins to objectivate his attention is drawn most towards the people in his environment—usually his parents. He soon finds that his cravings can only be fulfilled by getting into rapport with them. Hence there is a tendency for him to modify his earlier purely egocentric auto-erotic attitude and to enter into reciprocal relations with others. Society

¹ Theodore Schroeder, "Prenatal Psychisms and Mystical Pantheism," *Internat. Jour. Psychoanal.* vol. III, part 4.

always frowns upon the continuance of auto-erotism and encourages the development of objectivation with its biologically useful potentialities. If by misadventure the psychic progress of an infant is arrested at the primary subjective stage, which is pre-sexual, subsequently attempted sexual relationships prove a source of conflict; but are we therefore wise in speaking of the resultant neurosis as sexual? The question is academically interesting, though perhaps of no great pragmatic importance.

The theses of Burrow and Schroeder while in no way negating the psychological mechanisms, which Freud has shown to be at work in symptom formation seem to me valuable in carrying the matter further back and giving us a genetic foundation, to which our interpretation may advantageously reach. Although interpretation carried to this level may appear fanciful *D* in his "sensing" did practically revert to the type of prenatal psychism postulated by Schroeder. Thus with a well-educated subject like *D* the analyst is almost in the ideal position of studying a foetus or infant, who yet is capable of assisting directly in the interpretation. Of course the law of recapitulation requires qualification when applied, as here, in the psychic no less than in the somatic sphere. The main, though unavoidable, difficulty arises from retrospective falsification. In a case like the present, however, the process of thought is equally of interest as the content of thought.

My purpose in relating *D*'s case was not to give another example of the well-known connexion between latent homosexuality and alcoholism, but an endeavour to trace the unconscious motivation of his mysticism. This, I contend, is most readily understandable as a regression to that stage of existence described by Burrow as the stage of primary subjective identification; but through retrospective falsification sexual factors play a conspicuous part in the developed neurosis. The cause of regression to the point of original fixation, indeed, appears to be the inability of the libido to gain satisfaction in any other way tolerable to the ego-ideal. *D*'s cultural development as also his upbringing precluded him from achieving a sublimation within the folds of any religious sect and pre-disposed him towards an idealistic philosophy of his own elaboration. Upon this he wrote a book, which though unpublished was of service during analysis. Even philosophy, however, did not provide a satisfactory sublimation of the cravings, hence the analysis of which I have attempted briefly to set forth the essential data with their interpretation.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IDEA OF DEATH IN THE NEUROTIC MIND¹

By E. H. CONNELL.

THIS paper is based on clinical observation of persons suffering from Psychoneuroses and Psychoses, and since the terminology in medical Psychology is somewhat chaotic at the present time, it will be useful to define certain terms and to indicate the sense in which they are used in the following pages.

The term Libido is avoided and the expression "instinct interest" is used, this being the affective and conative elements in instinct experience, which give meaning to that experience and influence the reactions. The notion advanced by C. Spearman in his book on *The Nature of Intelligence*, that conation can and does control the intensity of cognition, is adopted and extended. The view of J. Drever, that it is the affect in the instinct experience of an animal organism that gives primary meaning to that experience, and that a secondary meaning is added by cognitive elaboration, is adopted. The term "Regression" is freely used to express a common phenomenon in Psychopathology and refers to the passing back from a higher to a lower level of Mental function, that is to say, from complex, rational, noesis, to the less complex, non-rational and more affective function operating in children and primitive people; or, further back, to the simple reflex instinctive behaviour level. In psychopathological regression, cognition is weakened and there is abundance of phantasy. This may proceed to failure of cognition, absence of the time and space conceptions, and uncontrolled impulsive actions. The term "Narcissism" is used to mean that state of mental function exhibited by the young child, in which the affect is attached to the self, to the body, and to phantasies of the self, which occurs in development before the stage of transcendence of the self to the conception of the not-self. Narcissism is characterised by self-love rather than self-interest, pleasure-feeling rather than personal advantage. The only other terms used which may be unfamiliar or have other implications than those intended here are the Reality Principle and the Pleasure Principle. These are terms

¹ Read before the Scottish Branch of the British Psychological Society at Edinburgh on Feb. 2nd, 1924.

116 *Significance of the Idea of Death in the Neurotic Mind*

freely used by Freudian psychoanalysts; where used in this paper the Reality Principle refers to a mode of mental function which neglects, postpones or suppresses affective ends and directs itself to purposive ends or objects; the Pleasure Principle, on the other hand, is the more primitive mode of function which neglects purposive ends in favour of pleasurable affect.

Let us now consider the Significance of the idea of Death in the Neurotic mind. It is striking to notice the absence of this idea in the minds of those physically ill, and the frequent presence of it in the minds of neurotics. The writer assisted in the bacteriological and microscopical examination of 2600 dysentery stools of soldiers in the 3rd British General Hospital on the Shat al Arab in 1915, 1916 and 1917, and personally visited and talked with nearly all of these patients: it was part of his duty to get answers to a questionnaire, the main objects of which were to ascertain the source of infection, to detect the carriers, and to prevent the spread of dysentery, so that the talk was more than a cursory question, but in no case did a patient mention death or show any conscious preoccupation with it, although many were extremely ill and some died in the hospital. Amongst those 2600 patients there were some neurotics, but it appeared as though physiological preoccupation in resisting organic disease diverted attention from the idea of Death.

In melancholia there is an impulse to self-inflicted death, so that melancholics have to be sequestered and guarded for their own protection. It has been frequently noted that the mental state of the melancholic is greatly improved by the occurrence of physical disease. When suffering from bacterial invasion, or severe injury, the melancholic who has been monotonously and with agitation accusing himself of being a sinful, unworthy man, ceases to do so and may soon recover completely; it is as though the occupation of energy in physiological resistance to disease relieved a psychic tension. The death idea in melancholia seems to be associated with self-hatred or loathing, and we have now to enquire whether this is a real hatred or an affective tension 'rationalised' by the melancholic as personal unworthiness.

Freud explains the impulse to death in Melancholia in these words: "As with Paranoia, so also with Melancholia (under which, by the way, very different clinical types are classified) it has been possible to obtain a glimpse into the inner structure of the disorder. We have perceived that the self-reproaches with which these sufferers torment themselves so mercilessly actually relate to another person, to the sexual object they have lost or whom they have ceased to value on account of some fault.

From this we concluded that the melancholic has indeed withdrawn his Libido from the object, but that by a process, which we must call 'narcissistic identification' he has set up the object within the Ego itself, projected it on to the Ego....The Ego itself is then treated as if it were the abandoned object; it suffers all the revengeful and aggressive treatment which is designed for the object. The suicidal impulses of melancholics also become more intelligible on the supposition that the bitterness felt by the diseased mind concerns the Ego itself at the same time as, and equally with, the loved and hated object. In Melancholia, as in the other narcissistic disorders...ambivalence comes markedly to the fore; by this we mean a directing of antithetical feelings (affectionate and hostile) towards the same person¹." Freud then would explain the death impulse in Melancholia as the result of three processes.

1. Abandonment of the sexual object.
2. Regression of the mind to narcissism.
3. Projection of hatred from the abandoned object on to the self, resulting from identification of the self with the object.

The Freudian interpretation of the death impulse in melancholia is attractive as a simplification by analogy with paranoid mechanisms, but the fact that melancholics recover is against the supposition that projection of hatred on to the Ego occurs; and an even more weighty psychological reason for the rejection of the Freudian interpretation is that such projection *does not* achieve psychic ease or comfort for the melancholic. He is agitated, restless, self-accusatory or stuporose, and continues to experience impulses of self-destruction. It may make this point, as to whether projection occurs in melancholia, clearer if the series of psychic events in paranoia and melancholia are compared.

In paranoia a mental conflict has occurred between the self-regarding sentiment and an impulsive desire to do something inconsistent with that sentiment. This conflict is solved by repression of the desire, and the impulse and its affect are then attributed to another person; the paranoiac thus achieves freedom from self-blame and self-accusation, but at the expense of a delusion. But impulse and affect remain unsatisfied and they activate the delusional system; the paranoiac is rational apart from his delusion, but his self-regarding sentiment is eventually influenced by the delusion; he may injure, kill or flee from the person to whom he has projected his desire with its affect, but whatever he does the person "persecutes" him by unseen agency and countless imaginary devices. The impulse and affect are unsatisfied in reality and

¹ S. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (Eng. trans.), pp. 356-357.

118 *Significance of the Idea of Death in the Neurotic Mind*

when regression occurs within the delusion the paranoiac is inflated, as it were, by the withheld affect and the self-regarding sentiment is enhanced so that the delusion is now one of self-sufficient grandeur, power and importance. It must be noted that from first to last there is no impulse to self-destruction, and this is comprehensible from the nature of Projection.

Now the melancholic in some cases has experienced a real loss of money, position or love, but more often the situation is that there are infantile characteristics in his mental functioning and there is a disillusionment in his experience of life; he ceases to attend to reality and complains that everything seems flat, dull and "wanting in life," and he occupies himself with the "might have been." What is called by psychiatrists "depression," which is acute unpleasure, is the predominant affect; his attention is apparently devoted entirely to painful ideas; the continuation of this state of unpleasure feeling is accompanied by dreams usually of a fearful or accusatory character; the withheld affect unable to achieve real expression and unable to find occupation in phantasy by regression, is felt as a great and pressing emotion unpleasant in tone which now breaks into the self-regarding sentiment and the melancholic monotonously accuses himself of having sinned beyond redemption, and he blindly and desperately or sometimes cunningly seeks death; suddenly all is changed, he recovers completely, depression lifts, interest in the objects of perception is normal and as it was before the first insidious onset. He can tell of his experience only in terms of feeling, that it was all dreamlike, like the horror of nightmare, and that although he knew who he was and where he was and why he was under care, he felt cut off, hopeless and as though he never would be well again; he says the impulse to self-destruction was beyond his control, all he felt was he must end the "pain" and at once.

If we regard affect as instinct interest, which gives meaning to perception or to the objects of perception: if we accept the view that affect withheld from conative expression becomes emotion, and that emotion is bipolar, pleasurable in so far as it is moving towards its ends and objects, unpleasurable in so far as it is moving away from its ends and objects; then in paranoia by projection the way has been cleared for the affect to invest the Self and that Self is exalted by an enhancement of the self-regarding sentiment, so that the affect reaches an object, although it is one that has been substituted for the real object. In melancholia the affect remains unpleasurable because it is dammed back from expression in Reality and does not succeed except in chronic cases in getting

dispersed in phantasy; it remains as a tension, and this produces the impulse to death.

In a regressive psychosis such as dementia praecox, there is a stage when the death impulse is compulsive. This stage occurs only in some cases, and as a rule early in the development of the psychosis. The psychoanalytic interpretation of this phenomenon is that cases of dementia praecox disposed to suicide are individuals who *have* developed to the object love stage, at least to the stage of taking their parents as love objects; their instinct interest adheres to the parent object, but at puberty when there is an increase of libido they fail to invest objects other than the parents with instinct interest. This involves such cases in so many real difficulties that intrapsychic regression occurs, but because there has been investment of real objects, namely the parents, with instinct interest, this withdrawal of affect from the parents by repression produces *temporarily* the same feeling of unpleasurable tension as is seen in melancholia, and sudden impulses to self-destruction.

In other cases, and much more commonly, the instinct interest regresses to phantasy and the sphere of the Pleasure Principle, and this repression reaches a degradation of psychic function in which even primary meaning disappears from the objects of perception. In such cases there is no tension from withheld affect and no impulse to self-destruction. The interpretation of the extraordinary fact maintained here that the idea of death is absent from the mind of the individual physically ill but present as an impulse in the melancholic and precocious dement is that it is due to intrapsychic tension from affect withheld from conative expression, and unable to attach itself by regression to imaginative phantasy. The excitement is suspended, as it were, between the two psychic realms of Reality and Pleasure Pain, between the Reality Principle function and the Pleasure Principle function. According to the *amount*, which really is equivalent to the *intensity*, of the affective tension or excitement, there is present, the idea of death, a tendency to death, or an impulse to death.

The *impulse* to death in melancholia and dementia praecox has been discussed, and we have now to examine the significance of ideas of death and tendencies to death in the psychoneuroses.

There is a tendency to death in anxiety hysteria. This psychoneurosis is characterised by an affective state of dread—by unreasonable anxiety, not about real problems or dangers but about the ordinary affairs of life—that from the midst of a blue sky a bolt is about to fall. Anxious hysterics think they are ill, have headaches and pains in the

120 *Significance of the Idea of Death in the Neurotic Mind*

epigastrium, pelvis and lumbo-sacral area, are bad sleepers, talk suicide and may attempt it in a half-hearted way. If asked why they wish to end their lives they may say that "they have been ill so long they cannot endure the agony any longer"; they may say their "heads are all wrong," that "something occurred inside their heads," that "everything went round and got mixed up together"; that "something came down and covered their brains and they have no feeling about anything at all"; that "they know that they will end in the asylum," that "they must end their lives before they are 33." If the agitation be extreme and topophobia be present, a spectacular attempt at suicide will almost surely be made, but generally speaking the more talk there is of death the less likely is an attempt. In conversion hysteria the patient frequently speaks of death but is careful not to make even a half-hearted attempt at self-destruction. When asked why they wish to end their lives they may say because their "illness makes life not worth living." Cases of phobia and of obsession speak of death and making an end of it all because of their difficulties, but they do not talk of death convincingly; they toy with the idea.

The anxious hysteric is the most dangerously near to suicide of all the psychoneurotics, and cases are frequently cited of poisonous doses of drugs being taken, and drowning attempts made, but these patients differ from the truly impulsive suicide in telling about what they have taken. The self-preservative instinct asserts itself, and it is noticed that drowning attempts are made when people are there to save them and often in shallow water. Anxiety hysteria is, as we know, due to psychic conflict, and the measure of agitation present is an index of the tendency to death and corresponds to the agitation in melancholia, only on a higher plane, that is to say in a more complex, highly-evolved, inhibited and controlled field of mental function. There has been no regression to Narcissism in anxiety hysteria, but the conflict and repression prevent, by conative deviation, the investment of objects with *sufficient* instinct interest. Nevertheless the hysteric has a large narcissistic element in his make-up, or, more precisely, he has an abnormal proportion of instinct interest deviated to phantasies of himself, and so there is reduced intensity in cognition of objects. This is what C. G. Jung implies by the word 'introverted.'

The idea of death present in obsessions does not become a tendency to death because the obsession is, like the physical symptom in conversion hysteria, a compromise by displacement or a solution of a conflict; and, moreover, the obsessional neurotic has very much the same zest in life

as the normal individual, except that his experience of life and reality is impoverished by the affect transferred to an act or a thought which is cut off and unassociated with his other acts and thoughts. It is probable that his talk about death is attributable, therefore, to the same fundamental cause which has been assumed to be the basis of the other psychoneuroses, but in obsessions it is not a strong or persistent idea.

Reference has been made to a tendency to death in agitated anxious hysteria, and it may be asked can this tendency become an impulse? It can and does if regression occurs. Anxiety hysteria tends to pass to conversion hysteria, or, if regression occurs, to manic depressive insanity; and in the latter event in the depressed phase the tendency becomes an impulse.

If then the facts are that in the psychoneuroses death is present as an obsessive idea, and sometimes as a tendency, and in certain of the psychoses there are impulses to death; and if the idea of, tendency to, and impulse to death arise from unpleasure, from tension of accumulated affect;—what is the significance of death to these patients?

It has a totally different significance to that which it has to a normal individual functioning in the Reality Principle. For the latter it is the inevitable end of human life. To the neurotic it is equivalent to quiescence, a quiescent resolution of the affective excitement; he does not consider its consequences for other people, or in any way confront it objectively. It is an alternative solution of the problem of how to dispose of excitement from dynamic instinct.

Death is envisaged by the neurotic as a sleep and a forgetting, an escape from what he calls "the pressure of life," and the meaning of it as connoting the total extinction of the individual's activity is not envisaged at all. So that to the neurotic death is like sleep, and the tendency to it is an effort by the organism to restore the quiescent equilibrium; in other words, it has no reality for the neurotic but is an activity of the Pleasure Principle.

The physiological changes that accompany these psychological states are not marked so far as clinical observations can detect them. There are changes in the function of the endocrine glands, both in the activity of secretion and the relation between the autocoids one with another. Experimental proof of the nature of these changes is difficult. There has been repeated experimental proof by Pavlov and others that psychic influences promote or inhibit physiological secretions, for example, the flow of gastric juice; that the thymus gland and the pituitary body influence the development of the sexual glands, that under psychic

122 *Significance of the Idea of Death in the Neurotic Mind*

influences the suprarenal bodies increase the secretion of adrenalin into the circulation. Nearer to our purpose, it is known that a hyperactive thyroid gland produces a syndrome resembling anxiety hysteria, except that in this syndrome of exophthalmic goitre the death tendency is not present, whereas in anxiety hysteria it is. Then apart from experimental proof there has been a good deal of speculation recently on the influence of the endocrine glands on individual behaviour. Dr Crichton Miller at the Glasgow meeting of the British Medical Association, in 1923, sought to associate the activity of certain endocrine glands with types of personality; a hyperactive thyroid with the creative artistic type, the hyperactive pituitary body with the will to power individual of the Napoleon type, the hyperactive suprarenal with the extrovert man of action of the British Naval Officer type. He did not speculate on the correlation between hyperactive sex glands and any type; had he done so we might have expected lovers, lunatics, and poets, to have been correlated! Physiologists now assume that the internal secretion of the interstitial cells of the testes and ovaries works against or is balanced by the internal secretion of the thyroid gland and suprarenal capsule. The presence of sex gland secretion has not been detected in the blood. As regards the evidence afforded by the nervous system, evidence by no means clear or complete, it is supposed that a hyperactive sex gland secretion acts on the vagus nerve and produces the condition of vagotonus. And the question arises, is the hyperactivity of the sex glands and the condition of vagotonus in the physiological sphere definitely related to psychic repression and the death tendency? On this subject I will quote from Eppinger and Hess.

“In subjects sensitive to pilocarpine, the tone of the whole autonomic system is raised, clinically this constitutional hypertonicity gives rise to gastric hyperacidity, physiological bradycardia, slight respiratory arrhythmia, eosinophilia, spastic constipation, a tendency to hyperidrosis and salivation. This condition is vagotonia and readily passes beyond physiological limits. Vagotonia gives rise to the lymphatic, arthritic and exudative diatheses in children, and to vaso dilation.”

I will also quote from Dr David Orr's appendix to the public Morrison lecture, 1920, by Dr R. G. Row: “The vagus nerve is closely related to the thymolymphatic system. Resection of the vagus is followed by acute yellow atrophy of the thymus, especially of its cortex, by atrophy of the lymphatic follicles of the spleen, atrophy of the cortical substance of the ovaries and testes and by lymphatic leucopenia. Hence the internal secretion of these organs is in a great measure regulated by the vagus.”

Again "Emotion is a most important factor in the genesis of the sympathetic neuroses; and even within physiological limits psychic states can determine changes in the endocrine-sympathetic mechanism. It is common to observe after fear or mental suffering the rapid development of chlorosis, Addison's Disease, hemicrania, renal neurosis, nervous diabetes, hyperidrosis, angina pectoris, angio-neurotic eruptions."

Now the opposite condition of vagotonia is characterised by tachycardia hyperthermia, rapid metabolism, gastro-intestinal atony, diminished secretion of sweat and saliva and vaso-constriction; the psychoneuroses and manic-depressive insanity present a mixture of these two groups of symptoms, but undoubtedly depression and the death idea is associated most markedly with vagotonic symptoms. It has not yet been experimentally proved that these symptoms are correlated with an over-secretion of the sex glands. There has been no isolation of the sex gland autocoid from the circulation. Clinically there is observed apparent deficiency in, and so overpowering of, the compensatory secretions of the adrenals, thyroid and pituitary, or of some of them, producing the condition named vagotonia; and vagotonia is observed to occur in some individuals at certain epochs in their life history, namely at prepuberty and at the climacteric. It is at these epochs that the psychoses, dementia praecox and melancholia, occur respectively, and these psychic states are associated with impulses to death: these epochs are also associated with an increment of sex impulses, and if there be no satisfactory discharge of the activity of these increased impulses a psychic state of dread or anxiety arises; if the organism fails to adjust its balance of function, it tends to a pathological state.

We observe the idea of death, the tendency to death and an impulse to death present in these states and ascribe it psychologically to tension from unexpended excitement or withheld affect, and physiologically to an alteration in the secretion of the endocrine glands.

It may be profitable now to consider this remarkable phenomenon of an organism seeking its own death from the standpoint of Biology.

Some recent experiments on the unicellular organism by Woodruffe and others have demonstrated the facts (*a*) that the unicellular organism will live indefinitely and continue to multiply indefinitely if the nutrient medium in which it lives is periodically renewed; (*b*) that if the nutrient material is not renewed the organism dies, apparently from the products of its own metabolism.

These demonstrated facts, which are inconsistent with the theory of Weismann that the unicellular organism and its products are immortal,

124 *Significance of the Idea of Death in the Neurotic Mind*

place the unicellular organism in line with the multicellular organism with a sexual cycle, and from them the inference may be drawn that there is a natural tendency in protoplasm to death except in that plasm modified as germ plasm; if so modified, the plasm tends to union with a similarly modified plasm and there follows from this union a fresh growth of plasm, a new generation, containing within its organism both soma plasm with a life-death rhythm and germ plasm with a reproductive rhythm.

Biology only admits two great harmonic drifts or tendencies in the organism, one to self-preservation, the other to reproduction, if both these tendencies are satisfied the individual lives a complete biological life. If it succeeds in preserving its own life for death at the normal period of the life rhythm of the species, then its germ plasm together with the soma plasm dies; if it reproduces, its soma plasm dies but its germ plasm lives.

From the biological standpoint the individual who has an impulse to death is no longer activated by one of the two "harmonic" drifts, namely the self-preservative, and is therefore activated by the other only, the sexual or reproductive.

This conception of the death tendency in neurotics may be now resumed in terms of Psychology, Physiology and Biology; psychologically as a psychic tension from failure of investment of the objects of perception with instinct interest, and failure of instinct interest to invest psychic substitutes for perceived objects, so that the excitement cannot find outlet in real ends or in substituted or imagined ends; physiologically as a change in the balance between the hormones or autocoids, which acting through the nervous system keep the organism adjusted to external and internal stimuli; biologically as a failure in the activity of one of the two great tendencies in the animal organism, a tendency essential to life and to adjustment to the environment.

Acknowledgments are due to the following authors for material extracted from their writings:

- EPPINGER and HESS. D. Orr's appendix to the 1920 *Morrison Lecture*.
- R. G. ROW. *Morrison Lecture*, 1920.
- J. DREVER. *Instinct in Man*, p. 140.
- S. FREUD. *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, p. 356.
- D. ORR. Appendix to 1920 *Morrison Lecture*.
- C. SPEARMAN. *Nature of Intelligence*, p. 135.
- C. G. JUNG. *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 37.

POETRY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

By J. C. HILL.

ONE of our students at Chester Training College, a boy of nineteen, fell in what appeared to be an epileptic fit and was taken to bed. A prefect was detailed to look after him. When the student recovered he was quiet but obviously distressed, and asked the prefect what was the best way to occupy one's mind when one was worried. The prefect was a musician, and said that he usually composed at the pianoforte, or tried to write poetry. The sick student tried all day to write a poem, but only produced a few lines on the back of an envelope. The prefect saw the poem and considered it doggerel.

During the night, the prefect was awakened by the sick student reciting poetry with dramatic gestures. He was sitting up in bed, sometimes addressing the stars, and by his fixed gaze was apparently asleep. The prefect listened for a time and suddenly realized that the poetry was original. He got out a pencil and paper and tried to note some of it. Several fragments were noted, of which the following two are fair specimens:

- (1) Come rack and pain, minions of absence,
 What shalt thou gain by tearing us apart.
 Each hour of pain stabs in the heart.
- (2) Why do they live?
 Can they not die
 All but you and I?
 Nought matters else.

The prefect had sympathised with the student in one of his half-conscious lamentations, and had been told of a love affair with which the student's people were interfering. This fact threw considerable light on the fragments quoted above.

A few nights later the student was found going down the dormitory stairs reciting poetry, and obviously sleep-walking. He was taken to his own home, and we heard no more of him until next term.

During the vacation he had written in a note-book several remarkable poems, one of the earliest being the following:

O Heart o' mine, heart o' mine, didst hear that sigh?
 O Joy of life, joy of life, didst hear that cry?
 From bloodless lips 'tis surging
 From longing heart love purging
 Of one once true
 Who once was you
 Heart o' mine.

O Lips o' mine, lips o' mine, didst feel my kiss?
 O Breath of life, breath of life, retain that bliss
 Or heart cease beating.
 Stop memory fleeting
 Of lips so red
 That are e'en dead
 For me, Lips o' mine.

I asked the student if he had read much poetry. He had read little. The only poems which had interested him had been poems of action. He had regarded poetry as "soft stuff." The above poem was produced without any effort, and was written down, exactly as it stands, in a few minutes. He was not quite clear in his own mind what it was all about.

The following poem was the result of a deliberate effort to write a poem on "Spring." He had shown some of his poems to friends at home who had said the poems were very good but that he should try to write "something more cheerful."

Laugh you winds, Spring is here,
 And sparkling sunbeams, winter drear
 Are chasing away.
 See a-waving in the breeze
 The boughs of joyous trees
 All budding with the green.

Hark to the birds a-chirping in the mead
 As with little lively eyes they seek a feed
 While warbling a sunny lay.
 There lambs are gambolling, frisking gaily
 Taunting, watching mothers féely
 A-cropping grass new-green.

Folk from the city dancing come
 Wearied by the eternal hum
 Of traffic's droning day.
 Children leap and will abandon scream
 For winter's past, and winter's dream
 At last, at longéd last is seen.

In this production, in which his best efforts were put forth, the obscure symbolism is absent, and the poem is entirely lacking in "*inspiration*."

The next poem in his book was the following:

Die, ah die—sweet rarity,
Too rare for me.
I cannot hold thee
And thou must cold be
Now and for eternity.

Mad I was to wildly hope
To be thy home.
Through darkness to the dome
Of Life I'll weakly roam
Or for light in death numb'dly grope.

Here we return to the true poetic quality. This poem was also composed and written in a few minutes without any effort. The student said he understood the poem when he wrote it, but that now he did not know what it meant. "*Sweet rarity*" puzzled him, but affected him emotionally so that he wanted to write more whenever he saw or heard the words.

The following extract is from a long poem which was written down as the words came, no thought being given to the construction, rhyme or meaning, and no corrections being made.

Blares the trumpet, twangs the taut string,
Chaotic melody a-dinning.
Swirl the bodies, swinging, singing
Faster, holding, drunken, spinning:
Sweeps the strings and wine is red
Life is laughter and God is dead.
Living, living, taking giving,
Mistress, man and maid.
Glories, stories, leaping, telling.
Diaphanously limbs arrayed,
Moon is waning, gleam is fading,
Fiddle wailing ends its scaling;
Minds a-faltering, sense invading
Melts the host in dawn a-paling
Music's day is done.

I asked the student to try to describe in prose what it was all about. He could not. I made an attempt at a prose translation. He said it set his "teeth on edge." "Do you understand it?" "Yes, I see it all." "As mental pictures?" "Yes." "Do you see all your poems as mental pictures?" "Yes." I turned to the poem beginning "Die, ah die, sweet rarity" and pointing to "*Sweet rarity*" said "What do you see now?"

"Oh! you've brought it all back to me," he exclaimed; "its Eileen" (his sweetheart). Later he was not so sure it was.

About three weeks later he brought his manuscript book to show me some further efforts. My attention was taken by the following remarkable poem:

SOMEWHERE.

Through the curling shadows of sombre eve
Looms a misty crater of things forgot,
A saw-like edge of fading red,
And fumed vapours swelling heave,
A scented stench of rebellious rot
Lifting slowly from memories dead.

Crawling round the ragged steep
Are grinning wraiths of passions lost:
Probing down midst the gruesome mass
Are forked eyes that sentinel keep.
Embittered souls see hopes embossed
Then fading in murky hopes wanly pass.

I asked the student if he could explain what it meant. He said he was describing a succession of visual images in words which came quite spontaneously. "But what is it all about?" He did not know. He had shown it to Eileen who said she "hated it." It gave her "a creepy feeling."

I asked for a copy of the poem. It reminded me of the visual imagery of the Rev. George Henslow which Galton quotes in *Inquiries into Human Faculty* (Everyman Edition, pp. 115-118). No one with any psycho-analytic experience could study these descriptions with the accompanying diagrams and avoid coming to the conclusion that the symbolism was sexual, although the idea that the visions had any general meaning does not seem to have occurred to Galton.

Some time later the student asked me why I had asked for a copy of the poem. I said it interested me.

"Do you think it has anything to do with sex?" "I don't know; do you?" "I'm sure of it," he said. "What makes you sure of it?" "Well, it's obvious, and the conditions under which I wrote it make me quite sure. I hate to think I am so much dominated by sex."

The student was unable, however, to interpret the symbolism for me, nor would he accept as satisfactory any interpretation I offered. Apparently it was as impossible for him to express the meaning in prose as it would be to express the pathetic line, "I am an old man, a very old man" by, say, "Man, aged 70."

The student showed the poem to seven men friends at College. Six of them liked it. None of them knew why. The student who did not like it was a special friend of the poet's, and the poet had referred to him some weeks previously as a strange fellow who had never had any interest in girls.

The Editor of the College Magazine (a Cambridge Graduate in Literature) had selected this poem for publication in the College Magazine. I asked him why he liked it. He said the symbolism was so weird.

I asked the poet if he ever dreamed. He did, sometimes. "What do you dream about?" (With some hesitation) "I had a terrible dream at the beginning of my illness at College. I have worried over it a great deal: I dreamed I had murdered my father. Battered his head in with a hammer." I explained that that was nothing to worry about, and said I would explain to to him soon. "What else do you dream about?" "I saw a gallows. People were being hanged." (Pause.) "Who were the people?" "Relatives, I think." "Tell me about them." "My mother was one."

It was not desirable to probe too far into his private affairs, and I explained the Oedipus Complex to him and told him several cases from my own experience. He seemed to be greatly relieved and much happier. I also showed him the two fragments quoted above ("Come rack and pain..." and "Why do they live?..."). He had no recollection of having composed them, although in some way they seemed familiar to him.

Later, the student showed me a sentimental poem he had written on "The Candle" which was burning in his room one night when he could not sleep (I regret that this poem has been lost). He explained that he was "sometimes bursting to express" himself and "could not find a suitable subject to write about." I recalled that Robert Burns had written poems "To a Mountain Daisy" and "To a Mouse," and I realized on re-reading these poems that the same mechanism ("Projection") had been at work in Burns' case. Robert Graves expresses this point very well in his book *On English Poetry*:

A particular aspect of the moon may fire some emotional tinder and suggest a poem. But the Moon is no more the *subject* of the poem than the murder of an Archduke was the cause of the late European War (p. 43).

Some of the changes in the student's manuscript book are interesting:

- (1) Glory come, glory go
All is sad, all is woe
Far away whispering low
Hear I words soft and low.
 sweet they flow.

(2)

There a sighing lane is turning
 As a snake with drowsy coil
 It probes into the ~~vaguies~~ shadows
 As though seeking rainbow spoil.

In the first example we have "soft and low" written to rhyme with "whispering low." According to Robert Graves such rhymes seem quite satisfactory when one is in the hypnoidal state in which, according to him, true poetry is first produced. It is when the poem is read later in a critical way that these false rhymes are noticed and corrected. In the case quoted the original line "Hear I words soft and low" is better, apart from the false rhyme, than the corrected line "Hear I words, sweet they flow."

In the second example we have a word ("vaguies") coined by the poet. It is a beautiful word, suggesting much more than the English word "shadows" which he substitutes for it.

The poet gave the following free associations from "vaguies."

Vaguies. "Shadows, the lane at home, trees, two of us walking along, talking —(pause)—that's about all I think."

He quarrelled with his sweetheart during a vacation and letters ceased. The following fragment was written soon after his return to College:

Man be love to me;
 Companionship hold me;
 Woman now mocks me;
 Take her away.

The student was now taking an active part in the College sports. He had seldom any inclination to write poetry. The poem beginning "Die ah! die—sweet rarity" now seemed to him "to be soft"; it "bored" him.

After a few weeks, correspondence with his sweetheart was resumed. There was less enthusiasm however.

On seeing one of his College chums burning his love-letters and apparently depressed over the breaking off of his love affair, the poet wrote the following:

THE BURNING OF THINGS.

Fulsome smoke and flame ye are well fed
 As in greedy wantonness ye drink
 The blood of life, lightly shed.
 Friend, let me kiss thee,
 And in my love, lose thou thine agonies.
 Hurt me not with simple bravery,
 But fill a kindred emptiness
 With the right of common sympathy.

Fulsome smoke and flame, ye are well fed:
 A heart of love feedest thee well.
 It emptieth its veins once rich, once red,
 Pours forth excess, burns hopes, fine dreams,
 Starves memories and in their stead
 Sees smoke and flame and hell.
 Prostrate thyself, O, Friend, in ghastly grief!
 Welcome thy misery and mourn
 Till bruised heart shall fail
 Its beating. When, tired and forlorn
 'Twill sleep. Then, rested, waken to hail
 With smiles the advent of rhythm new.
 Worn and winning heart, the dew
 Of flowers, the tears of earth
 And blood of friendship true
 Have filled thee with the peace of love.
 And so of joy and truth there comes a heaven's birth
 While to dark passions, hot stinging things,
 Thou biddest thy last adieu.

He showed this poem to his chum who had burned the letters, and asked what he thought of it. The poet told me he "nearly dropped" when he was asked what it was all about. The emotions which the poet had described were *his own* emotions, and evidently were not experienced at all by his friend.

When giving me some account of his early life, the poet told me that when a child he was greatly interested in fairy tales. I asked what were his favourite stories. "The stories about King Pippin and Queen Mab." "What were these stories about?" "About killing giants. I sometimes felt a little sorry for the giant." I asked if he saw the relation of that interest to the first dream he had told me (about killing his father). He did, now that I suggested it to him.

The main conclusions may be summarised as follows:

(1) This student's best poetry is a product of the Dream mind (the Unconscious). The poetry which he writes by conscious effort has not the true poetic quality, and conveys to the reader nothing which could not be equally well conveyed by prose.

(2) The presence of a "complex" on the subject, seems to be an important factor in the production of a poem, and in the appreciation of a poem.

(3) The poet does not always understand the meaning of his own poetry, although it has meaning.

I append several quotations which tend to show that much of the best poetry is produced in the same way.

1. Many poets of my acquaintance have corroborated what I have just said and also observed that on laying down their pens after the first excitement of composition they feel the same sort of surprise that man finds on waking from a "fugue," they discover that they have done a piece of work of which they never suspected they were capable; but at the same time they discover a number of surface defects which were invisible before.

ROBERT GRAVES, *On English Poetry*, p. 27.

2.

THE AUTHOR'S APOLOGY FOR HIS BOOK.

When at the first I took my Pen in hand,
Thus for to write; I did not understand
That I at all should make a little Book
In such a mode: Nay, I had undertook
To make another; which, when almost done,
Before I was aware, I this begun.
And thus it was: I writing of the Way
And Race of Saints in this our Gospel-day,
Fell suddenly into an Allegory
About their Journey, and the Way to Glory,
In more than twenty things, which I set down;
This done, I twenty more had in my crown,
And they again began to multiply,
Like sparks which from the coal do fly.
Nay then, thought I, if that you breed so fast,
I'll put you by yourselves, lest you at last
Should prove ad infinitum, and eat out
The Book that I already am about.

JOHN BUNYAN, *The Pilgrim's Progress*.

3. The Author continued for about three hours in a profound sleep, at least of the external senses, during which time he has the most vivid confidence, that he could not have composed less than from two to three hundred lines; if that indeed can be called composition in which all the images rose up before him as *things*, with a parallel production of the correspondent expressions, without any sensation or consciousness of effort. On awaking he appeared to himself to have a distinct recollection of the whole, and taking his pen, ink and paper, instantly and eagerly wrote down the lines that are here preserved. At this moment he was unfortunately called out by a person on business from Porlock, and detained by him above an hour, and on his return to his room, found, to his no small surprise and mortification, that though he still retained some vague and dim recollection of the general purport of the vision, yet, with the exception of some eight or ten scattered lines and images, all the rest had passed away like the images on the surface of a stream into which a stone had been cast, but, alas! without the restoration of the latter.

COLERIDGE, Note to the first edition of *Kubla Khan*.

4. O, how that *Name* inspires my style!
The words come skelpin, rank and file,
Amaist before I ken.

ROBERT BURNS, *First Epistle to Davie*.

5. The reason for your complaint lies, it seems to me, in the constraint which your intelligence imposes upon your imagination. I must here make an observation and illustrate it by an allegory. It does not seem beneficial, and it is harmful for the creative work of the mind, if the intelligence inspects too closely the ideas already pouring in, as it were, at the gates. Regarded by itself, an idea may be very trifling and very adventurous, but it perhaps becomes important on account of one which follows it; perhaps in a certain connection with others, which may seem equally absurd, it is capable of forming a very useful construction. The intelligence cannot judge all these things if it does not hold them steadily long enough to see them in connection with the others. In the case of a creative mind, however, the intelligence has withdrawn its watchers from the gates, the ideas rush in pell-mell, and it is only then that the great heap is looked over and critically examined.

FRIEDRICH SCHILLER (letter of December 1, 1788),
quoted by Freud, *Interpretation of Dreams*, p. 85.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOUTH IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS¹

BY EDWARD GLOVER.

FROM the psycho-analytic point of view, mouth activities can be classified into three main groups. The first of these, and by far the most completely understood of the three, is comprehended in the familiar phrase—the oral stage of *libido* development. The second includes the laying down of certain mechanisms which determine and help to delimit the corporeal ego, afterwards providing a basis for character formation. We might say that these activities constitute the oral stage of *ego-development*, were it not for the fact that throughout a large part of the period involved it is scarcely accurate to talk of a distinct ego-formation. The difference between the second and first group can be expressed more clearly if one thinks of the play and interplay of self-preservative and libidinal impulses.

Of the nature of the third group we can only say here, that it coincides with the significant period of mouth activity after birth, but cannot be immediately distinguished by direct observation. It includes the isolation or fusion through preservative or libidinal channels of the impulses to destruction which, as Freud has shown, represent one side of the primary instinct antithesis of life.

Roughly speaking, then, libidinal activity, self-preservative activity (including orientation) and mechanisms for fusing or diverting primary instincts form the functional groundwork of the mouth or oral stage.

The necessity for division into stages was born of empirical investigation of libido development. It will be remembered that Freud's division of libido organisation was based partly on his isolation of the component sexual impulses and partly on the dynamics of choice of a love-object. So that the first division was between an autoerotic stage where these component impulses found gratification of an 'anarchic' type, as Ferenczi² has aptly said, on the body itself without reference to a definite object, and a stage of genital primacy, when the component impulses are subordinated to the purposes of reproduction. Freud's study of *paraphrenia* then led to the recognition of a narcissistic stage where a definite

¹ Read before the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, April 30, 1924.

² Ferenczi, *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie*, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1924.

object is chosen, but one coinciding with the self. The analysis of obsessional neurosis resulted in a delimitation of a third stage, when component impulses are directed towards an outer object, but not under genital primacy. The primacy involved is rather one of anal-erotic and sadistic impulses. Still later, in a reprint of the *Three Contributions to Sexual Theory*, he sketched out the earliest stage of libido organisation, giving it the name of oral or cannibalistic stage¹.

Before turning to a study of this early oral stage, some preliminary consideration of the term 'stage' will perhaps serve to tone down what must otherwise appear a too dogmatic and rigid handling of the subject. The subdivision is obviously an artificial procedure of descriptive and diagrammatic value, one, however, which sacrifices realistic continuity to impressionism. More important, since in the last resort all analytic and other scientific findings can be woven into the texture of individual complexes, it may give rise to a kind of 'conceptual fixation,' in which the importance of one stage can be magnified beyond all measure.

In considering, then, the deeply sedimented and remotely accessible stages of oral development, it is highly necessary to follow the pharmaceutical device of introducing into any mixture certain correctives or adjuvants. In the present instance the most important of these is the idea of *relative primacy* of any one zone. We have to keep in mind that the erotogenic zones, mouth, anus, skin, musculature, etc., represent points of concentration of libidinal energy but that the whole organism can also be regarded as a reservoir of libido generally distributed. In the case of the mouth the association of preservative needs, not clearly distinguished as such, serves to accentuate the gratification of combined hunger and erotic tensions. At the same time, however, other gratifications of organ pleasure, especially of the muscular system, are in full swing: even in genital primacy, where a centralisation of libido into a common 'accumulation and discharge' system has taken place², this accumulation is only relative, and even the most indifferent parts of the body are to some extent erotically autonomous, and are capable in times of stress of taking over centralising functions, as can be seen in conversion

¹ This development can be traced in the following of Freud's publications: *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, 1st to 5th editions (1905-1922), Deuticke, Wien. "Eine Kindheits Erinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci" (1910). "Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Paranoia," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 3te Folge. "Zur Einführung des Narzissmus"; "Die Disposition zur Zwangsneurose," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 4te Folge, 1918. See also "The Infantile Genital Organisation of the Libido," *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, April, 1924.

² See Ferenczi's views on genital function, *op. cit.*

136 *The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis*

hysteria when genital primacy is denied and a backward displacement to the organic libido systems occurs.

The early primacy of the mouth is then purely relative, and this fact in turn gives rise to the question of periodicity: Is there in the case of pregenital primacies a general or individual period necessary for the sufficient working out of gratification? Apart from biological speculations as to periodicity (Fliess) and views on the influence of race history on individual development, there seems to be little question that, especially with suckling gratifications, there is an *optimum* period with individual variation, the shortening or prolongation of which constitutes either a traumatic experience, or a situation of fixation. I should be inclined to say that shortening of the period is almost invariably traumatic, whilst the effect of lengthening depends on the stage of ego development reached in the civilisation concerned, since we find that in certain more primitive races (*e.g.* in Serbia, Macedonia) suckling is sometimes carried on right into childhood (5–9), is associated with smoking in its later stages but given up when wine drinking is permitted (*e.g.* plum-brandy).

For the present we must content ourselves with one special consideration; if we assume that an insufficient or over-great gratification of an earlier primacy *can* take place and can give rise to an individual oral *disposition*, or *character*, how may this affect later primacies, such as the pregenital anal or phallic primacies? Normally it would seem that the primary gratification of one stage becomes subsidiary in the next, until under full genital primacy these are all represented in the preparatory fore-pleasure of coitus. May there not then come about in abnormal cases a struggle on the part of the earlier primacy to retain its dominating influence, thereby inhibiting the free working out of the next primacy by continuous archaic modification, *e.g.* may the oral impulses not seek displaced and condensed 'working out' at the anal level, giving rise to cumulative inhibition all along the pregenital series? Here again, it would seem that, although in the normal case gratification of a later stage seems to compensate for renunciation of an older pleasure, some such cumulative disturbance does take place in those constitutionally or individually fixated. How then does this disturbance take effect? Here we are faced with alternative possibilities. The first and most familiar implies the use of certain mechanisms of displacement and condensation, whereby libido energy is withdrawn from one point to invest another, in the case of regression, to reinvest another. This is the *quantitative* point of view and would account for the recurrence of suckling characteristics in other erotic, *e.g.* urinary, situations as an overflow occurring at some point in

common which permits or stimulates unconscious identification. Ferenczi¹ has recently put forward another view, that the 'handing on' is not only quantitative but *qualitative* and sees in the genital act itself a merging of certain pregenital characteristics, for which he has coined the term 'amphimixis.' The rhythm of coitus, for example, is regarded as an oral blending, eating during defaecation an oral-anal blending, etc. In either case, quantitative or qualitative, it has to be remembered that the primacy of the genital provides a partly effective but by no means complete centralisation of erotic tension, and that component impulses still continue partly autonomous, although in a sufficiently camouflaged state to evade the critical attentions of the ego-ideal.

Whichever point of view one takes, the facts of experience and analytic investigation can only be understood on the basis of *some* kind of displacement, and that, not only forwards but backwards, *i.e.* regressive. Displacement and regression form the keystone to all oral investigations.

It would seem reasonable to suppose therefore that to understand and explore oral development we have only to work back with the help of ordinary exploratory methods. Unfortunately the matter is not quite so simple. In the first place the system of word presentation essential to direct psychical remembering is not developed until the primacy of the mouth is over². Hence, with the exception of visual, olfactory and plastic representation, we can know nothing of the primary mouth situations, except by repetition through later situations akin in some way to the first. The early mouth positions are not only deeply sedimented and compressed, they are layered over by later deposits. More important still, in these later stages the ego is becoming more formed and is about to receive the final character imprint of the Oedipus situation. Imagine for a moment what this means; the barring of all uninhibited erotic impulses towards the parent, the repression of the anal-sadistic organisation together with all contemporaneous infantile sexual theories, that is to say, the very stages from which we might hope to gain information as to the significance of the mouth form a battle-ground of guilt-conflict, following which all primitive systems can gain expression only in disguise. Any view of the oral stage is not only blurred as seen through opaque glasses, it is more or less boarded off by this intervening repression, and

¹ Ferenczi, *op. cit.*

² For the relation of 'word' and 'thing' presentations to the (Pre)conscious system see Freud, "Das Unbewusste," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 4te Folge; also "Das Ich und das Es," I.P.V. 1923.

138 *The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis*

our main source of information remains a study of abnormal states, as it were an oblique reflection from a distorting mirror.

Now the influence of relative primacy and of repression are more matters of internal economy, and leave out of account a dynamic function of mouth activity which is perhaps more easy to appreciate since it concerns the 'stage setting' in which the drama of suckling is enacted. Just how far the abrupt termination of intrauterine life by the act of birth has been underestimated in conscious thinking can be gathered by a study of the opposite point of view contained in a recent treatise by Rank¹. Apart, however, from the validity of such speculations or their possible application, we have to note three main considerations. First that by the act of birth the antithesis of pleasure-pain has been established; second that a trauma requiring psychical fixation or binding has taken place². The oral stage commences with certain prescribed functions to perform, to sweeten the pill of existence and to afford repetition situations, such as the ever repeated gratification and privation of suckling and hunger whereby the catastrophic primal experience of birth is worked through. Both of these serve a third purpose, *viz.* to link the subject more and more to the outer world. The first is the libidinal, the second the repetitive and the third the reality function of oral development.

We may now proceed to review certain details in the actual process of suckling, the full significance of which is made apparent when they are encountered during post-oral stages of development. The pictorial setting must obviously depend on the method of feeding and especially whether bottle feeding has been adopted from the outset. Even with breast feeding there is wide scope for variety of experience owing to varying physical and mental characteristics of the mother. In all cases, however, the smell of the mother's body especially of the armpit, of exhalations from bed and body clothes, warmth of skin and the rhythmic movements of maternal respiration provide the atmosphere of the mouth stage. In breast feeding there is a gradual appreciation of a dome-shaped pillow with an especially sought-after projection, an exquisite pleasure centre vaguely orientated but having continuity *in experience* with the prenatal pleasure self. Later comes the mystifying appreciation of two domes each like a face with an eye in the middle, together with the intervening gulf, chasm or cleft. With increasing visual appreciation

¹ Rank, *Das Trauma der Geburt*, I.P.V. 1924.

² On the function of the repetition-compulsion, see Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, International Psycho-analytical Library, No. 4.

there gradually resolve out of chaos certain more definite impressions, a circumambient whiteness, a cosmic vantage point of brown, the areola, and a red or pink-tipped organ from which warm sweet whitish fluid can be extracted. On suitable treatment by the mouth this organ is erected and responds to rhythmic jaw-pressure with increased supplies. It is rough, and is studded round with pimple-like excrescences, calling for the erasing ministrations of tiny finger-nails. At times when the nipple is cracked there is mingled with milk a taste of blood, a reminder of the first blood-scented experience of the outer world at birth. It is easy to imagine how significant must be the wide variations in physical shape of the breast in different mothers, the size, degree of projection and erectility of nipples, the firmness or flaccidity of the mammae, and the ease with which breasts can be exhausted. This varies with different mothers and in the case of the first-born with the same mother. The technique of suckling, too, varies from the incorrect introduction of the nipple alone to the correct offer of the pendant breast.

We must remember that although the suckling reflex is in all probability present prenatally, the child has often to be taught to take the nipple, indeed sometimes has the nipple forced upon it. Quite apart from the fact that children injured at birth and those with nasal obstruction suck with difficulty, a broad distinction can be drawn as to the manner of sucking, from a purely passive torpid reaction to active and distinctly aggressive jaw activity. During suckling some peculiar movements of the body occur, a slow stretching and bending of the upper and lower limbs, a crooking of legs and drawing up of toes which are seen again in life during recumbent masturbation, during the recumbent lover's kiss and in the privation stages of restlessness with drug takers. During and towards the end of the process urine is frequently voided, and regurgitation may take place from oversatisfaction or faulty technique. The change over from breast to bottle produces reactions of varying intensity from easy acquiescence to violent protest, and in accordance with the teat used can favour a more passive type of suckling. The bottle lends itself to grasping activities but is deficient in other erotic respects. During the first year whilst jaw-pressure is constantly used, sucking and swallowing predominate, biting is more especially associated with dentition, and mastication does not usually date till premolar eruption (end of second year). It is important to note that whilst miniature weanings are constantly taking place, the final weaning occurs at a time when the biting apparatus is definitely developed. Ferenczi¹ holds that the eruption of

¹ Ferenczi, *op. cit.*

140 *The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis*

teeth is largely responsible for weaning and with certain exceptions this seems to be the case. At any rate, quite apart from the reaction to pain caused by fissured and inflamed breasts, it is certain that many of the initial slaps administered to the baby are associated with aggressive biting at the nipple. In other words, weaning ends in an atmosphere of punishment or at least loss following aggression. Erotic play with the nipple during actual suckling is a significant feature and equally so sadistic irregularity on the part of the mother, or the definite association of suckling as a means of stilling pain. Indeed, the complicated reactions of the mother particularly in the direction of erotic gratification or aversion during suckling are of the utmost consequence for future instinct modification: these, together with the side tracking of erotic play by the infant to dummy and thumb would require a lecture in themselves. One particular drama deserves more than passing attention, it occurs with increasing frequency when night feeds are discontinued and suckling is preceded by partial undressing. At the critical moment a crack or gap appears in the unbroken curve of the mother's body from which protrudes a large white organ with a brown centre and a pink tip, tiny hands clutch upwards from the immeasurable distance of the lap and the child climbs magically. After a pleasure eternity the baby is once more at a distance, the protruding organ disappears and the chasm closes up, leaving the curve of the body again unbroken.

So much for the individual experience of suckling: only for family Benjamins, however, does the matter rest here. For the others, at a time usually coinciding with the anal-sadistic phase, there is in store the mortification of discovering that from another unbroken maternal curve another organ with a red poll appears—the rival baby, during the suckling of which by the fickle mother oral memories are reactivated, although on this occasion with a clearer perception of objects and a more complicated emotional valuation on the part of the jilted baby.

Inadequate as these pictures are, they may help us to form certain generalisations. The first has been put very suggestively by Ferenczi¹, viz. that the child at this stage behaves as a direct ectoparasite, the mother's body constituting the first nutritive material. The second is the close relation of suckling followed by sleep to prenatal absolute narcissism, and the third that the nipple provides a point of focus for aggressive and libidinal impulses, a focal point which is ultimately beaten out into a path towards the outer world. This last generalisation really

¹ Ferenczi, *op. cit.*

follows from the first two and brings us to the relations between Instinct-development and Object-formation, the purpose served by the object in instinct economy and part of instinct deflection in object formation.

To begin with, we must remember that instinct tensions are continuous and are only altered by some form of discharge, hence they can be contrasted with stimuli from the outer world from which flight can provide suitable relief. It is this contrast which gradually conduces to separation of the outer world from the self, but the only reality involved is the reality of pleasure and pain. The most urgent of these inner tensions, hunger, is precisely that which brings about the most intimate connection with the nipple object which is, however, not distinguished as an object but as part of the pleasure self. Now whilst these hunger tensions recur constantly, developing an increasing erotic tone, gratification does not follow the same course; it becomes more arbitrary or at least is associated with certain motor expressions such as crying. Even this becomes in time less effective, and the displaceable part of the tension, the erotic part, is side-tracked and gratified autoerotically on the fingers or toes, thereby founding an additional criterion for the outline of the subject, the self—in the sense that one pleasure centre partly refuses to obey the omnipotent will, whilst other centres do obey unconditionally. Here is an enormous step forward: a part of the pleasure self is recognised as detachable, is associated with pain and thwarting. Moreover, it supports the fiction that all sources of inner tension (unlust, pain) can be attributed to outside sources. We can see in this gradual separation of a pleasure ego from a painful outer world the play of mechanisms of projection and introjection whereby inner and outer, originally one, are distinguished, although at first inaccurately. We might say that self-preservative instincts, at first fused with erotic components, have become isolated into hunger gratification and erotic gratification, whilst owing to lack of differentiation of a real ego, libido has been attached, as it were, by mistake to the object, which becomes progressively more distinct and more multiform. A path has been found for love. At the same time the original destructive instincts of the organism have, in the form of mastery instincts, become tinged erotically, *i.e.* a fusion has taken place which is ultimately represented by the sadistic component of sexual gratification. A path has been found for hate. This again might be said to have been deflected by mistake on the part of the self. Nevertheless these misapprehensions serve a useful function in that they widen the interests of the self in the outer world. The child seems to find in the outer world a pleasure-pain system, which can be identified with the pleasure and pain of instinct gratification and tension.

142 *The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis*

It is easy to see how such considerations are of more than theoretical importance. We have only to remember that the fusion and separation out of ego and sex instincts is a gradual continuous process throughout this stage, to realise how a *libidinal* regression to oral stages at a later period is capable of lighting up the *ego* point of view appropriate to the earlier period, more particularly the old pleasure-pain point of view of what is outer and what is inner¹.

We must now consider the relation of the mouth to the fully formed ego-characteristics. This can be expressed simply in the series incorporation, introjection, identification. It will be seen that the primary autoerotic objectless stage contributes that feeling of unalterable conviction which is the basis of all future identifications. It is the unconscious character of such identifications that the objects identified *are* the same: in the first instance the subject and all objects *are* the same for the child. We have seen that following this unity of self and outer world the isolation and investment of objects commences with the breast, so that, as Freud puts it, in the primitive oral phase, object investments and identifications can scarcely be distinguished from one another². Moreover the manner of dealing with the object is unique in that the object is actually taken into the mouth, a process of incorporation which has its psychical analogue in the introjection of objects into the ego. That this is something more than a mere resemblance has been shown by Freud in his study of cannibalistic activities and totemistic ceremonials³. Here we find a phylogenetic link which helps to fill the gaps in observation of child development: the swallowed food is believed by the primitive to bring about an alteration in the character of the subject, actual introjection has been followed by psychical identification. These primary identifications are of a somewhat different nature from the identification of the child with parent which occurs later when these parent objects and certain of their qualities are more definitely recognised, but they contribute enormously to the strength of these later *complete* object identifications. In a similar way the oral stage may be regarded as moulding

¹ For a clear understanding of instinct modification and the polarities of instinct, reference should be made to Freud's fundamental essay, "Triebe und Triebchicksale," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 4te Folge; also to his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and *Das Ich und das Es*. In addition, see Ferenczi, "Introjection and Transference" and "Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality," *Contributions to Psycho-analysis*, 1916.

² Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*; see also *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, same series.

³ Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, English edition. [See also Ferenczi, "A Little Chanticleer," *Contributions to Psycho-analysis*; Markuszewicz, "Beitrag zum antistischen Denken bei Kindern," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, vi, 1920.]

all subsequent object relations by fusing love and aggression towards one and the same object. At the mouth stage an inner tension, hunger, is dealt with aggressively by muscular movement towards and incorporation of what ultimately proves to be an outer object. But the fact of gratification makes this object a love object: as Freud puts it, at the oral stage of libido organisation amorous possession is still one and the same as annihilation of the object¹. In this sense, whilst the nipple provides a path both for love and hate, we can also say that hate precedes and finds a path for love. Keeping in mind, then, the close connection between this archaic ambivalence, introjection and identification at the oral stage, we are better able to appreciate what may happen when, in the course of *later* identification of *complete* objects, a sexual striving leads to the formation of love choice towards the complete object of the opposite sex, in other words, we can trace the influence of oral development in the Oedipus situation. In the first place, the erotic striving towards the parent of the opposite sex leads to a hostile attitude towards the parent of the same sex—so that, as Freud puts it, the ambivalence implicit in the original identification becomes manifest². The second oral contribution occurs when later this erotic striving is abandoned. A tendency then exists to regress to the oral method already mentioned, of introjection and identification, the boy adopting feminine characteristics, the girl masculine. In this description we have obviously singled out special aspects of the Oedipus situation to illustrate oral mechanisms, but we might add that in Freud's view all other abandoned object investments are dealt with in this way: it is, as he says, a kind of regression to the oral phase, and to it is due in large part the formation of character³.

It must be clear, of course, that other erogenous zones influence this ambivalent attitude towards objects in addition to playing a part in character formation, and it is essential for us to consider how far these can effect mouth mechanisms. Take, for example, the relation to anal activity. In its primary form mouth gratification consists in swallowing and retention, anal gratification in expulsion. Later on we find a significant change: retention has become one of the anal pleasure features and, although less notable, rejection either in vomiting or breast refusal one of the modes of expression of the mouth. Both are associated with a more definite appreciation of the object and both can express ambivalence towards the object. In the mouth, however, the association of aggression with the eruption of teeth serves to mask this fusion of anal

¹ Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

² Freud, *Das Ich und das Es*.

³ Freud, *op. cit.*

144 *The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis*

characteristics, so much so that Abraham¹ divides the oral stage into an earlier purely autoerotic suckling stage, when there is no object and no ambivalence, and a later narcissistic cannibalistic stage, when ambivalence is expressed for the first time in total incorporation and destruction. As Abraham points out, such divisions are arbitrary in nature and although ambivalence obviously implies the existence of an object, differences in jaw activity from birth would suggest that in the first stage strong dispositions exist which help to determine the degree of later ambivalence. Here again Abraham² makes the interesting suggestion that the retention activity of the anal sphincter muscles is largely contributed to by the repression of oral ambivalence, or more correctly, of the sucking components.

We have seen that thwarting of the mouth zone from without leads to increased interest in other zones at first more independent or autoerotic in nature. It is easy to understand that the act of urination, especially for the male child with his nipple-like penis, provides many compensations for oral loss; here is an organ which produces precious fluid to command. Not only is this product equated with mother's milk, but, in common with other bodily secretions and excretions, it plays an important part in the infantile sexual theories, especially in the theories relating to baby-manufacture. Hence the urinary stage not only provides both direct and regressional autoerotic compensation, but, by the process of identification, continuity between suckling and the ejaculation of semen is established. The oral compensation in ejaculation is more obviously regressive in the case of the male, more in keeping with introjective identification with the mother: insemination provides the woman with direct compensation by the equations: penis = nipple; semen = milk. As far as my observation goes, in cases of *ejaculatio praecox* where emission is not only premature but lacks the usual spasmodic quality, there is in addition to strong urinary interests, a marked oral disposition; it is in this respect a reaction of oral 'impatience.' Other displacements of oral activity are to be found in the fore-pleasure stages of coitus: the kiss, the playful bite, the embrace, the enfolding represent a repetition with varying ambivalence of the swallowing or incorporation stage. In the technique of coitus, the immission of penis, perineal contractions which produce vaginal sucking, the ejaculation of semen and its retention or partial ejection, we have again mouth-nipple parallels which permit direct compensation of oral loss in the case of the woman and regressional identifica-

¹ Abraham, *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido*, I.P.V. 1924.

² Abraham, *op. cit.*

tion compensation in the case of the man. Moreover in the act of suckling, whilst the man can only obtain vicarious satisfaction in viewing the act, the woman has a double source of satisfaction, identifying with the mother and again, this time regressively, identifying with the father by the same penis-nipple equation.

We have now to consider the relation of oral activities to component impulses. It is perhaps simpler to regard these as forming a kind of ring, on the analogy of the ring formulae of organic chemistry, where the ultimate compound is determined by the nature of concentrations at one or more points in the ring. It has already been noted in describing the oral pictorial setting that touch, taste, sight and smell are more closely associated with the mouth than with any other erotogenic zone. Now, with the exception of auditory channels, these comprise the full set of instruments of projection and object formation. Thus the earliest act of viewing associated with instinct tension and gratification is the gradually increasing apprehending of the contours and colours of the breast area, whilst later on the elaborate ritual of uncovering the breast is sufficient to stamp the action of uncovering with pleasure memories. Here the association with touching is very close, and one has only to recall their equally intimate relation in sexual fore-pleasure and in the perversions, *e.g.* the pleasure in viewing, handling and punishing those other twin cupolas the buttocks, or again the satisfaction of the boy (and envy of the girl) aroused by the somewhat obstetrical ceremony of being assisted to urinate by his mother; or again the early forms of sexual assault at puberty by 'feeling.' Here we are encroaching on the territory of the sadistic-masochistic couple.

In early infancy the expression of aggression and mastery through special parts of the musculature, the jaw and hands is combined with stimulation of other highly erogenised tissues, the mucous membrane and skin, and is associated in particular with certain smell memories including sweat and blood. Moreover, whilst suckling provides erotic gratification for the mother, evidence in itself of the child's mastery over the object, scratching and biting especially at fissured nipples or inflamed breasts, give rise to maternal reactions which, although confirmatory evidence of mastery, are in striking contrast to pleasurable acquiescence. The immediate result is some degree of restraint which may end either in withdrawal of the nipple or actual retaliation on the child or both. At all events there is an association of loss (tension—'unlust'—pain) which is heightened where biting has had no relation to the supply of milk but has been rather an aggressive play. Teething and painful mouth affections

146 *The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis*

help to fuse erotic gratification with the infliction and enduring of pain, a fusion which is being at the time reinforced by experiences at the anal aperture. As has been said, Abraham¹ holds the view that biting constitutes the original form of the sadistic impulse.

If we now correlate these two developmental activities, viz. the displacement of interest between one erogenous zone and another, and the association and mutual modification of different component impulses we are in a position to understand, *not* the causal mechanism in perversions but what helps to determine the end product. It is useful to remember here that at the oral stages feeling is directed not so much towards the whole object as towards part objects—also that in regressive identification the part can be taken to represent the whole. In fellatio, for example, in addition to the later regressive displacement of interest from vagina to mouth, we have a mother-child situation where, in accordance with previous dispositions, biting, sucking or both these activities can be gratified on a magnified nipple. In cunnilingus, in addition to the proximity of the breast-like buttocks and the secretions and odours of the parts, there is a special sucking interest to which we will shortly have occasion to refer. The method of flight from incest phantasies represented in the perversions brings us naturally to consider the castration complex. And here we find yet another more direct link between oral development and the Oedipus complex. In birth we have the prototype of situations where a state of pleasure is followed by loss and tension, later this is repeated constantly in suckling and defaecation at a time when objects are in reality only part objects. Especially in the later stages this loss has a suspicious resemblance to punishment. Now the castration complex by definition represents the nexus of phantasies with associated effect relating to loss or injury of the phallus as a punishment for incestuous wishes. Hence weaning is one of the important factors in forming the precastration disposition. The essential difference is that in the castration situation a complete object is involved whilst the injury to the subject is either apprehended or phantasied: in precastration situations the loss is a real loss connected with a part object inside or outside the self (faeces-nipple). In orally fixated cases the loss of the penis-like nipple can colour the true castration complex to the extent of obscuring the essential guilt situation behind the latter².

¹ Abraham, *op. cit.*

² Although the technique of psycho-analytic treatment does not come within the scope of this paper, it may not be out of place to emphasise how understanding of the early stages of ego and libido development are necessary for effective handling of 'resistances.' The anxiety of castration is to be understood as one of the manifestations of incest-guilt; to

Study of the oral pictorial setting sheds much light on the formation of castration theories. It explains in large part the firmly rooted belief in the 'woman with the penis,' with its modifications, 'the woman with the hidden penis, the disappearing penis and the reappearing penis.' It adds an additional motivation to the sucking activities in cunnilingus (*i.e.*, to recover by suction the hidden phallus) whilst a passive reversal of a sadistic oral impulse, together with a projection on to the female genital of destructive mouth impulses can be traced in the fear that the female genital will, during coitus, tear away and suck in the male genitalia¹. Again the duplicate breasts give unconscious reality to the compensatory reassurance of polyphallic symbolism². Continuing the study of flight reactions, we are inevitably faced with the problem of homosexuality. We are already familiar with one of the main mechanisms involved whereby renunciation of the incestuous object is dealt with by introjection on the oral pattern, the boy adopting female, the girl masculine characteristics. Another factor contributed from oral sources is the degree of activity or passivity standardised in suckling technique. In the case of passive technique we have direct continuity with the attitude of the male passive homosexual. Again, active homosexuals of both sexes are able to represent in their object relations an identification with both suckling mother and suckled child. In both these situations the atmosphere of jealousy and rivalry has an additional historical setting where suckling of the rival brother or sister has been observed. Finally in reference to the narcissistic valuation of the penis in homosexuality, we have only to remind ourselves of the original carry-over from suckling, *via* urination to the penis. When this carry-over has been fixed in the narcissistic stage of object love (*i.e.* self + penis) the influence of the mouth has at any rate left a strong imprint on the situation, where it is represented in some degree of fear of, contempt for and anger against the absence of the penis in the woman.

regard it merely as an expression of penis-envy is to underrate its use in defence or assuagement of guilt. A further stage of defence exists where castration reactions are expressed entirely in terms of oral loss or grievance. On the other hand, an actual regressive expression of 'oral' guilt is a factor of the utmost importance in cases bordering on a manic-depressive state: hence it is essential to have some idea as to whether an oral fixation applies solely to libidinal organisation or has affected the process of ego-development (see further: Horney, "On the Genesis of the Castration Complex in Women," *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, Jan. 1924; Abraham, *op. cit.* and James Glover, "Notes on an Unusual Form of Perversion," *International Psycho-analytical Congress*, April, 1924).

¹ See also Boehm, *Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse*, VII, 3, 318.

² See also Flügel, "Polyphallic Symbolism and the Castration Complex," *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, April, 1924.

The same sequence of events, viz. carry-over from oral to urogenital interests plays a large part in the technique of masturbation, which has to be considered not only biologically but as a flight reaction from Oedipus gratifications. A situation of oral revenge is often observed in masturbatory technique, whereby the penis is punished by the act itself: the elusive nipple is at last at the mercy of the one-time baby: it is driven to produce milk and its ultimate collapse after orgasm is regarded at the same time as a just punishment. A reversal of this situation is seen in cases such as one described by Abraham where cessation of masturbation was followed by depression and extensive sweet-eating.

Finally no reference to the psycho-dynamics of the mouth would be complete without mention of various infantile theories. One need hardly mention the most vital connection, viz. the theory of impregnation and delivery by the mouth. Again the nexus of phantasies of watching parental coitus, has had the soil well prepared where suckling of the new baby is carried out before the chagrined rival.

I propose now to refer as briefly as possible to the more systematic description of abnormalities in which the mouth plays a part. It will be well to remind ourselves again that an oral fixation may refer to purely libidinal activity or to the stage of separation of ego from outer world which exists during the height of mouth gratification. In both instances the development of psychic mechanisms is rudimentary, and motor discharge is the easiest way of dealing with tension. Further, such psychic recalling of experience as exists has that quality of reality which is experienced in hallucination. In the case of conversion hysteria, we can see that the ego development has proceeded satisfactorily, hence that object investment, too, has been effective. Indeed, it has been carried forward to the genital stage and even in the most marked regression the subject-object relation is not really broken. The outstanding feature of these cases is the disorder of libido development. It is obviously difficult to disentangle from the advanced libido mechanisms involved in hysteria, the factors which are due more essentially to mouth disturbance, but the influence of a purely libidinal oral fixation can be easily understood. Moreover, we have only to reverse the libido path from mouth to genital to see how in regressive reinvestment, genital expression can be easily attained at the mouth end of the body, the more so that this displacement upwards serves to avoid implicating directly the anal-sadistic pregenital stage. It will be seen, too, that the part played by the mouth in infantile sexual theories of birth gives wide scope to the series

of conversion symptoms which affect the upper part of the alimentary tract.

In the obsessional neurosis, the primacy of the anal-sadistic organisation and the play of ambivalence determine the familiar formations, and it is not hard to see how oral difficulties which are exquisitely ambivalent will serve to sharpen this ambivalence in a cumulative sense. But it is specially interesting to note that whilst the disturbance in obsessional neurosis is mainly libidinal, the subject object relation is also affected. The attitude to the object has never been really that of *love of a whole object*, but is rather one of part-love (as Abraham terms it¹); that is to say, it is reminiscent of the early stages of object development when parts of the self, faeces, or parts of the object, nipple, contributed to the pleasure-pain organisation. Here we have a critical point in the development of the individual—another step back and we are amongst the psychoses. Indeed, it is to Freud's² penetrating study of melancholia and the elaborate investigations of Abraham³ that we owe most of our understanding of mouth mechanisms. The two primary factors to be recognised are a constitutional increase in mouth erotism and a special fixation of libido at the oral stage of development. Here again we have a disturbance of early ego-relations to the object, but one infinitely more grave. By far the greater part of object investment has remained at the stage of part-love, whilst the remainder has been attached to the whole object on a narcissistic basis (*i.e.* the self as object). Hence it is not surprising to find that when in addition an infantile narcissistic love injury has been reactivated by some later love injury, the slender narcissistic threads tend to snap and the object is lost. But not entirely lost; the same mouth mechanism which found the object in the first instance by way of cannibalistic love, helps to retain it now, but at the ransom price of identification. The object is incorporated into the ego and once inside the ego is subjected to hostility and criticism in keeping with the full blast of primary oral ambivalence. It is in this sense that we must translate the self-reproaches, *viz.* the castigation of the object in the self, as well as the self-reproach for the intolerable cannibalistic wish, which latter is expressed in a more dramatic form in the refusal of nourishment.

¹ Abraham, *op. cit.*

² Freud, "Trauer und Melancholie," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 4te Folge.

³ Abraham, "Die psychologischen Beziehungen zwischen Sexualität und Alkoholismus," "Ansätze zur psychoanalytischen Erforschung und Behandlung des manisch-depressiven Irreseins u.s.w.," "Untersuchungen über die früheste prägenitale Entwicklungsstufe der Libido," *Klinische Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse*, I.P.V. 1921. These earlier researches are amplified in his *Versuch einer Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido*, I.P.V. 1924.

150 *The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis*

Passing on to the mechanisms of paranoia, we can only note a recent formulation by Abraham that whilst the libido development has never got beyond the anal-sadistic stage, the relation of ego to object has not passed the stage of part-love, and that in the paranoid regression a part-introjection of the object, penis, faeces and probably breast, takes place as compared with the complete introjection of melancholia. At any rate we can readily imagine that as object relations have never been stable in these cases, the formation of the ego-ideal must necessarily be even more unstable, and indeed we can see in the delusional formations, how the ego-ideal has deteriorated and crumbled until criticism is once more heard as the voice from without.

This deterioration of the ego-ideal leads naturally to the consideration of an interesting group of conditions, where there is no psychotic appeal to the mechanism of projection but where, nevertheless, normal introjection of the criticising instances has not been completely effected. The voice from without, however, is a real voice and the punishment no less real, in the one instance social obloquy and in the other the ministrations of the penal code. The most fascinating examples are alcoholism and drug taking, and in no conditions can we find greater wealth of illustration of mouth influences in development. Needless to say, here as elsewhere the root of the matter lies in the overcoming of traumatic experience at the Oedipus stage, but the venue of the conflict has been widely displaced, and a factitious integrity of the genital system has been preserved by flight to socially infantile regressions whilst unconscious guilt is appeased by social criticism, ostracism or punishment. Indeed, if we go back to the ancient codes, we can see punishment reflecting an unconscious appreciation of the infantile structure behind these habits. A Chinese Edict of 1100 B.C. institutes the death penalty (symbolic castration) for drunkenness, and in the Laws of Manu it is said, "any twice born who has intentionally drunk the spirit of rice (*sura*) through perverse delusion of mind, may drink more spirit in flame and atone for his offence by burning his body: or he may drink boiling hot, until he die, the urine of a cow or pure water or milk or clarified butter or juice expressed from cow dung¹."

It is curious to note that whilst in both conditions a flight from homosexual impulses plays a large part in determining the nature of the habit, in the case of drug-taking by mouth, there is, as far as my observation goes, a deeper repression of the active impulses and a corresponding increase in the heinousness (or naughtiness) of the habit. In both instances

¹ *Institutes of Hindoo Law: Ordinances of Manu* (Wm Jones). Allen & Co.

there is an exceedingly strong oral libido-fixation, and as a consequence a strong precastration setting. It is interesting to observe how frequently in the series of adolescent tabus, the mouth plays directly or indirectly a constant part: masturbation, of course, stands by itself in this respect, but the series of adolescent prohibitions roughly runs in the order, swearing, smoking, drinking, gambling and direct sexual intimacies, the earliest of which are kissing and hugging (pseudo-incorporation). Smoking itself forms an interesting transition study, not only on account of its special technique but because in the judgment of modern society adult indulgence stands midway between alcoholism and some other mouth gratifications, such as tea-drinking and sweet-eating which are either regarded as normal or when excessive as indications of at the most a neurotic character. Here, again, there are distinctions within the habit. Like all other gratifications, it provides condensed expression for libido-formations arising at other erogenous areas and dating from more advanced stages of development, but special habit forms may be contributed largely from one special zone or stage. Thus whilst cigarette, cigar and pipe-smoking obviously mingle gratifications of an anal type with displaced genital representation, tobacco-chewing is much more subject to an anal-sadistic tabu. Once more we find an ascending series from the point of view of social criticism; viz. cigarette, cigar, pipe and chewing quid. Even in the colour and scent of tobacco there are expressed reaction-formations varying from an appreciation of fine bouquet to apprehension of 'lowness' associated with the consumption of black twist. The same can be said of the shape and size of smoking appurtenances, from the delicate innuendo of the, now old-fashioned, ladies' midget cigarette to the frankly phallic 'chest-warmer' pipe¹.

Considerations of this sort add to the difficulty of distinguishing between neurotic or perverted formations associated with the mouth and the neurotic mouth characteristic, which itself shades off gradually into mouth character traits. Theoretically the distinction can be drawn by a consideration of the instinct mechanisms involved² together with an appraisal of the degree of ego-ideal formation. Thus in alcoholism we find evidence of miscarriage of repression, together with a strenuous attempt to prevent the 'return of the repressed,' whilst the ego-ideal formations, as has been suggested, are unstable and tend to seek reinforcement from without. At the same time, by overstepping what are

¹ See also Brill, "Tobacco and the Individual," *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, III, 1923, and Hiller, *ibid*.

² Freud, "Die Disposition zur Zwangsneurose," *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, 4te Folge.

152 *The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis*

socially regarded as the necessities of the case, they clearly place themselves in the category of abnormal states. We may say roughly that what distinguishes the neurotic character from these more severe conditions is the fact that whilst the *libidinal* gratification of impulses is direct and real, it is seldom recognised as such by the individual, whilst the punishment situation is less directly associated with social blame and more with individual consequences. The dynamic situation, however, is essentially the same: repression, reaction-formation and sublimation have not been entirely effective, whilst the ego-ideal exhibits some degree of instability.

In the case of oral neurotic character, as with all other neurotic character formations, there are two main streams, one in which the gratification is in the 'thing' itself, activities associated with the self or object, and one where gratification is obtained through 'word'-presentations. A very brief study of speech formations will serve to show that in the colloquial and formal use of words, wide gratification is permitted the oral subject. Indeed, they are capable of loose subdivision in accordance with developmental instinct activities. The oral sadist not only adopts incisive speech to eat up his victim but revels in the use of words which describe the biting process; his sarcasm is biting, he flavours his sharp-tongued speech with corrosive wit, a process which usually ends in feeding-up his opponent. Less aggressive types chew the cud of reflection, whilst others, still more passive, prefer to drink in the distillations of wisdom. In Isaiah the word of God is likened to wine and milk¹. We assimilate and digest information or, according to taste, eschew and spue it out of our mouth; too voracious reading ends, as we are accustomed to hear, in mental indigestion. We might note, too, an interesting example of 'word-amphimixis' in one of the innumerable colloquial equivalents for coitus, viz. 'a cut off the joint.'

It is impossible to do more than mention the multiformity of gratifications in action; they penetrate into every nook and cranny of our daily life. One generalisation, however, can be made; all gratifications are capable of distinction in accordance with the satisfaction of active or passive aims: they stamp respectively the biter or the sucker. Study the mouthpieces of pipes, the stub ends of pencils, offer your friends chocolate caramels, ask them if they like new bread or stale, dry or buttered toast, time them over an inhospitable piece of steak, observe the degree of partial incorporation of the soup-spoon, the preference for jam or jelly, for apple or orange, for cutlet and saute or sausage and

¹ Isaiah, lv. i.

mashed potatoes, and in a few minutes you will be able to hazard a guess as to instinct modification after birth which may require the deepest analysis to bring home to the individual. Even in the melancholic atmosphere of the vegetarian restaurant, you will find the conscientious biter at his nut cutlet, the sucker at his instant postum; there is but one striking difference, a cannibalistic tabu reigns supreme over the heavily burdened unconscious of the hungry ones. Small wonder they are advised to think happily whilst they eat.

To the next stage in classification of oral characteristics we have already alluded in the more exaggerated form of alcoholism: there is, however, a minor degree of indulgence in eating and drinking, the feature of which is that whilst not notably neurotic, it does not conform to the mere necessities of self-preservative appetites. Here, as has been suggested, we will find the café frequenter, the diner-out, the theatre addict who, like the baby, combines viewing with sustenance, although in this case not milk but chocolate cream. There is just a trace of compulsion in their make-up, and around the public houses of a Sunday evening, one can invariably find a small crowd in a minor state of optimistic impatience, whose nursery battle-cry 'want a dink' once rent the fretful watches of the night. Amongst the third group, where mouth habits bear no relation to self-preservative appetite, we can include artists whose activities are confined to the stub-end of the pencil, paper chewers and blanket suckers, transatlantic gum masticators, and a horde of other miniature mouth perverts.

We have the key here to one other generalisation about mouth traits, viz. that the necessities of self-preservation and the toleration extended to ceremonial eating provide a screen behind which purely erotic activities can take cover and defy the censoring attentions of the ego-ideal. An immediate consequence of this is that there is not so much necessity for displacement on to a psychical plane, such as exists with the anal and urethral impulses which, being more definitely under suspicion and infinitely less tolerated, must attain gratification in the disguise of psychical character traits. But oral psychical traits do exist and have been neglected merely because they so closely resemble the so-called urinary character. Indeed we can add quite definitely that the same intermingling of erotogenic influences from mouth, urethra and anus takes place in character trait formation which we have already noted in neurotic mechanisms. Impatience, envy and ambition constitute the oral triad: a sense of immediate urgency, a necessity to 'get the thing over' (one thinks of the throat), an accompanying motor restlessness, an

154 *The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis*

envy of the achievement of others, a desire to climb (one thinks of the dizzy height of breast and lap), a hankering after the plums, and yet behind it all a feeling that the silver spoon is or ought to have been in the mouth. This fact, indeed, does help to distinguish oral from urethral ambition. As Abraham has pointed out¹, the ambition of the oral erotic always tends to security and regularity; in the case of the permanent official we see one who quietly, calmly and diligently sucks at the regularly proffered nipple of the public purse. There is, moreover, an echo of the old oral omnipotence to be traced in the ambition of the oral erotic. If the worst comes to the worst, it is, he conceives, his inalienable claim on society to be supported. He is in that sense an optimist; something is bound to turn up and doubtless he clings in the secret recesses of his mind to the magic formula, "Table! Cover thyself." But there is another side to his character; let reality come too perilously near, if he but guess that society is prepared to let him go wanting, that the nipple he confidently anticipated is only a dummy, immediately the sponge is thrown up; he turns his back on the unfaithful bosom and drifts into that irresponsibility which borders on primal narcissism. Or, again, he may turn in a rage on society and seek to get his rights by force or rapine, as once on a time he furiously clawed at his mother's bodice. Even in the absence of dire necessity this aggressive reaction can be noted, and oral impulses are seen to emerge in the less urgent gesture of kleptomania.

One more mode of oral representation demands our attention, the autoplasmic, or, to limit it to one variety, the physiognomic². Abraham has remarked on the surly expression of anal erotics, the raising of the upper lip and contraction of the nasal wings as if in the act of smelling. Oral physiognomy need hardly go beyond the lips and jaw musculature. At this point the stern-jawed hero of romance comes into his own and testifies to a lifelong steadiness of oral purpose in striking contrast to the darling of the music-hall with his slack jaw and loose bibulous lips. These, indeed, speak louder than words, and in their firm or loose line, pursed or tremulous set, pout or pucker, moistness or dryness, bear silent witness to the instinct tendencies of life as they existed in the first few months after birth.

¹ Abraham, "Beiträge der Oralerotik zur Charakterbildung," *International Psycho-analytic Congress*, April, 1924.

² Abraham, "Ergänzungen zur Lehre vom Analcharakter," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1, 1923.

NOTE. In addition to the references given throughout this paper, the following may be consulted. Forsyth, "The Rudiments of Character," *Psychoanalytic Review*, VIII, 2, 1921; Sadger, *Die Lehre von den Geschlechtsverirrungen*, Deuticke, Wien, 1921; Hug-Hellmuth, *A Study of the Mental Life of the Child*, Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co.; also various shorter communications on oral manifestations or their modifications by Ferenczi, Spielrein, Eisler and many others in recent volumes of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*.

With the exception of one reference to Freud's *Totem and Tabu*, no mention has been made of the researches of applied psycho-analysis on the present subject. These will be found to provide a series of interesting ethnological and other parallels to many of the mechanisms described. The researches of Roheim are particularly interesting, e.g., "Nach dem Tode des Urvaters," *Imago*, ix, 1, 1923; as are those of Jones, "The Symbolic Significance of Salt," "The Madonna's Conception," *Essays in Applied Psycho-analysis*, 1923. Other references to the subject are to be found in Rank, *Beiträge zur Mythenforschung* I.P.V. No. 4, 1922, Riklin, *Wunscherfüllung und Symbolik im Märchen*, 1908 etc.

CRITICAL NOTICE

Versuch einer Genitaltheorie, von Dr S. FERENCZI. Internationale Psychoanalytische Bibliothek. Band xv, 1924. Pp. 128.

In the first of the three sections into which this work is divided, Dr Ferenczi, starting from the position reached by Freud in his *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, attempts a further analysis of the act of coitus itself, which, as he says, has been rather neglected in subsequent work. In the processes leading up to ejaculation he recognises the co-existence of the discharging and retaining factors associated by psychoanalysis with urethral and anal erotism respectively, and describes coitus as an 'amphimixis' of urethral and anal erotisms. In this description the *specific* nature of genital erotism hardly receives sufficient emphasis. The term amphimixis, which was given by Weismann to the complete mingling of the gamete nuclei in conjugation, is not happily applied to a process in which we may indeed trace the effect of the earlier erotisms, but which is certainly not constructed solely by them, as the zygote nucleus is constructed solely by the gamete nuclei. The whole section contains, however, very many illuminating observations and reflections—too numerous to mention in detail—which certainly deepen considerably our knowledge of the psychology of coitus. Among these may be mentioned the fundamental importance of the psychical identification of the individual with the penis, and then with the semen and spermatozoon, which permits the vicarious satisfaction of the striving to return to the body of the woman; the function of genital erotism in 'draining off' libido from other organs of the body and thus freeing them from libidinal tension for their functions of utility in the individual life; and the analysis of the development of the sense of *erotic* reality parallel with the author's earlier treatment (1913) of the development of the 'sense of reality' at large, in which he dealt with the progressive adaptation of the non-erotic psychical relation to environment.

The second section deals with 'phylogenetic parallels' to the process of coitus, and with the development of a theory of psychical regression to the aquatic life of the remote ancestors of the higher vertebrates, represented in the life of the individual mammal by the foetal liquid environment of the amniotic sac. As a starting point for his phylogenetic considerations, Dr Ferenczi takes the widespread 'fish symbolism' which

appears in myth and folklore as well as in the dreams and fantasies of the individual. In this the fish is equated to penis and to child, the sea (or water) to vagina and to uterus. The swimming fish is thus the symbol both of coitus and of the foetal situation, and Ferenczi's theory is that this symbolism implies an actual psychical reminiscence of the aquatic life of the lower vertebrates. He calls attention to the fact that among the vertebrates only the higher (terrestrial) groups have a specialised copulatory organ, indications of which are already found among the amphibians; and that the same terrestrial forms possess an amniotic sac which encloses the embryo in a liquid medium during its development—among reptiles and birds in the egg, among mammals in the uterus of the mother. Thus the act of hatching in the former groups, and of birth in the latter, represents the transference of the organism from a liquid to an aerial environment, corresponding phylogenetically with the transition from aquatic to terrestrial life. This event is a 'catastrophe' which the race once experienced, and which every individual higher vertebrate experiences during its own lifetime. The ontogenetic trauma of birth is identified with the phylogenetic trauma of forced adaptation to aerial life consequent on the emergence of land from the sea. The psychical symbolism which psychoanalysts interpret as a striving to return to the mother's body also represents a striving to return to the aquatic life of remote ancestors which existed before the 'catastrophe.' From this point of view the act of coitus itself is a parallel striving, since the individual identifies himself with the penis, and also with the semen or with the individual spermatozoon.

In regard to the actual causes of evolution (phylogenesis) Dr Ferenczi rejects the 'Darwinian' explanation of the accumulation of 'chance' favourable variations leading to adaptation to new conditions in favour of the 'more psychological' mode of thought of Lamarck, which claims a place for impulses and strivings as factors in evolution. Here he seems to neglect the trend of biological discovery and thought during the past quarter of a century, which has robbed that old controversy of most of its actuality. The modern biologist treats the causation of new characters as an independent problem from that of survival. We know a great deal more about the detailed causation of organic structure than we did in Darwin's time, though still very little compared with what there is to know. The modern biologist has no prejudice against accepting the reality of effects of somatic processes on the germ plasm leading to an alteration of the soma of the next generation, so far as such effects can be demonstrated. There is no doubt evidence which seems to establish

such effects in some cases, but certainly not enough to justify the wholesale adoption, as a general theory of evolution, of the view that 'impulses and strivings' of the individual higher animal, initiated by new factors of the environment, can be transferred to the germ plasm so as to reproduce such impulses and strivings in subsequent generations independently of the persistence of the external cause, or so as to produce an increasing effect on organic structure. Nor is it at all clear that psychoanalytic theory really demands such an assumption. In rejecting the origin 'by chance variation' of the amniotic sac as a protective organ for the delicate embryo in just those animals which at no time of their extra-uterine life breathe through gills, Dr Ferenczi writes of the belief that the amniotic fluid represents an 'introjected sea' in the body of the mother as corresponding better with the psychoanalytic sense for the determination and motivation of all biological and mental processes (p. 75). This line of thought represents a false antithesis. The doctrine of determinism is not a monopoly of psychoanalysis but a necessary postulate of all science, nor has 'chance' any meaning in biology in which it can be opposed to that doctrine. It is certainly true, however, that the cause of the appearance of a character may have no direct reference to its ultimate use. That is the meaning of Herbert Spencer's old distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' adaptation. There are plenty of well established cases of indirect adaptation in biology. It can never be too strongly insisted that what biology is concerned with is the knowledge of the *causes* of organic phenomena, whether these are initiated by physical or by psychical relations. And as to that we should keep a completely open mind, judging of each case on the evidence.

On the biological facts the amniotic fluid is certainly a substitute for, and in that sense 'represents,' the sea—or, if we like, is a sea introjected into the body of the mother. Psychoanalysis is not necessary to tell us that. Whether, as Dr Ferenczi suggests, the strivings of the adult individual to restore or maintain the primitive environment of its embryonic life was the cause or any part of the cause of the origin of the amnion, is another question. It is not easy to see how it could have been, nor does our author concern himself with the way in which such causation would actually work. And whether the human psychical symbolism in which a fish is equated with the embryo and the sea with the mother has any direct connexion with the evolutionary story is still another question. Similarly with the equivalence of the phylogenetic origin of the conjugation of unicellular organisms with fertilisation (*i.e.* conjugation of gametes) in the higher organisms. That has long been accepted biological

doctrine. The formation of gametes is the return to the primitive unicellular type, as it was in the simplest multicellular organism and has been ever since. The parallelism of the original formation of unicellular organisms from supposed pre-existing indefinite living substance with the escape ('birth') of ripe sexual cells from the sexual glands is more fanciful, for, after all, the ripe gametes (sexual cells) have other cells as ancestors, and the original unicellular organisms, by hypothesis, had not. Dr Ferenczi would have done better to compare the last divisions of the sperm mother cells to form spermatozoa and the corresponding divisions of the unripe ovum (formation of 'polar bodies') with those divisions of unicellular organisms, which may be supposed (on the basis of good evidence from the life-history of existing forms) to bring them into a condition in which conjugation is necessary as a prelude to further division. Instead of this he compares the 'ripening' of the gametes—a term applied to the divisions just mentioned—with the 'production of organic life'! The author's biological parallels, so far as they are sound, are therefore already well known (with the exception of the comparison of birth with the change from aquatic to aerial environment). Their phylogenetic psychoanalytic interpretation must remain open to doubt.

The essence of the author's general standpoint is the carrying over of the psychoanalytic methods into biology, and their thoroughgoing application to animals, organs and tissues. This 'psychomorphism' is defended by the example of Freud, who, in his *Sexualtheorie*, reconstructed, according to Dr Ferenczi, a whole department of biology by applying ideas gained from the study of the psychoneuroses. That Freud illuminated the whole problem of sexual ontogeny by boldly ignoring any artificial line between biology and psychology is indisputable. But it would be truer to say that, with the psychoneurotic material as a guide, he applied biological methods of thought to the problem of the development of the psyche. The physicist, says Dr Ferenczi, can only make physical processes intelligible by comparing them with 'attractions,' 'repulsions,' 'inertia,' etc., things of which we have our primary knowledge in our own psyche. In seeking for the meaning (Sinn) of a process, one looks, he says, for analogies in other branches of science. And he concludes that phenomena must be measured by a scale taken from a different branch of knowledge. In the case of biology and psychology he boldly formulates the statement that everything physical and physiological finally needs a 'meta'-physical (psychological), and everything psychological a meta-psychological (physical) explanation (p. 4).

The comment is inevitable that physicists do not 'explain' physical

processes by referring them to attractions and repulsions, nor by any other 'metaphysical' means, and that no amount of the most successful 'seeking of analogies' will ever 'explain' phenomena scientifically. That can only be done by stating phenomena of a certain degree of complexity in terms of simpler ones, and showing that the laws which apply to the simpler apply also to the more complex: as for instance when we find we can explain part at least of the behaviour of living protoplasm by referring it to physical and chemical processes which obtain also in non-living substances; or again when the interaction of chemical substances is explained by the theory of ionisation, or the specific behaviours of the elements by the electronic theory of the constitution of matter. In all such scientific explanations more complex processes are explained in terms of simpler ones, biological processes by reference to physics and chemistry, chemical processes by the discovery of physical processes on which they depend. No one has gained any useful scientific result by attempting to 'explain' simpler processes by more complex ones, or phenomena belonging to a 'lower' plane (*e.g.* the biological) with the help of phenomena belonging to a 'higher' one (*e.g.* the psychical). Such attempts belong to the pre-scientific period, and so far as they have been used in science they have done nothing but mislead. Yet that is what Dr Ferenczi asks us to do when he says that everything physical and physiological finally needs a 'meta'-physical (psychological) explanation.

Up to a point the behaviourists have successfully dealt with psychological phenomena in terms of biology, but it is generally held (except by members of that school) that their method of approach cuts them off from the phenomena which depend specifically on self-consciousness. In this sphere the psychoanalytic methods and conceptions have had great success, precisely because they can interpret many phenomena of behaviour and of conscious psychical activity in terms of something simpler, the impulses (*Triebe*) of Freud's Unconscious—many of which we have in common with the other higher animals—and their reactions with consciousness. In this task, as it seems to the reviewer, psychoanalysis has been considerably hampered by want of an adequate terminology. Freud borrowed conceptions and terms from the psychology of consciousness and applied them to the simpler processes of the unconscious mind, often with a strange unreal effect which accounts for part—though doubtless not the largest part—of the opposition to psychoanalytic theory. This handicap does not, of course, affect the validity of the results, because the phenomena he deals with are real phenomena. It simply means that they are rather misleadingly named. Freud, however,

except in one or two of his latest works, deals always with the psychical, and his success has been achieved by interpreting the complex in terms of the simpler *on the same plane* (i.e. the psychical), the special in terms of the general, neurotic symptoms, character traits and the like in terms of primarily unconscious impulses and affects. And if his use of such words as 'sex,' 'wish,' 'pleasure,' for instances, inevitably carrying with them the mass of conscious and half conscious connotations which they have acquired in their popular uses, have a strange and bewildering effect when applied to the undifferentiated and largely unconscious impulses for which Freud employs them, still the derivation of the differentiated from the undifferentiated forms of these impulses, and the essential unity of all the human impulses dealt with under each concept, are sufficiently clear. But when we pass out of the sphere of the human mind, conscious and unconscious, and apply the same conceptions to the organic, and even to the inorganic, their unsuitability—to use the mildest possible word—becomes glaringly apparent. Finally this method leads Dr Ferenczi to wonder (p. 127) whether Nietzsche was not right when he said that "all inorganic matter is derived from the organic, it is dead organic material!"

We would not for a moment be supposed to cast doubt on the unity of the organic world, or of nature at large. That the same principles which are at work in the human mind are at work in the simplest forms of life and in the inorganic world is clear enough. But their elucidation must be begun from the other end. We cannot go back on the whole method of science. Dr Ferenczi's bold and adventurous mind has produced a work full of ingenious suggestion and speculation, and much of it may be of considerable heuristic value. But he has got hold of the stick by the wrong end.

A. G. TANSLEY.

REVIEWS

Psychology and Primitive Culture. By F. C. BARTLETT, M.A. Cambridge University Press, 1923. Pp. ix + 294. Price 8s. 6d.

To a certain extent the title of this book is misleading. The word "primitive" as applied to man and society implies pre-historic, but no attempt is here made to re-construct the psychology of any imaginary group that could be called "primitive" in this sense. The cultures to which reference is made are all modern and can only be called "primitive" on the assumption that the modern savage is a living representative of "primitive" man. "After all," R. R. Marett reminds us in his volume *Anthropology*, "the Australians, or Tasmanians, or Bushmen, or Eskimo, of whom so much is beginning to be heard amongst pre-historians, are our contemporaries—that is to say, have just as long an ancestry as ourselves."

The fact is that Mr Bartlett has a very much wider and deeper interest in view than would be involved in an attempt to psychologize about primitive culture in the sense of that which is supposed to be the original form of culture—which must always be an ideal construction. His concern is with psychology and culture as we know it, on the assumption, both legitimate and necessary if there is to be any scientific inquiry, that culture, present, past or future, is always and everywhere the product of the interaction of certain elements in human nature and the environment. He treats of the culture of social groups which have a different civilization from that to which we are accustomed in the West because they are more elementary, and the general conditions are simpler; consequently the responses which are inevitably involved in all social groups can there be observed and traced to their essential conditions with more precision and accuracy than is possible in the direct investigation of the complex social groups of highly civilized communities. These instances of culture are called primitive partly for want of a better term, partly to indicate the greater simplicity of the situation, and partly also on the ground that the fundamental determinants of response, which can more clearly be discerned here than in highly civilized society, must be conceived to be genuinely primitive. In a word, it is the responses which are involved in there being any culture at all, not in a particular type arbitrarily called "primitive" as opposed to "modern," that Mr Bartlett is trying to distinguish and classify. His book, therefore, is in effect a careful statement of a programme or method for social psychology—and indeed for psychology in general, and as such it is of first-rate importance. It is a very definite and significant contribution to psychology, for it both offers real explanations and sets forth a method which is capable of very wide and fruitful application.

The scheme proposed may be thus outlined: The psychological study of society, to be scientific, must be objective; it must aim at explanation with the help of as few fundamental assumptions as possible. Behaviour is objective and observable, and it is to be accounted for as the result of human "tendencies" on the one hand, and material provided by the environment on the other. The fundamental psychological problem, then, is to indicate and give some account of the "tendencies." In the first instance they are to be distin-

guished from anything which is necessarily involved in individual consciousness. They are in the nature of a *bias*, which it is not possible (or necessary) to analyse into anything simpler, and their expression in particular types of behaviour is affected by their mutual relations, such as conflict and inhibition, co-operation and reinforcement. "In any case the important thing is not merely to obtain a list of the tendencies but to study the relationships which in given cases they bear one to another, and to elucidate the effects of these relationships." Mr Bartlett distinguishes four classes of tendencies to response which must be taken into account in social psychology. 1. The fundamental social relationship forms of "primitive comradeship, assertion and submission." 2. Certain other responses having a specifically social reference, in particular "the tendencies towards conservation, and the social form of constructiveness." 3. Certain individual instincts which have a social significance, largely determined by their relation to the fundamental social relationship forms. 4. "Group difference tendencies which cluster about the social institutions and conventions of a particular community, and exercise a relatively direct influence upon the social behaviour of the individual."

Granted the "tendencies"—which are no more and no less invented than are the atoms and electrons of physics—there is no need, Mr Bartlett maintains, for the social psychologist to concern himself, in the first instance, about personal attitudes, beliefs, etc. Indeed the significance of these cannot be estimated until an adequate objective study, along the lines of the suggested scheme, has been carried out. There is no doubt whatever that Mr Bartlett is right; and his demand for a more scientific, and less literary and artistic approach to the psychological problems of society is timely. The conception of man as an active agent in nature is fruitful only if we can determine what are the springs of action. All attempts to account for man, especially in society, on the assumption that he is primarily rational, and that he is social because of a rationally devised "social contract," or even because he critically accepts a social tradition, or environment, have failed to account for anything: all they have achieved has been a rationalization of some existing social order or theory. In point of fact, individual self-consciousness and critical reason are probably refinements which could only have arisen under the protection of a fairly developed social life (as Trotter pointed out in his *Instincts of the Herd*) and they remain subsidiary elements, and have never reached the status of primary determinants. The primary determinants are, in the psychological sense, unconscious; and the only hope for any intelligent modification or development of social life resides in the endeavour to discover the real conditions of social response—the fundamental social and individual tendencies and their inter-relation which underlie all behaviour. What psycho-analysis has done for individual psychology, in making clear the interaction of psychic factors which belong to much deeper and more "primitive" levels than that of rational self-consciousness, needs to be done for society at large; and the task, which McDougall may be said to have initiated in his *Introduction to Social Psychology* in 1908 has been advanced in a notable degree by Mr Bartlett in the present work.

J. CYRIL FLOWER.

Mnemic Psychology. By RICHARD SEMON. Translated by BELLA DUFFY. With an Introduction by VERNON LEE. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 344. Price 14s. net.

This is a translation of Semon's *Mnemische Empfindungen*, the introducer having "altered the title from 'Mnemic Sensations' to 'Mnemic Psychology,'" and having "ventured to suppress...the sub-title 'First Continuation of Mneme.'" These changes have been made, avowedly, to shield the work from the attacks of those biologists who, not agreeing with "Semon's contention that memory and heredity are two aspects of the same organic function," dealt unkindly with his earlier work on *Mneme* (pp. 11-13). In fleeing one foe, however, the flank has become exposed to another, for while modern psychologists might welcome the work under the less pretentious title, the day when an atomistic senso-associationism might hope to win general acceptance as a complete psychology would seem to be past. "As we see a certain colour or a certain figure again and again, we do not go on accumulating images or representations of it, which are somewhere crowded together like shades on the banks of the Styx¹." "The sole serious rival to the doctrine of separate faculties is that which, far smaller in both number and eminence of its advocates, has tried to resolve all knowing ultimately into sensation, and all thinking into nothing more than associative reproduction. But this senso-associationism, although indeed holding out an unmatched promise of scientific simplicity, breaks down by reason of flagrant conflict with the actual facts. In any case it certainly lacks the character of modernness; its associationist constituent goes back at least a couple of centuries, whilst the sensism, is co-ancient with the doctrine of faculties itself²." The error in tactics, however, is not the author's, who had no illusions as to the completeness of the work and, while promising further instalments, carefully insists that all enquiry in this "first continuation" must be subordinated to the chief aim—the study of mnemic sensations which "spring from [the] individually acquired, not from [the] inherited engram-store" (p. 58)—and with disconcerting *naïveté*, without any attempt at definition, uses *attention*, *volition* and *voluntary effort* as foundation, fundamental concepts on which to build with assurance. He has added a valuable chapter to the attempt to enmesh perception and recognition in mathematical formulae but has unwittingly acknowledged the inadequacy of his scheme as a complete psychology by making free, uncritical use of the "commonsense" psychology of the physical and biological sciences.

Commencing a summary of his first chapter, the author writes: "We recognise as...elements of any given contents of consciousness only *sensations*, and we consider what are called feelings not as specific elements but only as shades of sensation. These sensations we divide...into original and mnemic sensations." The original sensations are the *sensations* of ordinary psychology. The mnemic sensations are the *images* of ordinary psychology and are classed as sensations because the only criterion of differentiation between sensations and images is an indirectly ascertainable one—"the manner in which they are produced and preserved." "The directly ascertainable distinction of greater or less vividness" breaks down in borderland cases (p. 69). Original sensations, for the author, are reactions to original stimulation "received directly and observed introspectively" and correspond to original excitations

¹ Ward, *Psychological Principles*, 1918, p. 81.

² Spearman, *The Nature of Intelligence etc.*, 1923, pp. 26-7.

which are indirectly inferred (p. 57). "Excitation and sensation [are not] cause and effect [but] merely...the same objects taken in from different stand-points" (p. 63). Now excitation of material sense organs and original sensations being but the same 'objects' from different standpoints and mnemonic sensations being identical with original sensations from one of these standpoints, the other standpoint is assumed to demand an excitation of material "stimulable substance" as the correlate of mnemonic sensation and this is found in the ecphory of an engram.

"The engram is a lasting, latent change in the organic substance" (p. 171). "The ecphory of an engram should be understood as being its passage from the latent to the active state or, in other words, the arousing of a condition of excitation (= sensation), which has remained as a permanent, though locally dormant, alteration in the sensitive substance of an organism" (p. 179). The processes concerned and the dependence of mnemonic sensation on original sensation are set out in two mnemonic principles:

I. The principle of engraphy: "All simultaneous excitations (manifested in our case by sensations) within our organisms form a connected simultaneous complex of excitations which, as such, acts engraphically, that is to say, leaves behind it a connected and, to that extent, unified engram-complex" (pp. 159-160).

II. The principle of ecphory: "An ecphoric effect upon a simultaneous engram-complex is obtained by the partial return of the excitation-complex which on its side has deposited an engram-complex, and this return must take the form either of original excitations (produced by an original stimulus) or of mnemonic excitations (produced in the second instance by a mnemonic process)" (p. 181).

Stimulation of a sense organ results in original excitation (sensation), the excitation outliving the stimulus and dying down, at first rapidly and then more slowly. The phase of excitation (sensation) coterminous with the stimulation is termed the synchronous phase: the succeeding phase, which again may be subdivided, is termed the acoluthic phase. The synchronous phase and acoluthic phase together make up an original excitation (sensation). An isolated simple sensation is never experienced: we are ever the victims of simultaneous complexes of excitations, some in synchronous phase and others in all stages of the acoluthic phase and each simultaneous complex leaves its engram impress in "some still blank portion of the stimulable substance" (p. 258). The 'simultaneousness' must have duration for "every process of excitation in our organic substance, even the briefest, must take a measurable time" (p. 170), and as in each duration block the acoluthic phases of excitation from past stimuli are mingled with the synchronous phase of excitations from present stimuli and will carry over, with new acoluthic phase excitation from present stimuli, into the next duration block we have an organic basis for the 'specious present' and all 'forms of association' can be reduced to simultaneous association (Ch. X).

In the engram complex left by a simultaneous excitation complex, in addition to the engrams from original excitations, there are engrams from the mnemonic excitations present and also "a ground pattern left by the cyclically recurrent organic sensations...making a sort of background on which all other engrams are embroidered." In this 'sort of background' is found the explanation of the non-reversibility of mnemonic succession, for when the complex is ecphorised "these mnemonic breathing and circulation excitations (= sensations)

are prevented from reversing their course by the inevitable presence during every ecphory of original sensations of breathing and circulation" (Ch. XI).

Two forms of localisation of the engram store are recognised—one the *topogenous* localisation described at length in *Mneme* and corresponding to the "special topographical configuration in the central organ" (p. 261), the other *chronogenous* localisation introduced to account for the fact that "our individually acquired store of engrams is always at our disposal in chronological strata" (p. 171). The author is satisfied that the basis of each form of localisation is a material change in the stimuable substance but criticises the more common physiological explanations of facilitation and declares that to follow this material change "into the molecular stage [is] a hopeless undertaking at the present stage of our knowledge" (pp. 154, 259, 328).

The concept of homophony, confined to mnemonic homophony in *Mneme*, is extended and used to explain *abstraction*, increase in *vividness*, and "differentials of sensations" such as "sensation of depth" and *recognition* in a way that compels careful consideration, and, whether we can accept his foundation assumptions and agree with his conclusions or not, arouses regret that the author was unable to give to us "that further application of the general modes of thinking and the special methods inaugurated in his *Mneme* which [he] proposed making in a future work" (p. 338).

In the interesting introduction we are given a warm appreciation of Semon's work in the form of "Notes on some applications of *mnemic* principle in recent psychological literature."

The translator has given us a very readable edition of a difficult work, but a few errors that have been missed seem to call for a correcting slip.

R. J. BARTLETT.

The Unstable Child: An Interpretation of Psychopathy as a Source of Unbalanced Behaviour in Abnormal and Troublesome Children. By FLORENCE MATEER, A.M., Ph.D., Formerly Psycho-clinician in the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research. New York and London: D. Appleton and Co., 1924. Pp. xii + 471. Price \$ 2.75.

This book is a rather important, because constructive, contribution to our understanding of constitutional personality-defect. It materially helps us to clarify a little our more or less indefinite notions as to this greatly important branch of psychiatry. It does this all the better because it discusses the beginnings of psychopathy, namely in children. Personality, the individuality of mankind, is so uniquely complex and various, so incommensurable and irrelative, that every discussion and real description must receive especial welcome from those who pursue "the proper study of mankind" as man.

The author comes to her work well prepared by both 'education' and experience. After graduation from the Pennsylvania State Normal School at West Chester and five years of classroom teaching in the grades, Dr Mateer was for three years research assistant to Dr H. H. Goddard at the Training School for the Feeble-Minded at Vineland, New Jersey. Three years of graduate work at Clark University were followed by two years as psychologist at the Massachusetts Institution for the Feeble-Minded. The next three years were spent as psycho-clinician in the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research. Thereafter

Dr Mateer established at Columbus a private school for corrective treatment of psychopathic children in which her present contribution has grown and been tested. It is doubtful if a medical course would have added much to her adequacy in this constructive writing, however much it would advantage her in the actual handling of the children.

Psychopathy stresses the *badly-functioning* aspect of personality-defect, just as mental deficiency, 'amentia,' 'oligophrenia,' as Bleuler poorly calls it, stands for a native or acquired lessening proper of intelligence abstract, social, or mechanical, or all of them at once. This book emphasises the humanness, so to say, and the curability of much of the psychopathy of childhood: "The world in which we live is a world full of people who show tendencies toward such traits as excessive talking [*sic*] (so-called verbalism), mutism, irrational anger, extreme irritability, or ease of acquiring a 'grouch,' too easily aroused optimism ['aroused optimism' is a fine bit of cynicism too], incoherence, irrationality, automatic habits, perseverative conversation on the same subject, too great interest in the subject of sex, over-inquisitiveness, solitariness, lying evidently for the joy of it. One-half of the world is constantly wearing out and using up energy needlessly because of the irritating inconsequences of the other half. It is not obvious, glaring lack of intelligence that exasperates one so frequently in everyday life, but the 'peculiarities,' 'mannerisms,' and 'oddities,' too small to resent, too great to accept without actual nerve-strain.... We are all more or less psychopathic. The determining factor is the *degree* of our malfunctioning.... Only when such an individual's variation, or a group of such variations, makes an individual's behaviour deviate so definitely from what is done by the social group to which he as an individual belongs that it is impossible for him to live as a member of that group, without definite discomfort to the group, or without violating the social code in such a way as becomes a menace to human progress, may we say that his condition is definitely psychopathic."

The criterion of psychopathy, then, for Miss Mateer, is more or less local custom, and a psychopath in Massachusetts would be normal or superman even in sight of Mount Albert Edward in Papua. But for practical purposes, however inadequate in theory, this definition works out very well. The psychopathic child is a child maladjusted to highly-civilised communities.

Perhaps the best way of suggesting the range and the contents of this thoughtful book is to quote the thirty-one chapter-titles. They are divided into two groups, respectively relating to theory and to practice: "The Origin of Clinical Psychology; Recent Tendencies in Clinical Psychology; Problems of To-day; The Future Laboratory of Clinical Psychology; The Clinical Psychologist, Himself; Means and Methods; Verification of Results; Results So Far Obtained; A New Angle: Psychopathy; Methods of Determining Psychopathy; Serepta, a Psychopath; The Delinquent as a Deviate; A Practical Study of Delinquents; Children Under Six Mentally; Children Six to Nine Mentally; Children Ten to Twelve Mentally; Normal, but—; Intelligence Plus Delinquency; Generalisations; Congenital Syphilis; Conclusions." And there is a good index as well as an adequately-orienting preface.

As is the common recent practice (often overdone) in this kind of a work, almost half the book is taken up with case histories and a somewhat detailed analysis in mental age groups of the cases studied at the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research. This includes an excellent brief discussion of the delinquency of childhood and of early adolescence.

"It is wrong mental *function*—psychopathy—that explains unbalanced behaviour when mental age, heredity, environment, physical condition, and education give no clue." "There is no such thing as a bad child. Either he does not know any better or else he cannot help it." "Pure cussedness," the intuitive slogan of so many parents and guardians, has no obvious place as a reality in the neopallium of Dr Mateer.

"The psychopath is a chance waste-product of our attempts at civilisation. [One wonders if the author be a socialist at heart.] He will not grow less numerous. He is with us to stay. It is our duty and our privilege to study and to help him. He feels intensely, lives exceedingly. He is a bundle of contradicting desires, abilities, and defects. He has potentialities. *What he needs* is early detection, long years of training, supervised parole without stigma, and a chance to make good."

Such optimism does the author, a young woman, credit. Surely it will not be her fault if the years show that the optimism be extravagant—for the problem is one of the most basal and difficult in the whole vast range of humanity's amelioration and evolution.

NEW YORK.

GEORGE VAN NESS DEARBORN.

Abnormal Behaviour: An Introduction to the Study of Abnormal and Anti-Social Behaviour. By IRVING J. SANDS, M.D., and PHYLLIS BLANCHARD, Ph.D. London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1923. Pp. viii + 482. Price 16s. net.

The writers of this book have sought to give a general summary of recent work upon abnormalities in human conduct. To contribute new data or original views is not their purpose. What they have aimed at is a sane and systematic presentation of current views, without emphasising any one theory or aspect at the cost of the remainder.

The first portion of the book consists of a description of the emotional, intellectual and physical bases of human behaviour. In discussing the emotional basis they accept McDougall's view that each human emotion is correlated with a special instinctive tendency, and that these instinctive tendencies, together with the emotional energy which their excitement releases, form the main-springs of human conduct. The list of instincts offered by the writers differs a little from that familiarised by English psychologists. It comprises the following: (1) the food-seeking instinct, correlated with the feeling of hunger; (2) the instinct to escape, correlated with the emotion of fear; (3) the instinct to fight, correlated with the emotion of anger; (4) the reproductive instincts, correlated with sexual emotion; (5) the parental instinct, correlated with parental emotion; (6) the tendency to manipulate, correlated with the feeling of curiosity; (7) the instinctive and emotional activities designated by the term play; and, finally, (8) the gregarious tendencies and emotions, by which is understood the impulse to act like other members of the herd. Other instincts sometimes recognised, such as those of self-assertion, self-subjection, and disgust, are passed over. They are (somewhat singularly) considered as of relatively small importance for the problems of human behaviour. In discussing emotional conflicts as causes of disorders of behaviour, the writers

lay chief stress upon the sexual instincts. But they also believe that feelings of fear and feelings of inferiority may cause analogous disturbances.

Intelligence they define as 'innate intellectual capacity'; and, after a short account of the more familiar tests of intelligence and a brief discussion of individual differences in regard both to general intelligence and to special abilities, they examine at considerable length the importance of mental deficiency as a contributory factor in the production of anti-social conduct.

The human organism is then described as a physical rather than a psychical mechanism; and a short outline is given of the structure of the body and the functions of its several organs. The writers explain what is the influence upon conduct both of physical development and of physical disease; and offer a clear and careful summary of what is known about the glands of internal secretion in their relation to mental abnormality.

They then return to the methods of psychology and psychiatry. They describe the better known rating-scales for the description of personality; and give short delineations of what they term 'personality-types'—the manic-depressive type, the neurotic type, the 'shut-in' type, and the ego-centric type.

Three chapters are devoted to the part played respectively by psychoses, by psycho-neuroses, and by epileptiform disturbances in producing disorders of conduct; and two additional chapters are devoted to the more special problems of suicide and of drug-addiction.

The volume concludes with a section of a more practical bearing, dealing in separate chapters with the problems of education, vocation, and criminality. Much stress is rightly laid upon maladjustment, both in school and in business, as a factor in anti-social conduct. The treatment of these topics, however, is somewhat narrow. In dealing with educational maladjustments the writers are thinking chiefly of the epileptic, the syphilitic, and the mentally defective. Milder and commoner defects of temperament and intelligence are touched upon but lightly. The problem of the neurotic school-child, however, receives due recognition. In discussing vocational maladjustments, they are again interested in the rarer problems of mental deficiency and of insanity, more than in the more ordinary causes of inefficiency and discontent. The large amount of work done on vocational guidance for more normal individuals hardly receives sufficient recognition. In discussing modern methods for the correction and prevention of delinquency they take a broader standpoint. They still emphasise the bearing of recent psychiatric knowledge upon the treatment of delinquency. But they recognise that disorders of intelligence and temperament of a milder kind equally need diagnosis and treatment.

In the main, the survey is admirably eclectic. All the more important lines of contemporary research and speculation are duly but not disproportionately noticed. The whole of the discussions are rendered admirably concrete by the introduction of nearly a hundred and forty brief case-studies to illustrate the main points made. Each chapter has attached to it an excellent bibliography for supplementary reading. The book is written in non-technical language; and thus forms an admirable introductory volume, not only for the student of psychology and medicine, but also for the parent, the teacher, the magistrate, and the social worker.

C. BURT.

The Nature of Laughter. By J. C. GREGORY. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1924. Pp. 241. Price 10s. 6d. net.

Mr Gregory has written a pedestrian book. He keeps the middle of the way, and is not to be enticed from it by any will o' the wisp of theory or woodland sprite of the imagination. To write on laughter is something of an adventure. One is for ever being invited to mount on the back of a wild hypothesis and go for a gallop over the country-side at the risk of one's scientific neck. But Mr Gregory, if he was ever tempted to escapades so undignified as that, has manfully resisted the temptation. Secretly we may suspect that he was never tempted.

And this is the more surprising perhaps, because consciously or unconsciously he has tried to model his style on that of Meredith, who had a wicked, elvish spirit. Mr Gregory's sentences spring into life on their own, by a kind of spontaneous generation and with little help from those kindly midwives of literature, conjunctions and connective phrases; and having sprung thus boldly into life they frequently die before their time in exhaustion and obscurity. The result is that his book is quite unnecessarily difficult to read. It calls for continuous effort, and the effort, to be frank, is not always worth while.

But Mr Gregory's worst vice is the vice of quotation. His book is a galimatias of other people's sayings. Indeed it would appear sometimes as though he were too weary to compose more than two sentences out of three entirely without assistance. His page is hideous with inverted commas.

The book opens with a chapter on *Some Varieties of Laughter*. It is a promising beginning, for we welcome a writer who has the courage at the outset not to minimise the seeming chaos which it will be his duty to bring into some kind of order in the sequel. Mr Gregory notes the laughter of triumph, which is the most crude, brutal and primitive form of all laughter, the laughter of scorn, contempt, superiority, self-congratulation, the laughter of greeting and of play, the laughter of amusement (comic laughter, the sense of the ludicrous), and the laughter of humour, and he admits that there may be further varieties also which he has not enumerated. Follows a chapter on *The Humanization of Laughter*. Laughter seems to have begun by being altogether cruel, "original laughter may have been wholly animosity" (p. 13); yet it probably contained from the first "the germ of future kindliness." From what source this germ came Mr Gregory does not explain, but he proceeds to trace its growth and development as man becomes more civilised and less brutally disposed towards his fellows. In the third chapter we come on the central idea of the book, the idea of relief, which in the author's opinion serves to bind all forms and varieties of laughter into something like unity. All situations in which laughter occurs are in some measure situations of relief. "A survey of the occasions of laughter discovers always...the common element of relief" (p. 25). "Relief is the constitutive element in the physical act of laughing: laughter, physiologically, releases the body from a necessity for exertion and relieves it of secretions. The characteristic of one variety of laughter seems to be a pure sense of relief. In many other varieties relief is too obvious in the associated emotions to be mistaken. When it is less obvious it can still be observed. An element so pervasive of laughter, so deeply penetrative into so many of its varieties and so characteristic of its physical expression, can hardly be other than the common, fundamental ground-plan of all laughters, the centre or source from which they all spring" (p. 29).

Here is no revolutionary theory. It is just, sober, and competent, but not new. Nor in what follows, in the chapters treating of laughter in its relation to tickling, to social life, to wit, to incongruity and the sense of the ludicrous, to instinct, and to aesthetic values, is this central thread held anything but loosely in the author's hand. We lose sight of it for long periods, while Mr Gregory, as his eclectic manner is, ranges widely through the literature of the subject, snapping up a thought here and a thought there from writers as diverse as Bacon and Mr Carveth Read. In these later chapters there is much sound wisdom. Discussions by the way also, parentheses relevant and irrelevant, often bring together much useful and pleasant information. Mr Gregory has done a service to students of literature in tracing the gradual degeneration in meaning which the word *wit* has undergone. But on the more important topics for psychology—*e.g.* the relation of laughter to instinct—and for aesthetics—*e.g.* the position of laughter in comedy—it is astonishing how little he has said that is memorable. Laughter is admittedly one of the most baffling phenomena in human conduct and experience, and it is incredible that a man of Mr Gregory's unmistakable erudition and judgment should have been able to write a long book on this topic without throwing some new light on our psychological ignorance. But so it is. If he had any valuable contribution to make he has buried it too deep under his indiscriminate borrowings from other people.

J. Y. T. GREIG

Psychoanalysis and Aesthetics. By CHARLES BAUDOUIN. Translated from the French by EDEN and CEDAR PAUL. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1924. Pp. 328. Price 16s. net.

In their preface to this study of poetic symbolism, as illustrated in the works of Emile Verhaeren, the translators remark that Baudouin is peculiarly fitted to bring the newer psychological knowledge to bear upon aesthetic criticism, seeing that he is "in one and the same person, both poet and psychologist." What Freud has done for the dream and Varendonck for the day-dream Baudouin has attempted to do for artistic creation as exemplified in this poet of the modern symbolist school. Baudouin maintains throughout the book the following two theses: (1) "that the imagination is wholly guided by the affective life," and (2) "that the symbol is the language of sensibility itself" and, as such, is not merely permissible but essential in poetry.

In the very interesting Introduction the writer deals with the origin of symbolism in general. He defines the symbol as a result of condensations, displacements and repressions. He quotes Ribot's description of the phenomena of condensation and transference, showing the importance of the affective factor as a link between separate representations. It was this factor which was ignored in the earlier psychology, which recognized chiefly association by contiguity or by similarity in the intellectual sense. Baudouin then passes on to consider the conceptions of condensation and displacement as formulated by Freud. Throughout this book its author shows a reluctance to accept the Freudian position—at least without considerable modification. His conception of the symbol would appear to be rather that of the post-Freudians than that defined with such precision in Dr Ernest Jones' paper on "The Theory of

Symbolism¹." According to Baudouin it may be the *affect* which is symbolised, for he writes: "A dream landscape, resulting from the condensation of several real landscapes whose memories are tinged with a common affect, is a symbol of that affect" (p. 24). Or again, a complex 'symbolizes' an idea: "The amazing thing is that a complex dating from earliest childhood should have come to symbolize the idea of a march forward." To the lay reader the conflicting senses in which the vocabulary of the new psychology is used is a thing scarcely less amazing. Again, Baudouin's 'symbols' display very prominently the individual conditioning factor, whilst they can apparently represent at one stage in the subject's life, ideas invested with a repressed affect and at another stage the 'sublimated' modification of that affect. Other points in which Baudouin's position differs from that of Freud are the importance of the sexual determinants in repression (p. 23), his concept of regression (p. 47) and of the Oedipus complex (p. 208) and his belief in the possibility of repressing a sublimated instinct (p. 90). Yet, though Baudouin here and there shows a certain reluctance to lay stress upon the sexual, we read on page 111: "We need not veil our faces when we discover in the human imagination, and even in the imagination of a man of genius, that which is the pendant of the caudal vestige in Plato's skeleton. We have merely to recall that the evolution of one thing from another does not mean that the two things are identical—a fact which is forgotten by those who are scandalized at the reasoning of a Nietzsche or a Freud. We do not say that Plato was himself a monkey, or that this or that poetical or religious manifestation is itself sexuality."

After the introductory chapter the plan followed by the author is to trace the course of development of the poet's mind and the expression of that development in his works. The progress is that from marked introversion, through a crisis of physical and spiritual break-down, to the establishment of equilibrium between extraversion and introversion. The part played by certain images which persist in all Verhaeren's work is discussed at length. Chief amongst these images are clock-towers and trains, both invested with feeling through experiences of childhood, both becoming tormenting to the point of madness in the three years of moral chaos, and the second image (that of the trains) acquiring a tragic significance through the poet's death by falling under a train. In this connection Baudouin refers to Freud's view that deaths apparently due to accident are frequently the result of unconscious complexes which urge the victim to involuntary suicide (p. 146).

It is impossible to follow in detail the evolution thus traced. Briefly, the stages are as follows: Early impressions (*Les tendresses premières*), loss of faith and paroxysm of sensual pleasure-seeking (*Les flamandes* and *Les moines*). Already a certain macabre note is struck and we become aware of an algolagniac tendency. Both of these features are intensified in the period of crisis (*Les soirs*, *Les débâcles*, *Les flambeaux noirs*). In this period we note the phenomenon which Baudouin terms 'autophilia,' by which he means a process of introversion of the sexual instinct. He states on p. 111, that, in this process, desexualisation of the instinct takes place. But it is not easy to see, in the passages quoted immediately afterwards, how he succeeds in denying the presence in them of crude sexuality in no disguised form. Together with this autophilia there are manifestations of asceticism which Baudouin recognizes as proceeding in part from the will to power. There follows the period of conversion and deliverance, the recovery of balance following on the freeing of unconscious forces. In

¹ *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, Chap. vii.

Verhaeren's case 'conversion' meant the turning outwards towards the world and humanity and it was effected through his love for the woman whom he married. We note the revival of interest in life, the need for action, the awakening of pity, and a tendency to a more objective art (*Les villages illuminés, Les campagnes hallucinées, Les villes tentaculaires*, etc.). Baudouin comments on the 'symbols with two faces' which appear in these works. We have, for instance, the picture of the country-people's exodus to the towns, which is the objective aspect, whilst the subjective aspect is the poet's emerging from the 'garden' of introversion to the 'factory' of extraversion. Chapter VI is headed 'Life in all its ardour' and contains an account of some of the poems of the final period of equilibrium (*Les forces tumultueuses, La multiple splendeur*). In particular we notice the development of a pantheistic love of the world and a movement (paralleled in the works of Goethe) from the more subjective, romantic to the objective, classic form of art. The chapter entitled "An Oedipus Trilogy" contains an analysis of Verhaeren's three dramas: *Le cloître, Philippe II* and *Hélène de Sparte*, in each of which the poet's Oedipus complex finds clear expression.

The concluding chapter outlines a psychology of art. Baudouin holds that, while psychological criticism cannot replace that which is artistic and literary, yet it may be a valuable aid. "It may," he says, "...furnish the critics with a more objective outlook. Aesthetic appreciation will probably remain a subjective thing. It is no less subjective than physical pain. But when physiological science tells us positively that such or such a pain corresponds to such or such a lesion we are given an objective basis for physical suffering.... This is the way in which we may hope to see psychology aiding criticism" (p. 294). He shows further that those poems which give expression to the deepest emotions will react most powerfully upon the reader, though neither author nor reader need be conscious of the real object of the emotions. In an earlier chapter Baudouin pointed out that the rhythm of poetry induces a slightly hypnotic condition, a dream-like state, in which the mind responds specially readily to the artist's feeling (p. 26).

Finally, he reminds his readers of William James' distinction between 'existential judgments' and 'propositions of value.' The latter, he says, remain the prerogative of criticism. "Psychology will do well to keep to the 'judgment of fact'" (p. 299).

The book contains a portrait of Verhaeren and a facsimile of the MS. of a poem, as well as a beautiful and hitherto unpublished prose poem: "Ce soir."

The decision of the translators to give the French version of the poems, followed by as literal a translation as possible, is to be commended.

CECIL BAINES.

The New Psychology and the Parent. By H. CRICHTON MILLER, M.A., M.D.
London: Jarrolds, Ltd. Pp. 255. Price 6s.

Dr Crichton Miller is a sturdy idealist and, more fortunate perhaps than many of us, is able to find his idealism inherent in the so-called New Psychology. Although Dr Crichton Miller is not responsible for the term, the label "New Psychology" is surely to be deprecated; it savours too much of a revelation or a cult, of which there are too many about just now, and too little of a science

which can never be wholly or even mainly new, but, if it is to be trusted at all, can only be the expression in each generation of a growth in which the newest shoots of knowledge are in vital unity with the experience and observation of the past.

Although some of us may differ from Dr Crichton Miller in many directions, there can be no doubt that the book under review contains much good common-sense advice to parents, and as it is to them the book is addressed, it has fulfilled its purpose if the advice is good and not bad. Good parents will get help from the book, bad parents probably will not read it; but, after all, the instincts of parenthood are older than the New Psychology, and can perhaps be trusted to make a fair average of successes in the business. I do not write this flippantly; this book and many others of the same kind do undoubtedly contain much good advice, but there is a real danger of making the whole business of parenthood and childhood too self-conscious an affair altogether.

Although his conclusions are sometimes adapted and modified in order to fit in with his fundamental conceptions of the meaning and purpose of life, Dr Crichton Miller is in the main a disciple of Jung in his interpretation of psychological mechanism. In this book, as in so many others of a similar character, we are often reminded of the advice given by Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch in his lectures on the Art of Writing; speaking on the difficulties of this art, he advises his students always to call spades spades and be prepared always to double and redouble spades. This advice is very applicable to much of the psychology of Jung; in the first instance, spades may be called very clearly, but when in the progress of the game difficulties arise—difficulties generally inherent in the temperament of the psychologist—then, often with much erudition and great ingenuity, the original spade call is shifted to another and more attractive suit. It is very fascinating, but it is not the game.

Dr Crichton Miller gives a very interesting example of this in his book. Speaking of the interpretation of dreams, he says: "Sexual symbolism has been from all time a racial symbol of the interpretation of character. Our primitive man has always looked upon sexual life as a test, so to speak, of character; potency, virility and sexual relations have been taken as the symbols of human communion from all time. Therefore a great many pictures that appear in our dreams, which on the face of them are grotesquely sexual, have no narrow or physical sexual meaning at all, but refer to factors of character growth—spiritual factors, moral factors and so on—and do not really refer to actual creative sexuality." This seems to me a good example of changing suit in the middle of the game. If parents interpret the dreams of their children on these lines, they will tend to bring up more prigs than saints, and certainly more prigs than clear thinking men and women, taught to face reality as it is.

Apart from all questions of the clash of different schools of Psychology, I find it difficult to reconcile some of Dr Crichton Miller's statements with my own experience and that of many other clinical psychologists; for instance, in speaking of the emotional development of the girl, he states that the normal girl does not psychologically discover her father until between the age of 15-18; if this is true, then in my experience the normal girl is a very rare bird. Again, in discussing homosexuality, Dr Crichton Miller states that he has known a boy become homosexual as a result of a severe rebuff in his first attempt at a heterosexual attachment; that such a rebuff could be a true cause of homosexuality is contrary to all modern theories of inversion, and the case stated

like this may add a really needless terror to parents watching the developing mating instinct in their sons.

This book is not intended in any way to be a scientific treatise, but there is plenty of good psychology in it, as well as plenty of wise advice based on wide clinical experience and on an attitude towards life which can only make for sound altruism and high purpose.

MAURICE B. WRIGHT.

Opening Doors. By JOHN THOMSON, M.D. Oliver & Boyd, 1923. Pp. 20.
Price 1s. 6d.

This excellent little book deals with the special needs of blind, deaf, or crippled children. The subject-matter is divided into seven sections, each of which is defined by clearly worded headings. The author describes the signs which accompany the infant's growth in mental power, and urges the importance of early treatment when there is any marked absence of the usual activities of a normal child.

Considerable emphasis is laid on the formation of good habits, stimulation and training of the will, and the encouragement of voluntary effort. A timely warning is uttered against stressing any difference from other children which arises from the infirmity of the baby, and a wise reminder is given that no indulgence must be permitted which leads to the shirking of irksome duties on the plea of illness.

Opening Doors can be recommended to all Welfare Workers, and it should be read by every mother whose child, by awkwardness or slowness in development, gives cause for anxiety about its mental or physical capacity. The delicate understanding shown by the writer in the arduous task of the mother will serve to encourage her in that patience and perseverance which he so strongly inculcates. Even the boredom and irritability of the baby under training meets with sympathetic consideration. This recognition of the infant's point of view is as welcome as it is unusual.

L. YARDE BUNYARD.

NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS

Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, 1923. Part 3.

The third number of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* for 1923 is a special one in celebration of Ferenczi's fiftieth birthday, and contains, besides his portrait, a list of his scientific works and an editorial notice acknowledging his many services to the psycho-analytic movement.

Dr Ernest Jones' paper on "Cold, Disease and Birth" has been published in English in the third edition of his *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*. He believes that the idea that cold air induces disease is connected, by false symbolic associations, with the initial experience of birth (regarded as an injury analogous to castration).

Dr Josef Eisler (Budapest) contributes a paper on hysterical uterine phenomena, in which he considers the possible effect of hysteria upon (a) the mucous membrane and (b) the muscles of the uterus. Where no biological failure in development can be detected the conditions of amenorrhoea and dysmenorrhoea have been labelled "nervous" by gynaecologists. Eisler endeavours to show that amenorrhoea may be a manifestation of the masculine complex, a conversion-symptom motivated by the desire to be a man, the organ in question refusing to perform its function. A possible complication is that of "vicarious" menstruation in which there is periodic bleeding from some other organ (haemoptysis and haematemesis). This connection has been recognized by French gynaecologists. It indicates displacement from the genital to other erotogenic zones. He shows further that psychical factors may cause irregularity in the menstrual periods—e.g. the subject's desire to protect herself against her husband. As regards the muscular system, data are insufficient. Eisler gives two examples, however. The first is that of spontaneous miscarriage where no organic factor can be detected. He believes that in two cases which he quotes the psychical factor was the motive of revenge for neglect by the husband, a motive cherished by "nervous" women of the Medea type.

The second illustration is that of a case in which parturition was unduly delayed, labour lasting for four and a half days. A subsequent analysis of the patient revealed strong anal erotism and, in accordance with the familiar equation child = faeces, Eisler concludes that we have here an instance of the effect upon sexuality of repressed anal erotism.

Dr J. Hárnik (Berlin) contributes an article on the destiny of narcissism in men and in women. He shows that, in the latter, the primary narcissism is displaced at puberty on to the idea of physical beauty, whilst in males it remains focussed on the genitals, though it may undergo partial displacement on to the general idea of manly strength. (A translation of this paper has appeared in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*.)

Freud has shown that in hysteria "genitalization" of specific parts of the body may take place, whilst in poetic and artistic talent the organ used, e.g. the mouth or hand, may similarly undergo a heightening of libidinal cathexis. In his paper "Organ-libido and Talent" Dr Imre Hermann (Budapest) attempts to formulate a theory of the psychogenesis of artistic talent, his idea being that, whereas as a rule the "peripheral" processes of drawing and speech become subordinated to the "central" (conscious, logical) processes, the peripheral processes are not so subordinated when there exists an increased libidinal cathexis of the particular organ. He believes that it is this libidinal stress which can be inherited rather than the specific artistic gift. He quotes examples to show the existence of the "personal beauty" complex in artists and the "seer" complex in poets and scientists, and endeavours to establish a connection between pain, the heightening of the libidinal cathexis of the brain (as the main centre of narcissism) and the intellectual achievements of great thinkers. Thought, he argues, may act as a defence against pain, receiving the charge of ego-interest which the subject withdraws from the pain itself.

"From the Pathoneuroses to the Pathology of the Neuroses" is the title of an article by Dr Stephan Hollós (Budapest). The materialistic psychiatry of the nineteenth century has been succeeded by psycho-analysis, which avoids on the one hand the pitfall of attributing psychic phenomena directly to anatomical sources and on the other that of transcendental speculation. Freud's theory of the instincts establishes the thesis that they form the link between the somatic and the psychic, and the aim of psycho-analysis should be to find a unity in organic and mental phenomena. This unity is illustrated in the conversion symptoms of hysteria, and instinctive impulses have their effect on the beating of the heart, the irritability of the sympathetic system, etc.

Ferenczi in his work on the pathoneuroses concludes that any injury to, or morbid change in, a bodily organ which is especially strongly invested with libido or easily identified with the whole ego (e.g. the face, the genitals) may give rise to narcissistic neurosis, where narcissism is constitutionally very marked. In Ferenczi's and Hollós' joint work on paralysis they went on to show that a "pathopsychosis" may ensue from a cerebral lesion. In this case, however, the organic injury or morbid process is not directly consciously perceived, nor is interest consciously concentrated upon it, as in the pathoneuroses. Such diseases of the brain result particularly from toxic processes with their accompaniment of fever, in which a constant *struggle* goes on (between toxic and anti-toxic agents). Hollós suggests that this struggle reflects endopsychic processes by which an attempt is made to effect a secondary cathexis of the cells from which libido has been momentarily detached by the injury, and that this heightening of the cathexis of the injured part is a necessary condition of recovery. Similar phenomena of rhythmic struggle or effort occur in psychogenic diseases, and their significance is the same; in delirium the struggle is acute, in paranoid diseases it is chronic. The writer stresses the fact that psycho-analytical theory admits no sharp distinction between organic and non-organic bases in disease, and that even in functional psychogenic disease there must be a concrete pathological basis. He draws an analogy between the rôle of the cerebral lesion in organic diseases where there is a rich psychic content apart from the phenomenon of struggle and that of the somatic stimuli in dream-formation; that rôle is, to excite psychic processes which bring into play infantile fixations. In the functional psychoses it is to be assumed that the brain (the ego-organ *par excellence*) is in some way pathologically affected, possibly as a secondary consequence of the effect produced on the endocrine secretions by failure to "bind" the libido.

Melanie Klein gives a series of examples to illustrate the libidinal determination of school and lessons in the minds of children. (A translation of this paper will appear in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*.)

Dr Siegmund Pfeiffer analyses the speech of Mercutio in *Romeo and Juliet* (Act I, Scene IV) to show that the conception of Queen Mab is derived from the mother-imago in both its tender and terrible aspects. The first part of the speech describes wish-fulfilling dreams and the second anxiety dreams. Both are inspired by Mab, i.e. behind the anxiety dream lies the latent wish which repression converts into anxiety.

Dr Sándor Radó (Budapest) contributes the analysis of the dream of a patient during a course of psycho-analytical treatment.

Aurel Kolnai (Vienna) discusses the position of psycho-analysis in the history of thought, comparing and contrasting it with various modern intellectual movements. He touches on the services rendered to determinism, positivism and rationalism by psycho-analytical theory in reducing to scientific formulae much that was hitherto mere nebulous speculation and by the psycho-analytical method in dealing with phenomena without a preconceived system of values. On the other hand, psycho-analysis, through its theory of the unconscious and of the instincts, has struck a blow at physiological materialism. The writer refers to the gulf between suggestive-hypnotic therapy with its blind faith and yielding to authority and psycho-analytical therapy, the aim of which is to make possible a critical self-direction. Instead of attempting to combat individual phenomena, e.g. alcoholism, psycho-analysis seeks to comprehend the whole mental structure, and, by recognizing the infantile fixations upon which

such phenomena are based, to bring about intensive changes in the psyche. In contrast to modern occult theories, *e.g.* Christian Science, analysis does not demand antecedent belief in the result of given procedures. Such belief is evidence of the idea of the omnipotence of thought and of subordination to the pleasure principle. Psycho-analysis seeks to extend the field of consciousness and to recognize, but not to give free rein to, the unconscious. The psycho-analytical theory has made popular beliefs more comprehensive (*e.g.* in symbolism), giving a scientific interpretation of ideas affectively determined. As regards its relation to ethical thought, Kolnai points out that psycho-analysis, by the loosening of repressions, makes possible the conscious acceptance or rejection (leading to sublimation) of instinctive impulses, while the reality principle takes the place of the pleasure principle. The dissection of the concept of sexuality helps to show the true meaning of certain disguised sources of pleasure and to enable the individual to form ideals which are in accordance with facts. The writer concludes his paper with a comparison between the place occupied by psycho-analysis in the intellectual realm and that of the theories of Marx in the sociological realm.

Dr Géza Róheim (Budapest), in an article on Sacred Money in Melanesia, offers a contribution to the phylogenesis of the interest in money.

Dr Géza Szilágyi (Budapest), in a paper entitled "The Young Spiritist," gives a psycho-analytical study of an abnormal personality.

CECIL BAINES.

The University of Chicago Press

General Psychology. By WALTER S. HUNTER. A survey of psychological subject-matter from the behavioristic point of view. An introductory book with the emphasis upon the concrete experimental facts so far as they are available.

xiv and 352 pages, crown 12mo, cloth; 11s. net

The Psychology of Child Development. By IRVING KING. A study of the growing mind, that is of particular service to the teacher.

xxii and 266 pages, 12mo, cloth; 8s. 3d. net

The Psychological and Ethical Aspects of Mormon Group Life. By E. E. ERICKSEN. A careful investigation of the complexity of Mormon group life and communal sentiments.

x and 104 pages, crown 8vo, cloth; 8s. 3d. net

Essays in Experimental Logic. By JOHN DEWEY. Notes on thought and ideas, their stimuli, character, and objects, presented from a behavioristic point of view.

viii and 444 pages, 12mo, cloth; 19s. 6d. net

The Educational Situation. By JOHN DEWEY.

104 pages, 12mo, paper; 2s. 9d. net

Psychology and Social Practice. By JOHN DEWEY.

42 pages, 12mo, paper; 1s. 6d. net

Studies from the Psychological Laboratory. By JAMES R. ANGELL.
Vol. III, No. 2.

356 pages, royal 8vo, paper; 2s. 9d. net

The Mental Traits of Sex. By HELEN BRADFORD THOMPSON.

viii and 188 pages, royal 8vo, paper; 7s. net

The Control of Hunger in Health and Disease. By ANTON J. CARLSON.

viii and 320 pages, 8vo, cloth; 14s. net

Heredity and Eugenics. By WILLIAM E. CASTLE, JOHN M. COULTER, CHARLES B. DAVENPORT, EDWARD M. EAST, and WILLIAM L. TOWER.

312 pages, 8vo, cloth; 16s. 6d. net

AGENTS FOR THE BRITISH EMPIRE (EXCEPT CANADA)

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: Fetter Lane, London, E.C. 4

CONTENTS

(All Rights reserved.)

	PAGE
J. C. MCKERROW. Neuroses	85
ALFRED CARVER. Primary Identification and Mysticism	102
E. H. CONNELL. The Significance of the Idea of Death in the Neurotic Mind	115
J. C. HILL. Poetry and the Unconscious	125
EDWARD GLOVER. The Significance of the Mouth in Psycho-Analysis	134
CRITICAL NOTICE	156
REVIEWS	162
NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS	176

The *British Journal of Psychology* is issued by the British Psychological Society in two Sections, a *General Section* and a *Medical Section*, now entitled *The British Journal of Medical Psychology*. Each Section will appear in parts quarterly, the size and price of each part varying with the amount of material available.

The subscription price, per volume of about 350 pages, Royal 8vo, payable in advance, is 30s. net per volume (post-free) for either section. Subscriptions may be sent to any Bookseller, or to the Cambridge University Press, Fetter Lane, London, E.C. 4.

Volumes I–III, *Medical Section*, are now ready. Price for Volumes I and II in four parts, paper covers, 25s. net per volume. Volume III in four parts, paper covers, 30s. net. Quotations can be given for binding cases and for binding subscribers' sets, also for bound copies of back volumes.

Members of the British Psychological Society receive the *General Section* of the *Journal* gratis. Members of the Medical Section of the Society receive also the *British Journal of Medical Psychology* gratis. Information concerning Membership may be obtained from the Hon. Secretary of the *Medical Section* of the Society, Dr JOHN RICKMAN, 26 Devonshire Place, W.1.

Papers for publication in the *British Journal of Medical Psychology* should be sent to Dr T. W. MITCHELL, Hadlow, Kent. Those for publication in the *General Section* of the *British Journal of Psychology* should be sent to F. C. BARTLETT, The Psychological Laboratory, University of Cambridge.

Contributors receive twenty-five copies of their papers free. Additional copies may be had at cost price; these should be ordered when the final proof is returned.

Quotations for binding cases and for binding subscribers' sets can be obtained from the publishers.

The Cambridge University Press has appointed the University of Chicago Press agents for the sale of both Sections of *The British Journal of Psychology* in the United States of America, and has authorised them to charge the following subscription price:—\$7.00 net for either Section.